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I’ve done this because I love the act of writing, which
is to say I love the act of discovery, of revelation, and
then the attempt to share that revelation in all its
fullness and clarity.
You can never be sure how many people will want to
share in that feeling.
—Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014)
This is a slightly expanded version of my PhD thesis,
which was accepted by Brandeis University’s Martin
A. Fisher School of Physics in May of 2015. In turn,
that thesis was based on research I began at the New
England Complex Systems Institute.
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1 Abstract
In a complex system, the individual components are neither so tightly coupled or
correlated that they can all be treated as a single unit, nor so uncorrelated that they
can be approximated as independent entities. Instead, patterns of interdependency
lead to structure at multiple scales of organization. Evolution excels at producing
such complex structures. In turn, the existence of these complex interrelationships
within a biological system affects the evolutionary dynamics of that system. I present
a mathematical formalism for multiscale structure, grounded in information theory,
which makes these intuitions quantitative, and I show how dynamics defined in terms
of population genetics or evolutionary game theory can lead to multiscale organization.
For complex systems, “more is different,” and I address this from several perspectives.
Spatial host–consumer models demonstrate the importance of the structures which
can arise due to dynamical pattern formation. Evolutionary game theory reveals the
novel effects which can result from multiplayer games, nonlinear payoffs and ecological
stochasticity. Replicator dynamics in an environment with mesoscale structure relates
to generalized conditionalization rules in probability theory.
The idea of natural selection “acting at multiple levels” has been mathematized in
a variety of ways, not all of which are equivalent. We will face down the confusion,
using the experience developed over the course of this thesis to clarify the situation.
Chapter 2 applies the general abstract framework of multiscale structure to some
geometrical examples, to build intuition for it, and then connects it with population
genetics and network theory. Chapter 3 studies emergent multiscale structure in a
spatial evolutionary ecosystem. Next, Chapter 4 takes a different approach to the no-
tion of “more is different,” using both simulations and dynamical systems theory to
understand evolutionary games in which the interactions do not resolve into pairs.
I have set aside Chapter 5 to summarize the parts of probability theory which will be
necessary for the following two chapters, because I’ve yet to find a textbook which has
the necessary stuff all in one place. Chapter 6 is purely analytical: I break a theorem
from the literature, show how to fix it and then point out where it will break again. The
goal for Chapter 7 is to provide analytical arguments for at least a few of the things
seen in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Specifically, I aim to use universality to predict critical
exponents for phase transitions.
Chapters 8 and 9 are mostly about explaining other people’s work in a way I can
understand. Chapter 10 is essentially a concept piece, intended to sketch out the pos-
sibility of new interesting problems.
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2 Multiscale Structure
2.1 Introduction
A century and odd years ago, the philosopher William James asked [2],
What shall we call a thing anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve
out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human
purposes. For me, this whole ‘audience’ is one thing, which grows now
restless, now attentive. I have no use at present for its individual units, so
I don’t consider them. So of an ‘army,’ of a ‘nation.’ But in your own eyes,
ladies and gentlemen, to call you ‘audience’ is an accidental way of taking
you. The permanently real things for you are your individual persons. To
an anatomist, again, those persons are but organisms, and the real things
are the organs. Not the organs, so much as their constituent cells, say the
histologists; not the cells, but their molecules, say in turn the chemists.
The Jamesian view is that none of these scientific disciplines ought to be taken as more
“fundamental” than another. Each must prove its own worth by way of its pragmatic
utility; none is by necessity merely the reduction of another to a special case.
In the study of complex systems, we face this directly. A complex system exhibits
structure at many scales of organization. For example, one can study human beings
at any magnification, from the molecular level to the societal, and an entire science
flourishes at each level. We have developed a formalism for making this intuition
mathematically precise and quantitatively useful, employing the tools of information
theory [3,4,5,6,7,8]. To explore how this formalism can be used, and to make clear the
intricacies of multiscale information theory, we shall in this chapter apply that theory
to an illustrative class of geometrical problems. Having done this, we will be in a good
position to use it to study collective behaviors in systems developed in mathematical
biology.
Thinking clearly about what we mean by “complexity” is important for biology,
and few problems bring this home more clearly than the so-called C-value paradox.
This is the puzzle that the sizes of species’ genomes do not correlate with any obvious,
intuitive or meaningful measure of organismal complicatedness [9]. A species’ C-value
is the characteristic amount of DNA which occurs in one set of chromosomes within
its nucleus. It can be measured in picograms, for a physical unit, or in base pairs, for
a more informational one. (A trillionth of a gram roughly works out to a billion base
pairs.) One might think that species with larger C-values would be more “complex”
by some fairly apparent standard. However, nature has not turned out that way. The
domestic onion, Allium cepa, has approximately 16 billion base pairs on one set of
11
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chromosomes. This is roughly five times the total size of the human genome [10]. And
the problem goes beyond the check to our pride: life forms which seem by all accounts
to be comparably complicated can have widely separated genome sizes. For example,
lungfish can have genomes 350 times larger than those of pufferfish [10]. Even close
evolutionary proximity is no guarantee that C-values will agree. Zea mays, the maize
plant, diverged from the teosinte grass Zea luxurians about 140,000 years ago [11], and
in that time, its genome size has increased by half [9, 12].
So, the puzzle: what does all that extra genetic information do? The answer, in
brief terms, is basically nothing.
Nor are we humans making much use of our own genomes, percentage-wise. Eukary-
otic DNA contains, as a general rule, vast supplies of junk [9,10,13,14,15,16,17,18,19].
Some DNA specifies the sequences of proteins, and is designated “coding” DNA. Other
stretches of the double helix play a role in regulating which genes are active and when.
Still other portions of the genome are transcribed into the RNA components of cell-
ular machinery like ribosomes. But even with all these accounted for, there remain
sequences which are, identifiably, detritus.
The C-value “paradox” is not so paradoxical after all, then: the variable amounts of
genomic bloat due to nonfunctional DNA make C-value variations a rather unsurprising
phenomenon. The presence of a large quantity of nonfunctional DNA can have a
biological effect, since it takes up space and increases the resources required for cells
to replicate. For example, salamanders carry a truly remarkable amount of genetic
information, with different species possessing genomes four to thirty-five times the
size of our own [10]. Plainly, it is possible to make a salamander using far less DNA
than some species of them have. Among salamander species, larger genome size is
correlated with slower regeneration of lost limbs, suggesting that elevated genome size
might be somewhat costly [20]. The essential points are, first, that this cost is, if
it exists, not on the whole deleterious enough for natural selection to act strongly
against it [10], and second, that it is due to the quantity of DNA present, not its
specific sequence.
Moreover, the presence of DNA detritus suggets a way of thinking about complexity
more quantitatively. The matter is one of effective description. Let us focus, for the
moment, on the complexity of a genome itself, rather than of the body plan associated
with it. Our intuition leads us to say that we require more information to describe
a more complicated genome. However, large stretches of a eukaryotic genome will be
junk sequences, which can be switched with other, equally nonfunctional sequences or
even deleted entirely with little or no effect. This suggests a strategy: we can describe
the functional portion of the genome—the protein-coding genes, the regulatory regions
and so forth—faithfully, and then we can loosely characterize the rest. We take careful
notes about the functional parts, and then we fill in the rest with broad brush-strokes.
A coarse-grained description of the nonfunctional portion is adequate, because any
other nucleotide sequence which satisfies the same coarse-grained criteria could be
swapped in for the actual junk.
In turn, we can apply the same method to the functional portion. Multiple nucleotide
sequences are translated to the same protein, because multiple codons in the genetic
code stand for the same amino acid [21,22]. We can, therefore, exploit this redundancy
12
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and use a smaller number of characters to represent what it is most important to
know about each protein-coding gene. Then, multiple amino-acid sequences are often
biologically equivalent to one another, because the substitution of one amino acid for a
similar one does not drastically change the resulting protein [23]. So, we can describe a
protein in a coarse-grained way, and so on. Indeed, this plurality of possible sequences
compatible with the same coarse-grained description is biologically essential: given the
amount of DNA which human cells carry, we would otherwise be ground under heel
by the genetic load of deleterious mutations. It also affects the rate of evolution, since
a population can more easily explore the space of possible genomes when there is a
network of neutral paths through it [24].
The general lesson is that partial descriptions of a system can have increased utility
if they can exploit patterns and redundancies. Furthermore, the way the utility of
a description increases as we allow more information to be used tells us about the
structure of the system we are describing. This approach is different from the way
information theory has typically been used in the past, because we are considering scale
and information as complementary quantities [3]. We measure the effort which goes
into a description in units of information, whereas the effectiveness of that description
is the scale of what it captures.
We now turn to mathematizing this idea, following earlier work by the author and
others on multiscale structure and information theory. The resulting formalism will be
applicable at levels from the intracellular to the societal. This will allow us to discuss
descriptions, utilities and related concepts beginning from an axiomatic starting point
(so that we will not need molecular biology in order to define utility). With these
concepts developed and some illustrative examples analyzed, we will then apply them
to evolutionary dynamics.
2.1.1 Information-Theoretic Axioms for Structured Systems
For convenience, we review the basic axioms of the multiscale information formalism
which we developed in earlier work [3]. In this formalism, a system is defined by a
set of components, A, and an information function, H, which assigns a nonnegative
real number to each subset U ⊂ A. This number H(U) is the amount of information
needed to describe the components in U . To qualify as an information function, H
must satisfy two axioms:
• Monotonicity: The information in a subset U that is contained in a subset V
cannot have more information than V . That is, H(U) ≤ H(V ).
• Strong subadditivity: Given two subsets, the information contained in both can-
not exceed the information in each of them separately minus the information in
their intersection:
H(U ∪ V ) ≤ H(U) +H(V )−H(U ∩ V ). (2.1)
Given an information function H, we can construct functions which express different
kinds of possible correlations among a system’s components, such as the mutual in-
13
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formation, which is the difference between the total information of two components
considered separately and the joint information of those two components taken to-
gether:
I(a; b) = H(a) +H(b)−H(a, b). (2.2)
By extension, we can also define the tertiary mutual information
I(a; b; c) = H(a) +H(b) +H(c)−H(a, b)−H(b, c)−H(a, c) +H(a, b, c). (2.3)
This can be extended to higher scales in the same fashion, defining shared information
for sets of four or more components.
One way to understand the meaning of our axioms is the following. Take a set of
questions, which are all mutually independent in the sense that answering one doesn’t
help to answer any other, or any combination of others. Each question pertains to
one or more components of a system. Components have nonzero shared information
if one or more questions pertain to both of them. In other words, if each question
is represented by a point, then each component is a set of points, and set-theoretic
intersection defines shared information.
As mentioned earlier, this formalism treats scale and information as complemen-
tary quantities. Often, “scale” is thought of in terms of length or time (for example,
the James quote above organizes the learned disciplines essentially by the geometri-
cal dimensions of what they study). For an axiomatic development, a more general
definition is appropriate, and so for our purposes, “scale” will refer to the number of
components within a system which are involved in an interrelationship.
2.1.2 Indices of Structure
To specify the structure of a system according to our definition, it is necessary to
specify the information content of each subset U ⊂ A. Because the number of such
subsets grows exponentially with the number of components, complete descriptions of
structure are impractical for large systems. Therefore, we require statistics which can
convey the general character of a system’s structure without specifying it completely.
Using an index of structure, we can summarize how a system is organized and compare
that pattern of organization to the patterns manifested by other systems.
One such index of structure is the complexity profile, introduced in [5] to formalize
the intuition that a genuinely complex system exhibits structure at multiple scales.
The complexity profile is a real-valued function C(k) that specifies the amount of in-
formation contained in interdependencies of scale k and higher. C(k) can be computed
using a combinatorial formula which takes as input the values of the information func-
tion H on all subsets U ⊂ A [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. First, we define the quantity Q(j) as the
sum of the joint information of all collections of j components:
Q(j) =
∑
i1,...,ij
H(ai1 , . . . , aij ). (2.4)
14
2.1 Introduction
The complexity profile can be computed using the formula
C(k) =
N−1∑
j=N−k
(−1)j+k−N
(
j
j + k −N
)
Q(j + 1), (2.5)
where N = |A| is the number of components in the system. Generally, C(k) captures
the amount of information contained in interrelationships of order k and higher. We
shall illustrate this in the next section with a few examples.
The complexity profile satisfies a conservation law : the sum of C(k) over all scales
k is ∑
k
C(k) =
∑
a∈A
H(a). (2.6)
That is, the sum of the complexity over all scales is given by the individual information
assigned to each component, regardless of the components’ interrelationships.
Another useful index of structure is the Marginal Utility of Information, or MUI [3].
While the complexity profile characterizes the amount of information that is present in
the system behavior at different scales, the MUI is based on descriptive utility of limited
information through its ability to describe behavior of multiple components. Informally
speaking, we describe a system by “investing” a certain amount of information, and
for any amount of information invested, an optimal description yields the best possible
characterization of the system. The MUI expresses how the usefulness of an optimal
description increases as we invest more information. We can define the MUI precisely,
starting with the basic axioms of information functions, by using notions from linear
programming [3].
In general outline, one constructs the MUI as follows. Let A be a system, defined
per our formalism as a set of components A and an information function H. Then,
let d be a descriptor, an entity which conveys information about the system A. To
express this mathematically, we consider the new, larger system made by conjoining d
with the set of components A and defining an information function on the subsets of
this expanded set. The information function for the augmented system reduces to that
of the original for all those interdependencies which do not involve the descriptor d,
and it expresses the shared information between d and the original system. The utility
of d is the sum of the shared information between d and each component within A:
u(d) =
∑
a∈A
I(d; a). (2.7)
This counts, in essence, the total scale of the system’s organization that is captured
by d. We define the optimal utility U(y) as the utility of the best possible descriptor
having H(d) = y. The MUI is then the derivative of U(y).
How do these structure indices capture the organization of a system? We can illus-
trate the general idea by way of a conceptual example. Consider a crew of movers,
who are carrying furniture from a house to a truck. They can be acting largely inde-
pendently, as when each mover is carrying a single chair, or they can be working in
15
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concert, transporting a large item that requires collective effort to move, like a grand
piano. In the former case, knowing what any one mover is doing does not say much
about what specific act any other mover is engaged with at that time. Information
about the crew applies at the scale of an individual mover. By contrast, in the latter
case, the behavior of one mover can be inferred from that of another, and information
about their actions is applicable at a larger scale. From these general considerations,
it follows that for a system of largely independent movers, C(k) is large at small k and
drops off rapidly, whereas when the movers are working collectively, C(k) is small for
low k and remains nonzero for larger k. When the movers act mostly independently,
we cannot do much better at describing their behavior than by specifying the behavior
of each mover in turn. Therefore, as we invest more information into describing the
system, the gain in utility of our description remains essentially constant. For the case
of independent movers, then, the MUI curve is low and flat. On the other hand, when
the movers are acting in concert, a brief description can have a high utility, so the MUI
curve is peaked at the origin and falls off sharply. Heuristically speaking, we can in
this example think of the complexity profile and the MUI as reflections of each other.
When we develop these indices quantitatively, we find in fact that this is exactly true
in a broad class of systems.
Both the complexity profile and the MUI obey a convenient sum rule. If a system
separates into two independent subsystems, the complexity profile of the whole is the
sum of the profiles of the pieces, and likewise for the MUI. This property of both
structure indices follows from the basic information-function axioms [3]. In the next
section, we will see examples of systems which illustrate the sum rule for both the
MUI and the complexity profile.
2.2 Examples
2.2.1 Three-Component Systems
To explore the consequences of our definitions, it is helpful to begin with simple exam-
ples. Following the recent review article about the multiscale complexity formalism [3],
we study the following four systems, each of which contains three binary variables.
• Example A: Three independent bits: The system comprises three components,
and knowing the state of any one bit provides no inference about the state of any
other. As a whole, the system can be in any one of eight possible configurations,
with no preference given to any of the eight possibilities.
• Example B: Three completely interdependent bits: The system as a whole is either
in state 000 or state 111, with no preference given to either option. Knowing the
value of any one bit allows the inference of both other bits.
• Example C: Independent blocks of dependent bits: Each component is equally
likely to take the value 0 or 1; however, the first two components always take the
same value, while the third can take either value independently of the coupled
pair.
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• Example D: The 2+1 parity bit system: Three bits which can exist in the states
110, 101, 011, or 000 with equal probability. Each of the three bits is equal to the
parity (0 if even; 1 if odd) of the sum of the other two. Any two of the bits are
statistically independent of each other, but the three as a whole are constrained
to have an even sum.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the complexity profiles and the MUI curves for these
example systems.
Figure 2.1: Complexity profiles for the three-component example systems A, B, C and
D, computed using Eq. (2.5). Examples A and B illustrate the general fact
that highly interdependent systems have tall and narrow complexity pro-
files, whereas the profiles of systems with largely independent components
are low and wide. Example C, which we can think of as the combination of
two independent subsystems, illustrates the complexity profile’s sum rule.
Finally, example D, the parity-bit system, showcases the emergence of neg-
ative shared information. Note that the total signed area bounded by each
curve is 3 units. (Figure reproduced from [3].)
2.2.2 Minimal Incidence Geometry
To develop additional intuition about our information-theoretic formalism, and to
build a bridge between different areas of mathematics, we shall apply the information
theory of multicomponent systems to incidence geometry. The premise of incidence
geometry is that one has a set of points and a set of lines which connect them, satisfying
some conditions which abstract basic notions of geometry. To wit, for any incidence
geometry, every line contains at least two distinct points, and for every line, there exist
one or more points not lying on that line. We relate geometry to information theory
in the following way: Ascribe to each point 1 unit of information, and define each line
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Figure 2.2: MUI plots for the three-component example systems A, B, C and D.
Note that, as with the complexity profiles in Figure 2.1, the total area
bounded by each curve is 3 units. Furthermore, for examples A, B and C,
the complexity profile and the MUI are reflections (generalized inverses)
of each other. This is generally true for systems which are the disjoint
union of internally interdependent blocks [3], but it is not the case for the
parity-bit system, example D. (Figure reproduced from [3].)
to be a system component. Then for any incidence geometry, the information ascribed
to a component is always greater than or equal to 2, and the information within the
whole system is always greater than 2.
The examples we shall consider from incidence geometry will illustrate most of the
key features of the multiscale information theory formalism. The noteworthy exception
is that incidence geometry does not provide examples of negative multivariate mutual
information. This is a subtlety which can arise when one considers dependencies among
three or more components [3], as we saw in example D. However, it will not be a major
concern for the models from mathematical biology which we will study later in this
chapter.
The simplest possible incidence geometry contains 3 points and 3 lines. We depict
this construction in Figure 2.3.
If we denote the three lines by l1, l2 and l3, as in Figure 2.3, then because each line
contains exactly two points, we have
H(l1) = H(l2) = H(l3) = 2, (2.8)
while because any two lines intersect in exactly one point,
I(l1; l2) = I(l2; l3) = I(l1; l3) = 1. (2.9)
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1l
2l 3l
Figure 2.3: The simplest possible incidence geometry. Each of the three lines contains
two distinct points, and for each line, there exists exactly one point which
does not lie on that line. When we associate a unit of information to
each point, the shared information of any pair of lines is the information
ascribed to their point of intersection.
The joint information of all three components taken together is the total number of
points in the geometry:
H(l1, l2, l3) = 3. (2.10)
From these three observations, we can deduce that the tertiary mutual information of
the three components vanishes:
C(3) = I(l1; l2; l3) = 0. (2.11)
This is the information-theoretic restatement of the geometric fact that the three lines
do not all come together at a single point. All together, the complexity profile of the
minimal incidence geometry is given by
C(k) =
{
3, k ∈ {1, 2},
0, k = 3.
(2.12)
The information-theoretic relationships among the three system components l1, l2
and l3 can be expressed in a three-circle Venn diagram, which we depict in Figure 2.4.
The other structure index introduced above is the MUI. We can deduce the MUI
curve of the minimal incidence geometry using the properties of the MUI established
in [3]. First, a descriptor d must have at least 3 units of information to capture all
19
2 Multiscale Structure
0
00 1
1 1
0
3l2l
1l
Figure 2.4: Information diagram for the minimal incidence geometry depicted in Fig-
ure 2.3. Within each of the three circles, all of the regions which contain
nonzero information are regions of overlap with another circle. This is the
information-theoretic consequence of the geometrical fact that each point
belongs to more than one line. Note that the central region, where all three
circles overlap, contains no information.
of the information which was granted to the geometry. Expanding on an optimal
descriptor, one which wastes nothing, brings no benefit beyond a descriptor length of
H(d) = 3. Therefore, the marginal utility M(y) will equal zero for y ≥ 3. In addition,
because the integral of the MUI curve is the utility of a full description—that is, the
total scale-weighted information of the system—we know the integral of the MUI for
this geometry will be 6. Furthermore, we can constrain the height of the MUI curve,
using the following property:
• If there are no interactions or correlations of degree k or higher—formally, if
I(a1; . . . ; ak) = 0 for all collections a1, . . . , ak of k distinct components—then
M(y) ≤ k for all y [3, §VII.B].
Here, this means that M(y) ≤ 3. Furthermore, we know that M(y) is the derivative of
a piecewise linear function, so M(y) is piecewise constant. For the minimal geometry,
then, we expect the MUI should be
M(y) =
{
2, 0 ≤ y < 3,
0, y ≥ 3. (2.13)
Note that the MUI curve is the reflection of the complexity profile C(k) in Eq. (2.12).
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These properties hold for any incidence geometry: the MUI vanishes for y larger than
the number of points used to build the geometry, the integral of the MUI is the total
scale-weighted information, and the MUI is bounded above by one plus the maximal
number of lines which mutually intersect at a common point. We can relate the MUI
and the complexity profile by noting that the areas bounded by both curves are the
same, and moreover, the width of the MUI curve M(y) is the height of the complexity
profile C(1), because both are given by the number of points in the geometry.
2.2.3 Fano Plane
The Fano plane, pictured in Figure 2.5, has 7 points, 7 lines, 3 points on every line,
and 3 lines through every point. The total scale-weighted information is the number of
points per line times the number of lines, or 21. The information content of the whole
system is 7, while the mutual information between any line and any other is again 1.
1l 2l
3l
4l
5l
6l7l
Figure 2.5: The Fano plane: a symmetrical arrangement of seven points and seven
lines. The shared information between any two lines is 1, but the shared
information at higher scales depends on which set of lines we choose.
For the Fano plane, there are two possible information-theoretic scenarios involving
three distinct lines. If the three lines do not all meet at a common point, as for example
l1, l2 and l3, then the tertiary mutual information of those three components is zero.
The other option is for the three lines to meet at a common point, as with l1, l3 and
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l5, in which case the tertiary mutual information is 1.
I(l1; l2; l3) = 0, but I(l1; l3; l5) = 1. (2.14)
The tertiary mutual information I(li; lj ; lk) can never be greater than 1, because any
two lines come together in one and exactly one point. This uniqueness of intersections
also implies that, in the three-circle Venn diagram, the lens-shaped regions where two
circles overlap always contain a total of 1 unit of information. If the inner region of
triple overlap, corresponding to I(li; lj ; lk), contains the value 1, then the outer region,
I(li; lj |lk), must contain the value 0, and vice versa. In addition, the total information
content enclosed by each of the three circles is always 3 units, the number of points per
line. Together, these facts constrain the possible three-circle Venn diagrams for subsets
of the Fano-plane system, leaving only the two possibilities depicted in Figure 2.6.
1
1 1
0
3l2l
1l
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Figure 2.6: Illustrative examples of the two possible three-circle Venn diagrams for
three-component subsets of the Fano-plane system. Note that the infor-
mation in the central region is zero in one case but nonzero in the other.
We have in the Fano plane an elementary illustration of a commonplace occurrence
in complex systems: higher-order structure which cannot be resolved into lower-order
interrelationships. In this case, we see there exists a variety among triples of compo-
nents which cannot be inferred from considering pairs. The Fano-plane system does
not fall within the particular special classes of systems studied as examples in [3], since
not all subsets of the same size have the same information content.
We can deduce the complexity profile C(k) of the Fano-plane system by counting
points lying on k or more lines, or by computation using Eq. (2.5). If we take the
latter approach, with 7 components there are 27 − 1 = 127 nonempty subsets U for
which we must find the information content H(U). However, thanks to the high
degree of symmetry, the information content for the different possible subsets of the
component set is not that hard to work out. Because there exist 3 lines through any
point, eliminating 1 line (component) can only reduce the number of lines through any
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point down to 2. So, the information content of any six-component set is still 7. To
eliminate all lines through a point, we must erase at least three components. From
considerations like these, we can deduce C(k) by explicit computation with Eq. (2.5).
For the Fano plane, the complexity profile is given by
C(k) =
{
7, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3,
0, 4 ≤ k ≤ 7. (2.15)
We can also deduce this result quickly by recalling that, generally, C(k) captures
the amount of information contained in interrelationships of scale k and higher. In
the context of incidence geometry, the complexity profile C(k) has the geometrical
interpretation as the number of distinct points which lie at the intersection of k or
more lines.
Applying the same properties as we used for the minimal incidence geometry, we
can deduce that the MUI of the Fano plane vanishes for descriptor lengths y ≥ 7, that
the integral of M(y) is 7 · 3 = 21, and that M(y) ≤ 4 for all y.
2.3 The Dual of a Complex System
Geometry makes much use of duality. The dual of a geometrical arrangement is that
arrangement which is found by interchanging the roles of points and lines in the origi-
nal. For example, an affine plane of order n is a specialization of an incidence geometry
in which the following conditions hold [25,26]:
• the geometry contains n2 points in all;
• the geometry contains n(n+ 1) lines;
• each line contains n points;
• each point lies on n+ 1 lines.
Interchanging points and lines yields a dual affine plane [25, 27], a geometry which
meets the following criteria:
• the geometry contains n(n+ 1) points;
• the geometry contains n2 lines;
• each line contains n+ 1 points;
• each point lies on n lines.
If we translate from geometry to information theory, what is the meaning of duality?
We began by saying that each point in a geometry corresponded to a unit of informa-
tion, and each line was to become a component in an information-theoretic system.
Applying the operation of duality, we find that each line in the original geometry
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should be ascribed a unit of information in the dual system, and each point in the
original geometry becomes a system component in the dual.
The complexity profile of the original system is defined for values of k from 1 to
the number of lines in the original geometry. Therefore, the complexity profile of the
dual system is defined for values of k from 1 to the number of points in the original
geometry. The property of “lines meeting at a common point” in the original becomes
the property of “points lying on a common line” in the dual. Consequently, the
complexity profile of the dual system can be found from the original geometry. The
dual of k lines intersecting at a point is k points sharing a common line. We can find
the complexity profile of the dual system by counting the number of distinct lines in
the original system which contain k or more points.
For the minimal incidence geometry depicted in Figure 2.3 and the Fano plane
portrayed in Figure 2.5, the duality exchange operation does not change the complexity
profile. We can say that C(k) for those geometries is self-dual. Considering the affine
planes of order n defined above, we know that each point lies on n+ 1 lines, so C(k) is
a rectangle of width n+ 1 and height n2. In a dual affine plane of order n, each of the
n(n + 1) points lie on n lines, so C(k) is a rectangle of width n and height n(n + 1).
For affine planes, the duality transformation preserves the area, but not the shape, of
the complexity profile.
One naturally wonders whether this property of the area under the C(k) curve is
more general. We can investigate this question using the conservation law, proved in
Allen et al. [3], that the area under the complexity profile is always the total scale-
weighted information content of the system. For the special case of an incidence
geometry, this means that ∑
k
C(k) =
∑
i
H(li), (2.16)
where i ranges from 1 to the total number of lines in the geometry. Let {vj} be the
set of all points in the geometry. (For an affine plane, j thus ranges from 1 to n2.)
The area bounded by the complexity profile is then∑
i
H(li) =
∑
i
∑
{j|vj∈li}
H(vj). (2.17)
In this sum, the multiplicity of any H(vj) is the number of lines which contain the
point vj . Therefore, ∑
i
H(li) =
∑
j
H(vj) · |{li|vj ∈ li}| . (2.18)
The components of the dual system are the points of the original geometry, and the
information content of each component in the dual system is the number of lines which
pass through that point in the original geometry. Summing over the components of
the dual system to find the total area under the dual complexity profile yields the
same sum as in Eq. (2.18). In consequence, we can say that the duality transformation
generally preserves the area under the complexity profile.
24
2.3 The Dual of a Complex System
What can we deduce about the Marginal Utility of Information for affine planes and
their duals? We recall that the MUI is, by construction, a piecewise constant function.
The general properties we deduced earlier imply that for an affine plane of order n,
M(y) vanishes for y ≥ n2, and the integral of M(y) is the number of lines times the
number of lines per point, or n2(n+ 1). Furthermore, because exactly n+ 1 lines meet
at each point, M(y) ≤ n+ 2 for all y.
The most straightforward way to meet these requirements is with the following
piecewise constant curve:
M(y) =
{
n+ 1, 0 ≤ y < n2,
0, y ≥ n2. (2.19)
For a dual affine plane of order n, the integral of M(y) is the same, n2(n + 1). The
right-hand edge is instead at n(n+1), and the upper limit becomes M(y) ≤ n+1. So,
M(y) =
{
n, 0 ≤ y < n(n+ 1),
0, y ≥ n(n+ 1). (2.20)
For both affine planes and their duals, M(y) is the reflection of the complexity profile
C(k). And again, the duality transformation preserves areas but not shapes.
These self-duality properties are the information-theoretic consequences of the ge-
ometry theorem known as the principle of double counting [26]. To wit: if {vi} are the
points of an incidence geometry and {lj} are its lines, then∑
{vi}
|{lj | vi lies on lj}| =
∑
{lj}
|{vi| lj intersects vi}| . (2.21)
We can prove this by observing that both sides of Eq. (2.21) are equal to the size of
the set of ordered pairs defined by
S = {(vi, lj)| vi and lj are incident}. (2.22)
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2.4 Computation and Gammoids
The idea of information is closely related to that of computation, and in this section,
we will explore another type of system for which we can define an information function,
thereby bringing our concepts of multiscale structure into a computational context.
We can idealize a computation as a mathematical process that takes a set of inputs
to a set of outputs. For example, if we have a program that takes a number and returns
its square, we can represent that code pictorially as an arrow:
(2.23)
We have drawn the output as a filled circle, and the input as an unfilled one. The
picture (2.23) is a diagrammatic representation for any function that acts on a single
input to produce one and only one output: the sine of an angle, the number of meters
in a distance specified in furlongs and so on.
Some functions take two inputs and return a single output. Given two numerical
variables, for example, we could compute their sum, their product, the logarithm of
one to the base given by the other, and so forth. We can represent all of these functions
pictorially with the following diagram:
(2.24)
Alternatively, a single input might be used to create multiple outputs. For example,
we might be given the time elapsed in seconds since midnight, and calculate the current
hour and the minute within that hour:
(2.25)
There is a sense in which these outputs are not independent, for they derive from
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a common source. This is true even if, as is the case for separating clock time into
minutes and hours, we cannot infer one output from the other.
What other patterns of information flow might we encounter as we go about our
business? Given two positive integers, we can find their greatest common divisor and
their least common multiple. If a function performs both of these tasks, then it has
two outputs, both of which depend on the two inputs:
(2.26)
A computation may proceed by way of intermediate steps:
(2.27)
These intermediate stages may combine multiple inputs, and they can yield multiple
outputs. In our diagrams, input vertices (unfilled circles) have no incoming links,
and output vertices (filled circles) have no outgoing ones. We introduce intermediate
vertices with both types of links, as in the following:
(2.28)
In this example, two pieces of input data are combined to yield an intermediate result,
which is then used to compute two output values. If we saved this intermediate result,
we could reconstruct the two outputs without having the original input data. It might
be that we cannot deduce the left-hand output from the right, but there is still an
interdependency between them, linking them by virtue of their common past.
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Consider a computation with two inputs and two outputs, one of which is arrived
at by means of an intermediate step:
(2.29)
Both of the outputs derive ultimately from the same inputs. However, they are in a way
independent of each other, because knowing the result of the intermediate step lets us
compute one output but not the other. Diagrams with multiple layers of intermediate
steps are also possible, and they have a straightforward interpretation in terms of
computations that proceed in stages.
These considerations motivate the following idea: The effective amount of infor-
mation associated with a set of outputs is the number of inputs and/or intermediate
values which one must know in order to produce those outputs. We are, after a fashion,
giving a mathematical form to the notion that the difficulty of a computational task
is how arduous it would be to recover from a crash!
All of our diagrams have taken the form of directed graphs. Each one is a set of
vertices, connected by a set of edges, where each edge carries an indication of which
vertex is its source and which is its target. In addition, we have distinguished subsets
of the vertex set, marking each vertex as input, intermediate or output. Recognizing
this, we can develop the idea more generally.
Let G be a directed graph, or “digraph” for short. Designate a subset S of its
vertices as inputs, and select a subset T of vertices to be the outputs. We can think
of S as the set of “sources” for information flow, and T as the set of its “targets.”
(In the digraphs we have drawn, the vertices in S have no incoming edges, and those
vertices in T have no outgoing edges. This is sensible, but it turns out not to be
essential for proving the key properties of the information function.) The information
content H(U) of a subset U ⊂ T is the size of the smallest set of vertices having the
property that all paths from S to U must pass through it. The size of this “minimal
separating set” tells us how many intermediate variables we would need to save in
order to compute the outputs in U .
It can be proven that the function H satisfies our axioms for being an information
function. Consequently, the function H yields sensible expressions for the interdepen-
dence of output variables. Having defined H, we can construct the indices of multiscale
structure C(k) and M(y) as we did before.
28
2.4 Computation and Gammoids
For example, take the graph
(2.30)
Here, we have one output, which we label a, and we see directly that H(a) = 2.
A graph with two outputs might look like the following:
(2.31)
In this case, H(a) = 2, while H(b) = 1 and H(a, b) = 2. The shared information
between outputs a and b is
I(a; b) = H(a) +H(b)−H(a, b) = 1, (2.32)
corresponding nicely to the fact that a and b depend upon one common input.
A more involved two-output graph could include an intermediate step:
(2.33)
Here, H(a) = H(b) = 1, while H(a, b) = 2. The shared information between a and b
is now I(a; b) = 0, because the intermediate stage “shields” output a from the original
input.
What we have constructed here is known in pure mathematics as a gammoid, and
our information function is the rank function of that gammoid [28]. A gammoid is an
example of a matroid, a structure defined as a set of elements M and a rank function
that assigns a nonnegative integer to each subset of M . Matroid rank functions are
monotonic and strongly subadditive, so they count as information functions. As we
have seen in this section, matroid theory furnishes examples of mathematical entities
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to which we can apply the ideas of multiscale structure.
2.5 Network Dynamics
We can apply the multiscale complexity formalism quantitatively to a model which is
an idealized representation of multiple interesting biological scenarios. Doing so re-
quires relating the concepts of probability and information; we provide a more detailed
development of the mathematical prerequisites in Chapter 5.
One way to make progress on many biological problems is to make the approxi-
mation that each component of a system can, at any given time, be in one of two
mutually exclusive states of being. In essence, we idealize a phenomenon by treating it
as composed of binary random variables, possibly correlated. We might postulate that
each organism in a population can follow one of two survival strategies. For example,
a male bower bird can maraud, attacking other birds’ bowers, or it can remain at its
own bower, guarding its own mating display from marauders [29, 30]. Or, we might
postulate that a gene comes in two variant forms. Each instance of the gene in the
idealized population is then a binary random variable. We can make an analogous
approximation when modeling social and economic systems. For example, an indi-
vidual voter can choose between one of two political parties. Or, in a simplified but
still instructive model for a stock market, the price of a company’s stock can be going
either up or down [31].
A specific implementation of this idea is the Moran model, which was originally
formulated in biology but can be applied more broadly [31]. Consider a haploid popu-
lation of N individuals, and a gene which comes in two alleles. The genetic character
of the population can change as individuals are born and die. One simple dynamical
model for this process picks an individual at random with each tick of a discrete-time
clock. The chosen, or focal, individual mates with one of the other N − 1 organisms
and produces an offspring, which then takes the place of the focal individual. The
allele carried by the offspring is that carried by one of its two parents, the choice of
which parent being made randomly with equal probability either way.
Reframing the Moran model in network-theory language turns out to be conve-
nient for developing extensions, such as treatments including structured populations,
wherein mating is not uniformly random. Furthermore, doing so broadens the range of
systems to which the mathematics can be applied: moving away from the specifically
biological terminology makes it more explicit that the Moran model can be applied
equally well to biological evolution or to social dynamics [31].
The components of our system will be the N nodes of a network. Each node is a
random variable which can take the values 0 and 1. In addition to these N nodes, we
augment the system with a number N0 of nodes whose states are all fixed at 0, and a
quantity N1 of nodes whose states are fixed to be 1.
At each time step, we pick one of the variable nodes at random. We then choose,
stochastically, whether or not to change that node’s value. With probability p, we
keep the node value the same, and with probability 1 − p, we assign to it the value
of another node, chosen at random from a pool of candidates. This pool contains
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both the neighborhood of the node in the network topology and the N0 + N1 fixed
nodes. In this way, the fixed nodes represent the possibility of mutation: even if all
the dynamical population has allele 1, there remains the opportunity of picking up a
0, and vice versa. For a complete graph, the steady-state behavior of this dynamical
system can actually be found analytically [32]. The probability that exactly m nodes
out of the N whose value can vary will be in state 1 is
q(m) = A(N,N0, N1)
Γ(N1 +m)Γ(N +N0 −m)
Γ(N −m+ 1)Γ(m+ 1) , (2.34)
where the normalization constant A is given by
A(N,N0, N1) =
Γ(N + 1)Γ(N0 +N1)
Γ(N +N0 +N1)Γ(N0)Γ(N1)
. (2.35)
We illustrate q(m) for networks of N = 10 nodes and different values of N0 and N1 in
Figure 2.7. The function q(m) is an example of the beta-binomial distribution, which
is significant in probability theory for reasons we will return to in Chapter 5.
Because the gamma function can take noninteger values, we can compute the prob-
ability q(m) even for nonintegral N0 and N1. This is useful if we wish to examine the
low-mutation-rate limit.
Figure 2.7: Probability that exactly m nodes out of 10 will be in the 1-state, for
different values of N0 and N1. Red (solid): N0 = N1 = 5; green (dashed):
N0 = N1 = 1; blue (dash-dotted): N0 = N1 = 0.5; black (dotted): N0 = 5
and N1 = 1.
If the network topology is that of a complete graph, then the system has exchange
symmetry, an invariance under permutations which simplifies the calculation of struc-
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ture indices [3]. This simplification follows from the fact that if exchange symmetry
holds, all subsets having the same number of components can be taken to contain the
same quantity of information. Formally, for each set U ⊂ A, the information of U is a
function of the cardinality |U |, which we can write as a subscript, H(U) = H|U |.
Recalling that the complexity profile C(k) indicates the information in dependencies
of scale k and higher, the information specific to scale k is
D(k) = C(k)− C(k + 1). (2.36)
The sum of D(k) over all scales k is C(1). For any fixed scale k, the complexity D(k)
is (up to a prefactor) the binomial transform of the sequence al ≡ Hl+N−k.
D(k) =
(
N
k
) k∑
l=0
(−1)l+1
(
k
l
)
Hl+N−k. (2.37)
We can calculate Hn from the probability distribution q(m), as given by Eq. (2.34).
Knowing Hn, we can compute D(k), from which we can easily find the complexity
profile C(k). Figure 2.8 illustrates the results. We see that C(k) depends upon the
numbers of fixed influence nodes, N0 and N1. When C(k) is concentrated at k = 1,
the nodes are changing their values almost independently of one another. This is the
case, for example, when we set N0 = N1 = 5. For those parameter values, the external
influences are stronger than those of the variable nodes upon each other, while being
equally balanced in both directions. This creates a situation in which knowing the
status of any one variable node provides very little information about the status of
any other. On the other hand, when C(k) is elevated at larger values of k, then
nonnegligible amounts of information apply at higher scales. This occurs when the
external influences are weaker than the internal dynamics, causing the variable nodes
to act collectively.
2.6 Frequency-Dependent Moran Process
One fundamental fact of evolutionary biology is that the environment of an organ-
ism consists in large part of other organisms. A simple, albeit approximate, way to
represent the configuration of an ecosystem is by specifying the frequencies of abun-
dance or population densities for the species which are present. (We will consider
more sophisticated approximations, and the hazards of oversimplified representations,
in later chapters.) In this context, we can speak of frequency-dependent fitness: the
success of an organism type or an evolutionary strategy can be a function of the current
population densities.
The simplest kind of frequency dependence is a linear relationship between popula-
tion density and fitness. As before, we consider two varieties, and we keep the total
population size constant, so the frequencies of both types can be given in terms of a
single variable x. We take the reproductive rates of type-0 and type-1 organisms to
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Figure 2.8: Complexity profiles for the cases illustrated in Figure 2.7. Each curve
is normalized so that the total area under it is 1. Elevated complexity
C at larger k indicates collective behavior at larger scales. Red (solid):
N0 = N1 = 5; green (dashed): N0 = N1 = 1; blue (dash-dotted): N0 =
N1 = 0.5; black (dotted): N0 = 5 and N1 = 1.
be given by
f0(x) = A01x+A00(1− x), (2.38)
f1(x) = A11x+A10(1− x). (2.39)
The coefficient Aij is the payoff which a type-i player gains by playing with a type-
j player. Different values of the matrix A represent different interactions between
evolutionary strategies.
In order to apply Shannon information theory, we need a probability distribution. A
convenient and meaningful one for these purposes is the mutation-selection equilibrium
distribution, which is the steady state of the frequency-dependent Moran process. We
can find this distribution numerically by iterating the appropriate update rule, which
we can represent as multiplication by a transition matrix. The next step is to construct
this matrix. Having done so, we will be able to compute q(m) and thence obtain the
complexity profile, as before. The result will typically depend both upon the payoff
matrix A and on the mutation rate.
Let the total population size be N , and let m denote the number of type-1 indi-
viduals. We suppose that reproduction is imperfect, with mutations occurring at rate
u. That is, an offspring inherits its parent’s type with probability 1 − u, while with
probability u, we pick the offspring’s type at random. A nonzero mutation rate implies
that the population does not have to get stuck in a uniform configuration: even if all
individuals have the same type, an error in reproduction can create an organism of
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the opposite type in the next generation. This is a necessary requirement for having
a steady-state probability distribution which is not concentrated entirely at m = 0 or
m = N .
To find the steady-state probability distribution for m, we first need to calculate
the probabilities that m will increase or decrease. In the frequency-dependent Moran
process [33], the probability that m will decrease by 1 is
pm→m−1 =
m
N
(
(1− u) (N −m)f0
(
m
N
)
mf1
(
m
N
)
+ (N −m)f0
(
m
N
) + u
2
)
. (2.40)
And the probability of m increasing by 1 is
pm→m−1 =
N −m
N
(
(1− u) mf1
(
m
N
)
mf1
(
m
N
)
+ (N −m)f0
(
m
N
) + u
2
)
. (2.41)
With these equations, we can find the steady-state probability distribution q(m), which
will depend on the payoff matrix A and the mutation rate u. (For the present pur-
poses, a numerical computation will suffice.) Knowing q(m), we can as before find the
complexity profile C(k). The resulting curve tells us about the scales of organization
which arise within the population as a consequence of the evolutionary game dynamics.
To connect with the literature [33], we carry out this calculation for the payoff matrix
A =
(
6 4
7 5
)
, (2.42)
which defines an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. One application of this to biology
is the case of the bower birds mentioned earlier [29,30]. Simplifying somewhat, a male
bower bird has two strategies available to it: to guard its own bower, or to maraud
and attempt to damage others. Designate guarding as strategy 0 and marauding as
strategy 1. The matrix element Aij denotes the payoff to a bird following strategy i
against an opponent who plays strategy j. In this example, a guardian (row 0) who
plays against a marauder (column 1) obtains a score of 4. The highest payoff is A10,
the score obtained by a marauder who plays against a guardian. In fact, it is better
to maraud than to guard, when facing either kind of foe:
A10 > A00, and also A11 > A01. (2.43)
So far, it looks like the thing to do is to maraud. However, the payoff obtained when
both birds follow this strategy is A11, which is less than the payoff A00 they would
have obtained if they had both stayed home.
The particular choice of numbers here is arbitrary, but the relationships between
the numbers are representative of typical conditions in the wild. As Gonick [30] sum-
marizes, “Seemingly forced by the game’s logic into a hostile strategy, they end up
worse off than if they had only cooperated!” A wide variety of biological scenarios can
be considered as examples of this game [34, 35]. A primary concern is to identify the
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conditions under which cooperation (for example, both bower birds guarding rather
than marauding) is evolutionarily favorable.
This type of situation is designated a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” because it is usually
introduced with an example of two people apprehended for a crime and interrogated
by the police. Each player can choose to say nothing, or to inform on the other player.
The payoff matrix is such that it is better to inform than to stay silent, whatever
option the other player takes; however, if both players keep quiet, they fare better
than if they both inform on each other.
Figure 2.9 shows the probability distribution for the Moran process in mutation-
selection equilibrium with this payoff matrix, given two different mutation rates. Note
that the effect of varying the mutation rate is quite dramatic. As before, we can
compute the complexity profile, which we plot in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.9: Equilibrium probability that exactly m agents out of 10 will be in the 1-
state (marauding), for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game defined by Eq. (2.42).
Blue (thinner line): u = 0.1; red (thicker line): u = 0.2.
2.7 Multiscale Challenges and Evolution
In the previous section, we considered the scales of organization which can arise as
an evolutionary process develops stochastically. We can also apply our mathematical
formalism of multiscale structure to other aspects of evolutionary theory. The following
is excerpted from an article by Allen, Bar-Yam and myself [3].
The discipline of cybernetics, an ancestor to modern control theory, used
Shannon’s information theory to quantify the difficulty of performing tasks,
a topic of relevance both to organismal survival in biology and to system
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Figure 2.10: Complexity profiles for the cases illustrated in Figure 2.9. Each curve is
normalized so that the total area under it is 1. Elevated complexity C at
larger k indicates collective behavior at larger scales. Blue (thinner line):
u = 0.1; red (thicker line): u = 0.2.
regulation in engineering. Cyberneticist W. Ross Ashby considered scenar-
ios in which a regulator device must protect some important entity from
the outside environment and its disruptive influences [36]. In Ashby’s ex-
amples, each state of the environment must be matched by a state of the
regulatory system in order for it to be able to counter the environment’s in-
fluence on a protected component. Successful regulation implies that if one
knows only the state of the protected component, one cannot deduce the en-
vironmental influences; i.e., the job of the regulator is to minimize mutual
information between the protected component and the environment. This
is an information-theoretic statement of the idea of homeostasis. Ashby’s
“Law of Requisite Variety” states that the regulator’s effectiveness is lim-
ited by its own information content, or variety in cybernetic terminology.
An insufficiently flexible regulator will not be able to cope with the environ-
mental variability. A multiscale extension of Shannon information theory
provides a multiscale cybernetics, with which we can study the scenarios
in which “that which we wish to protect” and “that which we must guard
against” are each systems of many components, as are the tools we employ
for regulation and control [4, 5, 6].
Multiscale information theory enables us to overcome a key limitation
of the requisite variety concept. In the examples of traditional cybernet-
ics [36], each action of the environment requires a specific, unique reaction
on the part of the regulator. This neglects the fact that the impact which
an event in the environment has on the system depends upon the scale
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of the environmental degrees of freedom involved. There is a great dif-
ference between large-scale and fine-scale impacts. Systems can deflect
fine-scale impacts without needing to specifically respond to them, while
they need to respond to large-scale ones or perish. For example, a human
being can be indifferent to the impact of a falling raindrop, whereas the
impact of a falling rock is much more difficult to neglect, even if specify-
ing the state of the raindrop and the state of the rock require the same
amount of information. An extreme case is the impact of a molecule: air
molecules are continually colliding with us, yet the only effects we have to
cope with actively are the large-scale, collective behaviors like high-speed
winds. Ashby’s Law does not make this distinction. Indeed, there is no
framework for the discussion due to the absence of a concept of scale in the
information theory he used: Each state is equally different from every other
state and actions must be made differently for each different environment.
Thus, in order to account for the real-world conditions, a multiscale
generalization of Ashby’s Law is needed. According to such a Law, the
responses of the system must occur at a scale appropriate to the envi-
ronmental change, with larger-scale environmental changes being met by
larger-scale responses. As with the case of raindrops colliding with a sur-
face, large-scale structures of a system can avoid responding dynamically
to small-scale environmental changes which cause only small-scale fluctua-
tions in the system.
Given a need to respond to larger-scale changes of the environment,
coarser-scale descriptions of that environment may suffice. A regulator that
can marshall a large-scale response can use a coarse-grained description
of the environment to counteract large-scale fluctuations in the external
conditions. In this way, limited amounts of information can still be useful.
To make requisite variety a practical principle, one must recognize that
information applies to specific scales.
Ashby aimed to apply the requisite variety concept to biological systems,
as well as technological ones. An organism which lacks the flexibility to
cope with variations in its environment dies. Thus, a mismatch in vari-
ety/complexity is costly in the struggle for survival, and so we expect that
natural selection will lead to organisms whose complexity matches that of
their environment. However, “the environment” of a living being includes
other organisms, both of the same species and of others. Organisms can
act and react in concert with their conspecifics, and the effect of any action
taken can depend on what other organisms are doing at the same time [37].
In some species, such as social insects [38], distinct scales of the individ-
ual, colony and species are key features characterizing collective action.
This suggests a multiscale cybernetics approach to the evolution of social
behavior: We expect that scales of organization within a population—the
scales, for example, of groups or colonies—will evolve to match the scales
of the challenges which the environment presents. Furthermore, the con-
cept of multiscale response applies within the individual organism as well.
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Multiple scales of environmental challenges are met by different scales of
system responses. To protect against infection, for example, organisms
have physical barriers (e.g., skin), generic physiological responses (e.g.,
clotting, inflammation) and highly specific adaptive immune responses, in-
volving interactions among many cell types, evolved to identify pathogens
at the molecular level. The evolution of immune systems is the evolution
of separate large- and small-scale countermeasures to threats, enabled by
biological mechanisms for information transmission and preservation [39].
As another example, the muscular system includes both large and small
muscles, comprising different numbers of cells, corresponding to different
scales of environmental challenge (e.g., pursuing prey and escaping from
predators versus chewing food) [40].
In Chapter 4, we will use evolutionary game theory to understand one example
of multiscale requisite variety: a scenario in which reproductive success depends on
multiple organisms acting in concert.
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3.1 Introduction
Spatial extent is a complicating factor in mathematical biology. The possibility that an
action at point A cannot immediately affect what happens at point B creates the oppor-
tunity for spatial nonuniformity. This nonuniformity must change our understanding
of evolutionary dynamics, as the same organism in different places can have different
expected evolutionary outcomes. Since organism origins and fates are both determined
locally, we must consider heterogeneity explicitly to determine its effects. We use sim-
ulations of spatially extended host–pathogen and predator–prey ecosystems to reveal
the limitations of standard mathematical treatments of spatial heterogeneity. Our
model ecosystem generates heterogeneity dynamically; an adaptive network of hosts
on which pathogens are transmitted arises as an emergent phenomenon. The structure
and dynamics of this network differ in significant ways from those of related models
studied in the adaptive-network field. We use a new technique, organism swapping,
to test the efficacy of both simple approximations and more elaborate moment-closure
methods, and a new measure to reveal the timescale dependence of invasive-strain
behavior. Our results demonstrate the failure not only of the most straightforward
(“mean field”) approximation, which smooths over heterogeneity entirely, but also of
the standard correction (“pair approximation”) to the mean field treatment. In spatial
contexts, invasive pathogen varieties can prosper initially but perish in the medium
term, implying that the concepts of reproductive fitness and the Evolutionary Stable
Strategy have to be modified for such systems.
Mathematical modeling of biological systems involves a tradeoff between detail and
tractability. Here, we consider evolutionary ecological systems with spatial extent—
a complicating factor. Analytical treatments of spatial systems typically treat as
equivalent all configurations with the same overall population density, the same allele
frequencies, the same pairwise contact probabilities or the like. For ease of analysis,
one seeks a simplified analytical model, which coarse-grains “microstates” (the com-
plete specification of each organism) to “macrostates” (characterized by quantities like
average densities), allowing one to make useful predictions about the model’s behav-
ior [41,42]. Corrections to simple coarse-grainings can quickly generate an overbearing
quantity of algebra. It is fairly well appreciated that the simplest approximations
break down in the spatial context. What is less acknowledged and not yet systemati-
cally understood is that the extensions of the simpler approximations also fail. Before
exhausting ourselves with ever-more-elaborate refinements, it would be useful to have
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some understanding of when a particular series of approximations is doomed to inad-
equacy.
In this chapter, we study the context in which commonly-used coarse-grainings can
be expected to fail at capturing the evolutionary dynamics of an ecosystem, and in ad-
dition we provide a novel, direct demonstration of that failure. The fundamental issue
is spatial heterogeneity, a long-recognized concern for mathematical biology [43, 44].
When does spatial heterogeneity significantly impact the choice of appropriate math-
ematical treatment, and when does a chosen mathematical formalism not capture the
full implications of spatial variability? We show that one can test a treatment of
heterogeneity by transplanting organisms within a simulated ecosystem in such a way
that, were the treatment valid, the modeled behavior of the ecosystem over time would
remain essentially unchanged. We demonstrate situations where the system’s behav-
ior changes dramatically and cannot be captured by a conventional treatment. The
complications we explore imply that short-term descriptions of what is happening in
an evolutionary ecological model can be insufficient and, in fact, misleading, with re-
gard not just to quantitative details but also to qualitative characteristics of ecological
dynamics.
Many modeling approaches in mathematical biology which appear distinct at first
glance turn out to be describing the same phenomenon with different equations [45,
46,47]. What matters for our purposes is not so much which technique is chosen, but
whether the underlying assumptions do, in fact, apply.
“Mean-field theory” is a term from statistical physics [48,49] which has been adopted
in ecology [50,51,52], referring to an approximation in which each component of a sys-
tem is modeled as experiencing the same environment as any other. This implies that
the probability distribution over all possible states of the system factors into a prod-
uct of probability distributions for individual components. An example in population
genetics is the assumption that a population is panmictic. That is, if a new individual
in one generation has an equal chance of receiving an allele from any individual in
the previous generation, then we can approximate the ecosystem dynamics using only
the proportion of that allele, rather than some more complicated representation of
the population’s genetic makeup. Modeling evolution of that population as “change
in allele frequencies over time” (per, e.g., [45, 53]) is, implicitly, a mean-field approx-
imation [54]. The mean-field approximation is also in force if one postulates that an
individual organism interacts with some subset, chosen at random, of the total popu-
lation, even if the form and effect of interactions within that subset are complicated
(as in, e.g., [55, 56]).
It is well known that real species are not necessarily panmictic. However, many
treatments which acknowledge this are still mean-field models. The textbook way of
incorporating geographical distance into a population-genetic model is to divide the
system into N local subpopulations, “islands,” connected via migration [57, 58, 59].
Within each subpopulation, distance is treated as negligible, and organisms are well
mixed [44, 60]. This approach makes a simplifying assumption that there is a single
distance scale below which panmixia prevails [61], and it relies on well-defined bound-
aries between panmictic subpopulations which persist over time [60]. Furthermore,
the connections among subpopulations are frequently taken to have the topology of a
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complete graph, i.e., an organism in one subpopulation can migrate to any other with
equal ease [44,58,59,60]. In this case, each of the N subpopulations do experience the
same environment, to within one part in N . Thus, the mean-field approximation is in
force at the island level, and the island model incorporates spatial extent without in-
corporating a full treatment of spatial heterogeneity. For real ecosystems [61,62,63,64],
one or more of these simplifying assumptions can fail. Long-distance migration is often
thought to return a spatial ecosystem to a well-mixed form, but if organisms’ migration
habits are themselves adaptive, this is not necessarily so [65]. More complicated pop-
ulation structures require more sophisticated mathematical treatments of evolution,
a fact which has mathematical consequences, but more importantly has real-world
implications for practical issues like the evolution of drug-resistant diseases [66].
Where mean field approximations fail, “higher order” approximations may be em-
ployed. Rather than individual organisms or islands, a pair approximation considers
pairs of organisms or pairs of spatial regions in average contexts. However, this ap-
proximation can also fail when local contexts of groups do not reflect the overall sys-
tem behavior due to heterogeneity across larger domains. Patches of distinct genetic
composition in different parts of a spatial system that are well separated cannot be
treated correctly by such approximations. Quantitative analyses confirm this inade-
quacy. We introduce a new approach to analyzing such approximations by swapping
pairs of organisms in a way that preserves the pair description. For spatial systems,
such swapping events violate the spatial separation between patches and changes the
evolutionary behavior of the system. The swapping method therefore serves as a direct
test of the (in)adequacy of the pair approximation. For evolution on random networks
of sites that do not embody large spatial distances, the pair approximation can work
and the swapping test does not change measures of evolutionary dynamics. However,
such networks do not capture important properties of spatial heterogeneity.
As one of the key properties of spatial extent is the propagation of organisms from
one part of the space to the other over long distances, we show that important in-
sights can be gained by considering models of percolation. Percolation describes the
physical propagation of, e.g., fluids through a random medium. In certain limits the
evolutionary behavior of spatial systems can be mapped onto percolation behavior,
demonstrating that investigations of such systems which go beyond mean-field or scal-
ing studies are relevant to evolutionary dynamics. This and other advances that go
beyond the mean field are necessary to fully describe spatial evolutionary dynamics
as they are necessary for the description of many physical systems of spatial extent.
The complexities of spatially extended evolutionary dynamical systems beyond the
prototypical problem of percolation create new demands and opportunities for ad-
vancing our insight into the dynamics of heterogenous systems and their implications
for evolution.
3.2 Model and Methods
We make the issue of spatial heterogeneity concrete by focusing on a specific model
of ecological and evolutionary interest. We take a model of hosts and consumers
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interacting on a 2D spatial lattice. Each lattice site can be empty (0), occupied by a
host (H) or occupied by a consumer (C). We use the term consumer as a general label
to encompass parasites, pathogens and predators. Where convenient for examples,
we will specialize to one or another of these terminologies. Hosts reproduce into
adjacent empty sites with some probability g per site, taken as a constant for all
hosts. Consumers reproduce into adjacent sites occupied by hosts, with probability τ
per host; sometimes τ is fixed for all consumers, but we also consider cases in which
it is a mutable parameter passed from parent to offspring. We will refer to τ as
the transmissibility. Hosts do not die of natural causes, while consumers perish with
probability v per unit time (leaving empty sites behind). Because consumers can only
reproduce into sites where hosts live, the effective graph topology of reproductively
available sites experienced by the consumers is constantly changing due to their very
presence. This makes the ecosystem an adaptive network, a system in which the
dynamics of a network and the dynamics on that network can occur at comparable
timescales and reciprocally affect one another [67,68,69,70,71]. In this model, dynamics
can be highly complex, including spatial cascades of host and consumer reproduction.
Even when a quasi-steady-state behavior emerges, as we shall see, it is a consequence
of fluctuations over extended space and time intervals.
Several different types of biological interactions can be treated by this modeling
framework. Hosts could represent regions inhabited by autotrophs alone, while con-
sumers represent regions containing a mixture of autotrophs and the heterotrophs
which predate upon them [72]. Alternatively, host agents could represent healthy or-
ganisms, while consumers represent organisms infected with a parasite or pathogen.
Thus, host–consumer models are closely related to Susceptible–Infected–Recovered
(SIR) models, which are epidemiological models used to understand the spread of a
disease through a population. SIR models describe scenarios in which each individual
in a network is either susceptible (S) to a pathogen, infected (I) with it, or recov-
ered (R) from it; susceptible nodes can catch the disease from infected neighbors,
becoming infected themselves, while nodes which have become infected can recover
from the disease and are then resistant against further infection. Susceptible, infected
and recovered individuals roughly correspond to hosts, consumers, and empty cells,
respectively. An important difference between host–consumer models and epidemi-
ological models concerns the issue of reinfection. In the host–consumer model, an
empty site left behind by a dead consumer can be reoccupied by another consumer,
but only if a host reproduces into it first. Other research has considered models
where R[ecovered] individuals can also become I[nfected], with a different (typically
lower) probability than S[usceptible] ones, thereby incorporating imperfect immunity
into the model [73, 74]. The degree of immunity is independent of geography and the
environment of the R[ecovered] individual, unlike reoccupation in the host–consumer
model. Another application is illustrated by the Amazon molly, Poecilia formosa,
which is a parthenogenetic species: P. formosa, all of which are female, reproduce
asexually but require the presence of sperm to carry out egg development. (This kind
of sperm-dependent parthenogenesis is also known as gynogenesis.) P. formosa are
thus dependent on males of other species in the same genus—usually P. mexicana or
P. latipinna—for reproduction. Because P. formosa do not incur the cost of sex, they
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can outcompete the species on which they rely, thereby possibly depleting the resource
they require for survival, i.e., male fish [58,75]. Thus, hosts could be regions contain-
ing sexual organisms, with consumers standing for areas containing both sexual and
asexual individuals [58].
Figure 3.1: Snapshots of a simulated host–consumer ecosystem on a 250 × 250 lat-
tice, taken at intervals of 100 generations. Consumers are dark gray (red
online), hosts are light gray (green online) and empty space is left white.
The simulation began with a single consumer at the center of the lattice,
which gave rise to an expanding front of consumers. The first image in
this sequence shows the state of the ecosystem 100 generations into the
simulation. Hosts which survive the consumer wave recolonize the empty
sites, leading to pattern formation. Here, the host growth rate is g = 0.1,
the consumer death rate is v = 0.2 and the consumer transmissibility is
fixed at τ = 0.33.
This host–consumer model displays waves of colonization, consumption and repop-
ulation. Hosts reproduce into empty sites, and waves of consumers follow, creating
new empty regions open for host colonization. Therefore, clusters of hosts arise dy-
namically [76,77,78,79], a type of pattern formation which can separate regions of the
resources available to pathogens into patches without the need for such separation to
be inserted manually. Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical example of this effect. This is
a specific example of the general phenomenon of pattern formation in nonequilibrium
systems [54]. Consumers are ecosystem engineers [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85] which shape
their local environment: an excessively voracious lineage of consumers can deplete the
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available resources in its vicinity, causing that lineage to suffer a Malthusian catas-
trophe [58, 64, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90]. Because the ecology is spatially extended, this
catastrophe is a local niche annihilation, rather than a global collapse [91]. A mutant
strain with a high transmissibility can successfully invade in the short term but suffer
resource depletion in the medium term, meaning that in a population where consumer
transmissibilities evolve, averages taken over long numbers of generations yield a mod-
erate value [50,92]. This implies that an empirical payoff matrix or reproduction ratio
will exhibit nontrivial timescale dependence [50,93,94].
This model is distinct from another approach to studying evolutionary dynamics in
spatial contexts, that of evolutionary game theory. Game-theoretic models of spatially
structured populations have been explored at great length. These investigations have
found that breakdowns of mean-field approximations are commonplace. However,
evolutionary game theory has its own simplifying assumptions. The vast majority of
studies consider only two-player games. Population size is usually taken to be constant,
and population structure is typically fixed in place. In game-theoretic models, the
benefits and costs of different organism behavioral traits are parameters whose values
are chosen by the modeler. By contrast, “benefits” and “costs” in host–consumer
models are emergent properties which depend on interactions over many generations.
Population size is not fixed, and population structure is dynamical: the environment
in which different consumer varieties compete changes stochastically, in ways affected
by their presence.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Evolution of Transmissibility
We investigate evolution in the spatial host–consumer ecosystem through simulation
and analytic discussion. If the transmissibility τ is made a heritable trait, passed from
a consumer to its offspring with some chance of mutation, what effect will natural
selection have on the consumer population? Figure 3.2(A) shows the average, minimum
and maximum values of the transmissibility τ observed in a population over time. The
average τ tends to a quasi-steady-state value dependent on the host growth rate g and
the consumer death rate v; if the simulation is started with τ set to below this value,
the average τ will increase, and likewise, the average τ will decrease if the consumer
population is initialized with τ over the quasi-steady-state value. Even when the
average τ has achieved its quasi-steady-state value, the population displays a wide
spread of transmissibilities whose extremes fluctuate over time [72].
In a well-mixed ecosystem, the average τ of the population will tend to 1, maxi-
mizing the reproductive rate of the individual consumer. This occurs because each
consumer on average experiences the same environment as any other, and thus has the
same number of hosts available to reproduce into. A consumer with a higher τ has a
higher reproduction rate and therefore evolutionary dominance up to the highest pos-
sible value, 1. The observation of a quasi-steady-state value below 1 is an important
result. This is the first breakdown of the mean-field approximation, and it indicates
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Figure 3.2: (A) Minimum (blue), average (green) and maximum (red) transmissibil-
ity τ for a consumer population over time, with g = 0.1 and v = 0.2. (The
mutation rate is µ = 0.255 and the step size is ∆τ = 0.005, as was used
in reference [72].) The average τ tends to a quasi-steady-state value de-
pendent on g and v; if the simulation is started with τ set to below this
value, the average τ will increase, and likewise, the average τ will decrease
if the consumer population is initialized with τ over the quasi-steady-state
value [72]. The horizontal dotted line indicates the threshold value of τ
which, in a mean-field model, is the smallest value at which a consumer
population can sustain its numbers. The dashed line indicates the value to
which τ would trend in a well-mixed ecosystem. (B) Minimum, average
and maximum τ as a function of v, with g = 0.1. The dotted line shows the
minimum sustainable τ as predicted by mean-field approximation. Each
point is found by averaging over 15,000 timesteps. Error bars indicate one
standard deviation.
the inapplicability of traditional assumptions about fitness optimization, with impli-
cations for the origins of reproductive restraint, communication-based altruism and
social behaviors in general [50,72,91,93,94,95].
One can avoid τ tending to 1 in a panmictic system by imposing some extra con-
straint, such as a tradeoff between transmissibility and lethality, where higher trans-
missibility becomes impossible due to lethality that prevents transmission. This trade-
off between infectiousness and lethality can be considered as a within-host version of
resource overexploitation that here occurs at the population level. Such within-host
tradeoffs are difficult to establish empirically in living populations [96, 97]. Often,
one lacks pertinent information, such as the functional relationship between pathogen
load and disease transmission probability, or the extent to which empirical proxies
for pathogen load predict actual host mortality [98]. An empirical observation of low
virulence should not by itself be taken as evidence that a tradeoff exists: it may well
be that another condition, such as panmixia, fails to obtain. The behavior of spatial
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models makes clear that the relevant scale of the limiting factor is not necessarily
within the individual host.
Another difference between spatial and nonspatial host–consumer systems is the
rate at which consumers must reproduce in order to sustain their population. One
can calculate the minimum sustainable value of τ in the mean-field approximation [99]
by balancing the birth and death rates. If the host population is small compared to
the total ecosystem size, then the minimum sustainable τ is the value which satisfies
kτ = v, where k is the number of neighbors adjacent to a site. For the parameters
used in Figure 3.2(A), this value would be 0.05, which is substantially smaller—by
a factor of 4—than the lowest τ seen in the evolving spatial population. Consumer
populations with τ at the mean-field threshold are not sustainable in the spatial case.
This is easily verified by numerical simulations or by using the mean-field equations for
the host–consumer dynamics [95,100,101]. Stochastic fluctuations suppress the active
phase, i.e., the range of parameter values which permit a living consumer population
is reduced [99].
To gain insight into this phenomenon, we study the case of fixed τ by means of
numerical simulations. We fill the lattice with hosts and inject a single consumer with
a τ of our choice; then, we observe how long the descendents of that consumer persist
as a function of τ . The consumer population does not persist when τ is either too low
or too high. Figure 3.3 shows the probability that a consumer strain will survive for
a substantial length of time (2000 generations) after injection into a lattice filled with
hosts. This probability is hump-shaped, with an asymmetric plateau bounded above
and below by cutoffs.
To understand the upper cutoff visible in Figure 3.3, i.e., the value of τ above which
the consumer population again becomes unsustainable, consider the limiting scenario
where g ≈ 0. If hosts do not reproduce into available empty sites, our system reduces
to an epidemic process which has been studied before [74, 102]. Below the transition
point at τ = 0.5, a consumer injected into a lattice of hosts will produce a consumer
strain (which we can think of as an infection) which survives for a finite number of
generations and then dies out, leaving the lattice filled with hosts (susceptibles) marred
by a small patch of empty sites (recovered individuals). Above the transition point,
a single consumer gives rise to an expanding wave of consumers which propagates
over the lattice, leaving empty sites in its wake, until it consumes all the hosts in the
ecosystem. This regime is known as annular growth. No finite ecosystem can sustain
annular growth indefinitely. If the host growth rate g is made nonzero, then hosts
can recolonize sites left empty by the expanding consumer population, opening the
possibility of host–consumer coexistence in an ecosystem of dynamically formed and
re-formed patches. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of this phenomenon. This is
a specific example of the general phenomenon that, even far from phase transitions,
nonequilibrium systems can display pattern formation [54].
We can, therefore, interpret the upper cutoff on consumer sustainability as a Malthu-
sian catastrophe due ultimately to the limited amount of available hosts [95]. In physics
jargon, this cutoff is a finite-size effect. This is the key to understanding what happens
when multiple types of consumer are present on the same lattice, and in particular the
case we study in the next section, where an invasive consumer variety is introduced to
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Figure 3.3: Probability of a consumer strain surviving 2000 generations after injection
at a single point in a 250 × 250 lattice filled with hosts. (Computed with
1000 runs per point. Host reproduction rate g = 0.1, consumer death rate
v = 0.2.) Vertical dotted line shows the sustainability threshold found
through the mean-field approximation.
an ecosystem where native hosts and consumers have already formed a dynamic patch
distribution. The environment experienced by the invasive variety is that formed by
the native species, and the “finite size” of the resources available to the invasive variety
is not the size of the whole lattice, but that of a local patch [95].
3.3.2 Timescale Dependence of Invasion Success
A key question about an ecological system is whether a new variety of organism, having
a different genetic character and phenotypic trait values, can successfully invade a
native population. If a mutant consumer strain with fixed transmissibility τm can
successfully invade a population of transmissibility τ0 < τm, then we expect the time-
averaged value of τ seen in the evolving system to be larger than τ0. To investigate this,
we simulate scenarios where the native population has τ close to the average value seen
in the evolutionary case described above. We then inject a mutant consumer strain
with significantly larger τ and study the results. For a typical example, we see from
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Figure 3.4: (A) Survival probability as a function of time for five scenarios: inject-
ing mutants with the same transmissibility as the native consumers, three
examples of injecting mutants with transmissibility higher than the τ of
the native consumers, and an example of injecting mutants with lower τ
than the native population. (B) Time intervals during which the survival-
probability curves for the native and invasive strains overlap. ∆τ indicates
the difference between the invasive and native transmissibilities. The closer
the mutant trait value is to the resident, the greater the duration of time
over which the survival-probability curves for the native and mutant strains
overlap. Here, overlap is defined by probabilities being coincident at the
95% confidence level; using other overlap criteria gives qualitatively the
same results. Inset: magnified view of the ∆τ ≥ 0.04 region.
Figure 3.2(A) that when g = 0.1 and v = 0.2, the average τ is approximately 0.33. So,
we simulate τm = 0.45 mutants entering an ecosystem whose native population has
τ0 = 0.33. Initially, the mutants prosper, but they ultimately fail to invade. As shown
in Figure 3.4, the probability of a τm = 0.45 strain surviving for tens of generations
after injection is larger than that of a τ0 = 0.33 strain. That is, mutants with the higher
τ can out-compete the neutral case. However, after ≈ 74 generations, the survival-
probability curves cross. Observed over longer timescales, the mutant strain is less
successful than the native variety. This pattern is consistent for τm > τ0: the average
transmissibility seen in the evolutionary case stands up to invasive varieties. This key
result manifests the distinctive properties of the spatial structure of the model. The
underlying reason for this result is that the mutants encounter the resource limitations
imposed by the patchy native population. Over short timescales, the mutant strain
enjoys the resources available within the local patch, consuming those resources more
rapidly than can be sustained once it encounters the limitations of the local patch size.
In this way, the initial generations of the mutant strain “shade” their descendants.
Thanks to descendant-shading, short-term prosperity is not a guarantee of medium-
or long-term success.
This is to be contrasted with what happens in a well-mixed ecosystem. In the
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well-mixed scenario, consumer strains with higher τ successfully invade and displace
the native population with a high probability. The invasion success is consistent with
the dynamics of a continuously evolving ecosystem. If τ is made an evolvable trait
in simulated panmictic systems, the average τ of the population will tend to 1, as
predicted by the mean-field analytic proof. There is no difference in a well-mixed
scenario between short-term and long-term success. Descendant-shading does not
occur in the well-mixed case. This follows from the lack of distinction between local
patches and large-scale structure.
One common measure of evolutionary success is the expected relative growth rate
of the number of offspring of a mutant individual within a native population, i.e., the
relative growth rate of a mutant strain. This rate, known as the invasion fitness, is
often used to investigate the stability of an evolutionary ecosystem [51,103,104]. If the
invasion fitness is found to be positive, the native variety is judged to be vulnerable
to invasion by the mutant. Conversely, if the invasion fitness is found to be negative,
the native variety is deemed to be stable. For the spatial host–consumer ecosystem,
this method gives qualitatively incorrect predictions for evolutionary dynamics.
Our investigation builds on earlier work which studied the timescale dependence
of fitness indicators in spatial host–consumer ecosystems [93, 94]. In this chapter
we have augmented the prior work by considering the survival probability to show
the effects of varying τ . We have also more systematically shown the number of
generations until dominance of the evolutionary stable strain. In addition, we reported
the case of a mutant strain invading a background population, clarifying the conceptual
and quantitative results of those earlier works, which considered instead scenarios
complicated by multiple ongoing mutations.
3.3.3 Pair Approximations
The inadequacy of mean-field treatments of spatial systems motivates the development
of more elaborate mathematical methods. In this section, we review one such method-
ology, based on augmenting mean-field approximations with successively higher-order
correlations, and we test its applicability to our host–consumer spatial model. The
numerical variables used in this methodology are probabilities which encode the state
of the ecosystem and can change over time. One such variable is, for example, the
probability pa that a lattice site chosen at random contains an organism of type a.
Another is pab, the probability that a randomly-chosen pair of neighboring sites will
have one member of type a and the other of type b. The change of these quantities
over time is usually described by differential equations, for which analysis tools from
nonlinear dynamics are available [51,76,95,104,105,106,107].
The importance of the joint probabilities pab is that they reflect correlations which
mean-field approximations neglect. To understand the relevance of the joint probabil-
ities pab, consider a scenario where an invasive mutant variety forms a spatial cluster
near its point of entry. Let pM be the probability that a lattice site chosen at random
contains a mutant-type organism, and let pMM denote the probability that a pair of
neighboring sites chosen at random will both be occupied by mutant-type organisms.
Then the average density of invasive mutants in the ecosystem, pM , will be low, while
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the conditional probability that a neighbor of an invasive individual will also be of the
invasive type, qM |M = pMM/pM , will be significantly higher. (It is typical in theo-
retical spatial ecology to denote conditional probabilities with q, rather than p [108].)
A discrepancy between the conditional probability qa|b and the overall probability pa
can persist when the ecosystem has settled into a quasi-steady-state behavior, and is
then an indicator of spatial pattern formation.
Applying this idea to the spatial host–consumer model, let pC be the probability
that a lattice site chosen at random contains a consumer, and let qC|C denote the con-
ditional probability that lattice site adjacent to a consumer will also be occupied by a
consumer. Figure 3.5(A) shows pC and qC|C measured during the course of numerical
simulations. In a well-mixed scenario (where we expect the mean-field approximation
to be applicable), the average consumer density pC and the consumer–consumer pair-
wise correlation qC|C are essentially equal over time. In the spatial lattice scenario,
pC and qC|C are noticeably different.
Treating the correlations qa|b as not wholly determined by the probabilities pa is a
way of allowing spatial heterogeneity to enter an analytical model. Whether it is a
sufficient extension in any particular circumstance is not, a priori, obvious. Typically,
the differential equations for the pair probabilities pab depend on triplet probabili-
ties pabc, which depend upon quadruplet probabilities and so forth. The standard
procedure is to truncate this hierarchy at some level, a technique known as moment
closure [70,103,105,109,110]. Moment closures constitute a series of approximations of
increasing intricacy [111,112]. The simplest moment closure is the mean field approxi-
mation; going beyond the mean field to include second-order correlations but neglecting
correlations of third and higher order constitutes a pair approximation. These approx-
imations do not incorporate all of the information about spatial structure which may
be necessary to account for real-world ecological effects [103].
3.3.4 Organism Swapping
Several factors have been identified which undermine pair approximations [70, 72, 95,
100, 101, 103, 106, 113, 114, 115]. In our model, we can directly test the efficacy of pair
approximations in a completely general way. The key idea is to transplant individuals
in such a way that the variables used in the moment-closure analytical treatment
remain unchanged. At each timestep, we look through the ecosystem for isolated
consumers, that is, for individual consumers surrounded only by a specified number
of hosts and empty sites. We can exchange these individuals without affecting the
pairwise correlations. For example, if we find a native-type consumer adjacent to three
hosts and one empty site, we can swap it with an invasive-type consumer also adjacent
to three hosts and one empty site. We can also exchange isolated pairs of consumers in
the same way. The variables used in the moment-closure treatment remain the same.
Were the moment-closure treatment valid, we would expect the dynamics to remain
unchanged when we perform such exchanges.
When we perform the simulation, however, swapping strongly affects the dynamics.
With this type of swapping in effect, mutants with higher τ can invade a native pop-
ulation with lower τ . In one typical simultation run with a native τ of 0.33 and an
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Figure 3.5: (A) Pairwise conditional probability qC|C plotted against the average den-
sity of consumers, pC , for three variations on the host–consumer model: a
well-mixed case in which mean-field theory is applicable, a random regu-
lar graph (in which each site has exactly four neighbors) and a 2D square
lattice. The dotted line, pC = qC|C , indicates the mean-field approxima-
tion. 104 timesteps were computed for each case. The well-mixed case is
simulated by dynamically rewiring sites at each time step, precluding the
generation of spatial heterogeneity; consequently, the pairwise correlation
qC|C is within statistical variation equal to pC (R2 = 0.953). A random
regular graph (RRG) with random but static connections does develop
spatial heterogeneity so that qC|C is not the same as pC (R2 = 0.581).
The discrepancy is even stronger in the lattice case (R2 = 0.304). (B)
Success rate of invasive mutant strains as a function of swapping probabil-
ity. Voracious mutant strains with τ = 0.45 are introduced into a lattice
ecosystem defined by a host growth rate of g = 0.1, a consumer death rate
v = 0.2 (the same for both consumer varieties), and a native consumer
transmissibility of τ = 0.33. Average success rates are found by simulat-
ing 2000 invasions per value of the swapping probability parameter; error
bars indicate 95%-confidence intervals. Increasing the fraction of possible
swaps which are actually performed makes the voracious invasive strain
more likely to take over the ecosystem.
invasive τ of 0.45, the invasive strain succeeded in 1,425 of 10,000 injections. Without
swapping, the number of successful invasions is zero.
Swapping can be considered as creating a new ecosystem model with the same
moment-closure treatment as that of the original. The behavior of invasive strains is
different, because transplanting organisms allows invasive varieties to evade localized
Malthusian catastrophes. Swapping opens the ecosystem up to invasive strains, since,
in essence, it removes individuals from the “scene of the crimes” committed by their
ancestors.
This type of swapping is, to our knowledge, a new test of moment-closure validity.
Randomized exchanges have been incorporated into computational ecology simulations
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for different purposes. For example, research on dispersal rates in an island model
shuffled individuals in such a way that the population size of each island was held
constant [116].
If, instead of performing every permissible swap, we transplant organisms with some
probability between 0 and 1, we can interpolate between the limit of no swapping,
where invasions always fail, and the case where pair approximation is most applicable
and invasions succeed significantly often. The results are shown in Figure 3.5(B) and
indicate that the impact of swapping becomes detectable at a probability of ≈ 0.25
and effectively saturates at a probability of ≈0.9.
Our swapping method allows us to test the significance of complications which can
undermine pair approximation techniques or make them impractical to apply, several
of which have been identified. First, introducing mutation into a game-theoretic dy-
namical system can make pair approximation treatments of that system give inaccurate
predictions [106,114].
Second, when the evolving population has a network structure, the presence of short
loops in the network often makes pair approximations fail [113]. For example, in a
triangular lattice, one can take a walk of three steps and return to one’s starting
point, whereas on a hexagonal lattice, the shortest closed circuit is six steps long. A
pair approximation can work well for a dynamical system defined on the hexagonal
lattice but fail when the same dynamics are played out on a triangular one. This
happens because the short loops provide opportunities for contact which the coarse-
graining necessary for a pair approximation will miss. (We will study this point in
more detail in Chapter 4.) This effect is amplified in adaptive network models, where
the underlying network changes dynamically in response to the population living upon
it. In such cases, even extending the moment closure to the triplet level brings little
improvement [70].
Third, fluctuating population sizes make pair approximations significantly more
cumbersome to construct, leading to systems of differential equations which are too
intricate to be significantly illuminating. In a game-theoretic model where a lattice is
completely filled at all times with cooperators and defectors, there is one independent
population density variable and three types of pairs. By contrast, in an ecological
model where two consumer varieties are competing within an adaptive network of
hosts, a pair approximation requires nine independent variables [95, 100, 101]. Mod-
eling phenomena of biological interest can easily increase the complexity still more.
For example, if organism behavior changes in response to social signals [72], the num-
ber of possible states per site, and thus the number of dynamical variables in a pair
approximation treatment, increases further.
Fourth, the pair-approximation philosophy of averaging over all pairs in the system
impedes the incorporation of environmental heterogeneities. These include biologically
crucial factors like variable organism mobility, background toxicity or other localized
“costs of living,” and resource availability [115].
Finally, dynamical pattern formation creates spatial arrangements which the pair
approximation does not describe [103]. This can be thought of as the ecosystem
generating its own environmental heterogeneities.
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3.3.5 Effect of Substrate Topology
It is instructive to compare the spatial lattice ecosystem with the host–consumer model
defined on a random regular graph (RRG). In an RRG, each node has the same num-
ber of neighbors, as they do in a lattice network, but the connections are otherwise
random. RRGs have been used as approximations to incorporate the effects of spatial
extent into population models, as they make for more tractable mathematical treat-
ments, although they are typically less realistic than spatial lattices [117]. The network
structure is set at the beginning of a simulation and does not change over time. The
important aspect of this network as compared to the spatial case is that there exist
short paths of links that couple all nodes of the network. This is quite different from
the spatial case, where strains in one part of the network cannot reach another in only
a few generations due to the need to traverse large numbers of spatially local links.
When we simulate our host–consumer ecosystem on an RRG, we find that an invasive
consumer strain with higher transmissibility τ can out-compete and overwhelm a native
consumer population with lower τ . In one typical simulation run, using the native and
invasive τ values of 0.33 and 0.45 respectively, 2,233 out of 10,000 invasions were
successful, whereas on the lattice no invasion succeeded using the same parameters.
Thus, the RRG does not capture the essential features of the spatial scenario. In
particular, our results show that the RRG case is more like the well-mixed case than
the spatial lattice, as far as stability against invasion is concerned.
Our swapping test provides insight into the utility of the pair approximation, which
can be effective for the RRG even though it is not for the spatial case. Consider the
pairwise correlation value qC|C , which would be a variable for a pair approximation
treatment. On an RRG, the underlying network topology provides enough locality
that pC and qC|C are unequal, distinct from the well mixed case as shown in Fig-
ure 3.5(A). This means that the pair approximation is nontrivial for the RRG as it
incorporates the difference between qC|C and pC , which would not be contained in a
mean-field treatment. We can also implement swapping on the RRG, where invasions
can succeed without it; as expected, swapping does not affect the success rate on the
RRG. With 10,000 simulated invasions for each case, the 95%-confidence interval for
the difference in success rates between full swapping and none is 0.004 ± 0.01. Thus,
the pair approximation may be successful in this network topology. However, this
does not mean that the RRG or the pair approximation capture the full significance
of a spatial system, because the RRG network does not embody essential properties
of spatial extent—separation by potentially large distances.
3.3.6 Percolation
In order to obtain quantitatively or even qualitatively correct predictions for spa-
tial host–consumer evolutionary dynamics, different approaches are needed. Having
encountered the limitations of moment closures, we now demonstrate a change of per-
spective which yields quantitatively useful results. In certain situations, the process of
pathogen propagation through the host population distributed in space can be mapped
onto a percolation problem. A topic widely investigated in mathematics, percolation
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theory deals with movement though a matrix of randomly placed obstacles. A pro-
totypical percolation problem is a fluid flowing downhill through a regular lattice of
channels, with some of the lattice junction points blocked at random. The key param-
eter is the fraction of blocked junction points. If this fraction is larger than a certain
threshold value, the fluid will be contained in a limited part of the system. However,
if the blocking fraction is below the threshold, the fluid can percolate arbitrarily far
from its starting point. This is a phase transition, a shift from one regime of behavior
to another, in this case between a phase in which fluid flow can continue indefinitely
and one in which flow always halts. Similar issues arise when a pathogen propagates
by cross-infection through a set of spatially arranged hosts. Sufficiently many hosts
in mutual contact are required for the pathogen to propagate successfully. Pathogen
strains therefore survive or die out over time depending on whether percolation is or
is not possible [52,99,102,118,119,120].
One important goal of studying host–pathogen models is knowing the pathogen
properties that enable its survival in a population, or equivalently what prevents it
from persisting in a population. The growth rate of a pathogen in a population can
be an important public health concern. We therefore focus on analyzing the minimum
value of the transmissibility that enables a pathogen population to persist, and the
growth dynamics of population sizes near that transition.
Of essential importance to the quantitative theoretical and empirical analysis is the
recognition that infected population growth can be described by power laws n ∼ tz,
with an exponent that differs from that of the mean field. Identifying the value of the
power z is important to practical projections of the number of infected individuals.
The initial growth curve of infected populations can be correctly extrapolated if the
exponent is known, guiding public health responses. Knowing what impediments are
needed to prevent further propagation can even better guide public health intervention
strategies.
We show in Figure 3.6 the results of numerical simulations which indicates that
the consumer extinction transition, when the transmissibility τ becomes just large
enough that the consumer population sustains itself, lies in the directed percolation
universality class [74,121,122,123,124]. A similar result has been reported for related
models [99,102], consistent with those models being in the same universality class. The
directed percolation universality class is a large set of models, all of which exhibit a
phase transition between two regimes of behavior, and all of which behave in essentially
the same way near their respective transition points. The scenario of fluid flow through
a random medium considered above is a classic example of a directed percolation-class
model, but many others exist as well [74, 121]. The critical exponents describe how
properties of the modeled system vary over time or as a function of how far the
control parameter is from the critical point. They are the same for all systems in the
universality class. Other universality classes exist as well, with different classes having
different quantitative values for the critical exponents. Identifying the universality
class a system belongs to enables us to study a complicated phenomenon by examining
a simpler representative of its class instead. This is convenient, because regions of
parameter space near phase transitions are precisely where mean-field and moment-
closure approximations are least reliable, even for short-timescale modeling. Near the
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Figure 3.6: (A) Population size as a function of time, averaged over 103 simulation
runs, for τ values near the transition points at g = 0 and g = 0.05 on the
spatial lattice, with v = 1. Dashed and solid lines indicate the popula-
tion growth for systems at dynamic percolation and directed percolation
transitions respectively, showing that these transitions have the character-
istic properties of those universality classes. (B) Critical τ for the host–
consumer ecosystem with v = 1. The transition line crosses over from the
dynamic percolation universality class at g = 0 to directed percolation be-
tween g = 0.015 and g = 0.02. Red Xs indicate the transition curve for
the host-consumer dynamics on a random regular graph (RRG) of uniform
degree 4; the dashed line connecting them is to guide the eye. The RRG
transition is neither directed percolation nor dynamic percolation.
phase transition, stochastic fluctuations create dynamical patterns with a wide range
of sizes. In Figure 3.6(A), we see that percolation theory gives quantitatively correct
predictions for the growth of consumer population sizes in the spatial host–consumer
model.
We can understand the g = 0 and g = 1 extremes by mapping the host–consumer
model onto other stochastic models for which exact or approximate results are avail-
able. When g = 0, the host–consumer model maps onto the SIR epidemic process [74].
In turn the SIR model on the square lattice can be understood in terms of bond
percolation on the square lattice [125], for which the transition point is known ex-
actly [126,127]. We can therefore predict analytically that the critical τ on the square
lattice is 0.5. Percolation theory also gives a prediction for the critical τ on an RRG:
it should be approximately 1/3 [128]. These both match the simulation results seen in
Figure 3.6(B).
In contrast, when g = 1, empty sites are filled as quickly as possible, so the behavior
of the host–consumer model should resemble that of an epidemic model with only
Susceptible and Infected sites. In this case, the transition point of the epidemic model
on the square lattice is only known numerically [125]. The numerical value, ≈ 0.29,
does agree with the critical τ found by simulating the host–consumer model at g = 1.
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Thus, in the limiting cases of g = 0 and g = 1, the host–consumer model is roughly
equivalent to the SIR and SIS epidemic models. However, a host–consumer model
with 0 < g < 1 has dynamical behavior distinct from an epidemic model which allows
reinfection of Recovered sites. The key difference is that reoccupying an empty site
with a consumer requires prior recolonization by a host, whereas the vulnerability of a
R[ecovered] individual to becoming I[nfected] is defined as an intrinsic property of the
R[ecovered] type. This changes the role of ecology: both models incorporate space,
but the effect of spatial extent is different. This manifests as a change in the shape of
the critical-threshold curve, as well as a change in universality class [74,125].
Furthermore, when we use an RRG topology instead, comparing host–consumer
dynamics at g = 1 with an SIS epidemic model reveals their transitions to take place
at different thresholds. For the host-consumer model, the critical τ on an RRG is
approximately 0.2615, while the SIS threshold is approximately 1/3 [129,130,131].
The physics analysis of percolation behavior near the transition point maps directly
onto the critical public health problem of the growth of infected populations, and more
generally onto the dynamics of evolutionary systems. For these systems the mean field
treatment fails and the standard transmission of infectious diseases in a population
need not apply. Applications to real world systems must accommodate the actual
network of connectivity. This network can also be modified by intervention strategies.
3.3.7 Patch Size and Structure
Since it is the size of a host patch which determines the amount of resources avail-
able for consumers, we now investigate patch sizes in detail. One way to test if the
host patches have a characteristic size is to take snapshots of the dynamics in its
quasi-steady-state regime (e.g., the fourth panel of Figure 3.1) and compute its auto-
correlation. We can do this by running the snapshot through a filter that produces
a binary matrix whose entries are 1 in locations occupied by hosts and 0 otherwise.
Applying FFTs and the Wiener–Khinchin theorem then yields a 2D autocorrelation
matrix, which by averaging we can collapse to a function of distance. If this au-
tocorrelation function has a characteristic distance scale—for example, if it decays
exponentially—then we can use that distance as the correlation length. We present
examples confirming this in Figure 3.7.
Next, Figure 3.8 summarizes the results of this procedure for host–host correlations
as we vary τ , holding the other parameters fixed at g = 0.1, v = 0.2. We see that the
correlation length of the host distribution, which we can regard as the characteristic
size of host patches, increases with τ . By choosing a different filter, we can apply the
same procedure to find the characteristic size of empty regions. The right panel of
Figure 3.8 summarizes the results.
We consider the following scenario: a native population of consumers, with transmis-
sibility τnat, is dynamically forming and re-forming host patches. Into this ecosystem,
a mutant consumer with transmissibility τmut is introduced. Call the characteristic
size of host patches ξH and the characteristic separation between them ξ0. Both of
these length scales will depend on g, v and τ . The length ξH(g, v, τ = τmut) is the
typical size of host patches in which the mutant variety “expects” to live. If this length
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Figure 3.7: The decay of host-host autocorrelation as a function of distance, for differ-
ent choices of τ (fixing v = 0.2, g = 0.1). Note that the correlation curve
for τ = 0.33 essentially coincides with the curve found when τ is a mutable
trait.
is too much larger than ξH(g, v, τ = τnat), the size of the patches which exist due to the
native population, then the mutant variety is likely to suffer a Malthusian catastrophe.
When we find the correlation lengths via simulations, as seen in Figures 3.8 and 3.9,
we see that both ξH and ξ0 increase with τ . Assuming that the deleterious effect of
“expecting” larger host patches grows with the discrepancy between “expected” and
actual patch sizes, the distribution of τ in the consumer population will accumulate
in the region where the ξH curve starts to take off.
The missing piece is an analytical expression for ξH and ξ0 in terms of the parameters
g, v and τ , when all these parameters are fixed. What is the functional form of
ξH = ξH(g, v, τ) and ξ0 = ξ0(g, v, τ) ? (3.1)
Figure 3.8 suggests that both correlation lengths depend roughly exponentially on τ ,
but the offsets and growth rates will depend on g and v.
One way in which we might try to estimate the length scale ξH and see, at least
qualitatively, how it depends on the system parameters, is to use a moment closure.
This method turns out not to work, and we now investigate why. Consider a square
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Figure 3.8: (Left) Correlation length of hosts for different values of τ (g = 0.1,
v = 0.2). The solid line is the curve ξH = α × exp(τ/β) + γ, where
the parameters found by least-squares fitting are α = 0.009 ± 0.002,
β = 0.068 ± 0.002 and γ = 1.59 ± 0.02. (Right) Correlation length
of empty space under the same conditions. The solid line is the curve
ξ0 = α × exp(τ/β) + γ, with α = 0.026 ± 0.007, β = 0.082 ± 0.004 and
γ = 1.20± 0.05.
lattice of size L×L, and assume for simplicity that it contains some number K of host
patches, all of a comparable size which we take to be the characteristic length ξH . The
population density of hosts is
pH =
Kξ2H
L2
. (3.2)
The quantity qH|H used in a pair approximation denotes the probability that a ran-
domly chosen neighbor site of a randomly chosen host will also contain a host. If we
imagine a patch of hosts in an otherwise empty lattice (for convenience, suppose the
patch is roughly circular), then sites in the interior of the patch have all their neigh-
boring lattice sites occupied by hosts, while sites on the edge have some empty space
adjacent. Only the sites on the perimeter can be responsible for decreasing qH|H below
unity. Writing P for perimeter and A for area, we have
qH|H = 1− KfP
A
, (3.3)
where f is a constant we can take to be roughly one-half. If, for simplicity, we assume
ordinary Euclidean scaling of perimeters and areas,
P ∼ ξH , A ∼ ξ2H , (3.4)
then we have that
qH|H = 1− Kf
′
ξH
. (3.5)
We have two quantities, pH and qH|H , which we can compute by numerically integrat-
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Figure 3.9: (Top) Host-host correlation length ξH for different values of τ (g = 0.1,
v = 0.4). The solid line is the curve ξH = α × exp(τ/β) + γ, where
the parameters found by least-squares fitting are α = 0.0089± 0.0005, β =
0.0893±0.0009 and γ = 1.81±0.01. (Bottom) Void-void correlation length
ξ0 under the same conditions. Here, α = 0.014± 0.001, β = 0.096± 0.002
and γ = 1.51± 0.02.
ing a set of coupled differential equations. And we have two unknowns: the patch size
ξH and the number of patches K. We solve for ξH , obtaining
ξ3H = f
′L2
pH
1− qH|H . (3.6)
As the conditional probability qH|H approaches unity, the patch size increases.
Unfortunately, when we compute pH and qH|H by numerically iterating the dynam-
ical equations (see [95,100,101]), we find that the inferred ξH value decreases with τ .
The direction of the change, as predicted by pair approximation, is incorrect! This is
a sign that the pair approximation is losing important information about larger-scale
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structures.
Another possible way to predict how ξH and ξ0 depend on g, v and τ comes from the
theory of spatial stochastic processes. For some models, we can derive an analytical
expression for the power spectrum of fluctuations, as a function of both spatial and
temporal oscillation frequencies. A peak in this power spectrum indicates a charac-
teristic length or time scale [132, 133, 134]. Because the host–consumer lattice model
differs in a few significant ways from those treated by these methods before, we defer
a detailed exploration of this idea until a later chapter. The upshot appears to be that
the characteristic length scale increases in the proper direction, that is, with increasing
τ , although thanks to the differences hinted at, the concavity may not be correct.
Figure 3.10: Typical frames from host–consumer simulations run with different values
of the transmissibility τ (the other parameters are fixed at g = 0.1, v =
0.2). (Top left) τ = 0.30; (top right) τ = 0.35; (bottom left) τ = 0.40;
(bottom right) τ = 0.45.
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At this point, we might be concerned that computing a correlation length in this
fashion could be smearing over too much. If there are many small patches and a few
large ones (and Figure 3.10 makes this look plausible), then does reducing the pattern
to a single correlation length lose any important information? To cross-check the idea
that host patch size controls the evolved transmissibility, we therefore measure patch
size in another way.
The most straightforward way to assign a size to a patch is to count the number of
lattice sites it contains. This has the advantage that while we are computing it, we
can also count the number of sites in the patch which border on empty space. So, we
can see how the perimeters of host patches relate to their areas. If host patches were
Euclidean circles, then the perimeter would scale as the area to the one-half power.
On the other hand, a patch which consists of a single site in a discrete lattice is all
boundary: its perimeter and its area are equal. Our patches live on a square lattice,
so a cluster of hosts must contain at least five individuals for its area to be greater
than its perimeter. The more hosts are contained within the cluster, the more likely
the cluster is to have an interior. We therefore expect a crossover: below some value
of the area, the maximum observed perimeter will be equal to the area. Above the
crossover point, the maximum observed perimeter will grow more slowly. Noting that
the patch dynamics are stochastic and their edges irregular, we hypothesize that this
growth will be faster than the area-to-the-0.5 obtained for Euclidean circles.
Figure 3.11 bears this out. When we plot the perimeters of host clusters against
their areas, we see a crossover at an area of ≈ 30 lattice sites (for g = 0.1, v = 0.2).
Furthermore, the increase of perimeter with area above the crossover point is faster
than the square root of the area.
Pascual et al. [135] study the cluster-size distribution for prey in a predator–prey
model which is similar to our host–consumer ecosystem. However, they do not find a
crossover: instead, cluster perimeter scales smoothly and just barely sublinearly with
cluster area, across the whole range of observed areas. This may be due to an extra
mixing effect which their model includes and ours does not, an effect which tends to
bring more of a cluster to its perimeter.
Having measured the host patch sizes, we can investigate the size distribution. Fig-
ure 3.12 shows the numbers of patches observed at different sizes. The fall-off of
frequency with area is faster than an inverse-area relationship, though not uniform.
At first blush, an appropriate characterization would be a power-law decay with an
exponential cutoff. Because this distribution is fairly broad, we use a percentile to
characterize it: we find the value of the area such that 99% of the host patches are
that size or smaller. This is indicated by the vertical dashed line in Figure 3.12.
We see the results of repeating this calculation across a range of τ values in Fig-
ure 3.13. The minimum of the 99th-percentile curve gives the value of the transmissi-
bility which evolves when τ is a mutable trait!
We can understand this, heuristically, using much the same argument we made
above. A consumer strain which “expects” that large host patches are available will
fare poorly if they are not. When τ is evolvable, the τ distribution of the consumer
population will tend to concentrate around the minimum of the 99th-percentile curve.
In the short term, local subpopulations with higher τ can blossom, causing occasional
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Figure 3.11: Perimeters of host patches, plotted against their areas (g = 0.1, v = 0.2,
τ = 0.44). The upper (red) straight line indicates linear growth, and the
lower (green) line indicates square-root growth. Note the crossover at
area ≈30 lattice sites. Below the crossover point, the maximum observed
perimeter toes the line of linear growth, indicating that host patches exist
which have no interior.
upward shifts in the average τ . We expect, therefore, that the average τ in the evolving
population will lie somewhat to the right of the curve’s minimum point.
The hypothesis that these curves can be well approximated by exponentially trun-
cated power laws can be validated by standard curve-fitting techniques [136]. Apply-
ing methods suitable to power-law analysis reveal that for all τ values, the number
of patches decays with roughly the 1.5 power of the patch area. The location of the
cutoff determined by curve-fitting follows, unsurprisingly, the relationship seen with
the 99th-percentile areas (Figure 3.13). One should take care, however, when applying
these statistical methods and interpreting the results, as they presume an indepen-
dence among data points which may or may not be applicable here. If it is the case,
for example, that large patches are typically accompanied by smaller patches nearby,
then the assumption of statistical independence would be invalid.
The qualitative shape of the area/abundance curve, that is, the power-law depen-
dence with an exponential cutoff, is also seen in the results of coagulation and fragmen-
tation processes [137,138]. Furthermore, such distributions are known to be maximum
entropy distributions: they arise when one maximizes the Shannon entropy (which we
will discuss in Chapter 5), subject to a certain type of constraint [139]. This suggests
that the general functional form is rather robust.
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It is a good idea to try and understand the shape of the 99th-percentile curves
(Figure 3.13) heuristically, since the minima of those curves indicate the values to
which τ will evolve. Suppose, for concreteness, that the abundance as a function of
area is a power-law decay with an exponential cutoff. Why should the cutoff decrease
and then increase? Can we think of this in terms of countervailing influences?
First, we consider the low-τ regime. When τ is small, the cutoff should be large,
because the system is near a critical point, and critical points mean power laws. The
closer we move towards criticality, the better the quality of the power law, and the
less noticeable any cutoff will be. Therefore, as we increase τ , we move away from
criticality, and the deviation from a clean power law becomes more severe. This
qualitatively explains the decreasing part of the curve in Figure 3.13.
What about when τ is large—say, when it is larger than the value to which it
would evolve when mutation is present? Here, the theory of critical points is no longer
pertinent, and we find guidance instead in the study of coagulation and fragmentation
processes. Numerical simulations indicate that for each value of v and g, there is a
region along the τ axis where the total host population size does not strongly depend
upon τ (see Figure 3.14). That is, when τ is large, we can adjust it and the host
population size P will not change too much in response. This suggests that we can
construct a simplified model in which P is a parameter that we can vary independently
of the consumer transmissibility.
Gueron and Levin develop a model of group-size dynamics wherein a population of
fixed total size is divided into groups that can merge and split stochastically [137]. The
rates of merging and splitting are taken to be functions of the group sizes. If x and y
are the sizes of two groups, then the probability per unit time that those groups will
merge is m(x, y). Similarly, the probability per unit time that a group of size x will
fission into fragments of sizes y and x− y is s(x, y). A convenient choice of functional
form that allows some analytical solutions is to take
m(x, y) = µa(x)a(y), (3.7)
where a(x) is an increasing function of x and µ is a rate parameter. (For example, the
probability of merging might increase with the surface area of each group, implying a
power-law dependence on the group population.) The splitting rate is taken to be
s(x, y) = 2σa(x). (3.8)
This stochastic process has a stationary solution: the distribution of patch sizes
follows the truncated decay
f(x) =
2σ
µ
(
1
a(x)
)
e−x/xc . (3.9)
The cutoff xc is fixed by the total population size:
P =
2σ
µ
∫ ∞
0
dz
z
a(z)
e−z/xc . (3.10)
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In our host–consumer ecosystem, host patches split apart because they are eaten
into by consumers. They can merge together on their own, but their fission requires
consumption. Very crudely speaking, the splitting rate should increase with the con-
sumer population density. (In a slightly more refined approximation, we could say
that the splitting rate should increase with the contact probability qH|C .) This corre-
sponds, in the Gueron–Levin model, to increasing σ. If we imagine that P and µ are
fixed, increasing σ must be balanced by decreasing the value of the integral. Likewise,
lower consumer density corresponds to lower σ and thus a larger value for the integral.
The only way to change the value of the integral, if the function a(z) is a given, is to
alter the cutoff xc. To obtain a larger value, we move the cutoff farther out.
We have, therefore, that if the host density is constant with respect to τ but the
consumer density falls, then the cutoff should be larger. When we measure the densities
by numerical simulation, these are the trends we find at larger τ , and so the upswing
fits neatly into our picture.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 together indicate that while pair approximation itself fails to
capture the eco-evolutionary dynamics of the spatial system, it can provide a qualita-
tively useful guide when combined with a coagulation/fragmentation model and the
principle that host patch size controls consumer transmissibility by way of localized
Malthusian catastrophes.
The distribution of areas (Figure 3.12) and the perimeter-area relationship (Fig-
ure 3.11) together provide an approximation to the complexity profile of the host-patch
system, as we defined it back in Chapter 2. Crudely speaking, the interesting part of a
host patch is its boundary: in order to say what the patch might do next, we need to
know what is happening at its edges. Therefore, the effective information content of a
host patch should scale, roughly, with its perimeter. If we neglect the influences of one
patch upon another, we can approximate the host population as a collection of blocks,
and we can invoke the sum rule stated in §2.1.2. Each block contributes a rectangle
to the complexity profile. The width of the rectangle is the number of hosts in the
patch, and the height is the information content, which is given by the perimeter.
Alternatively, by interchanging the axes, we can construct an MUI curve in the same
way. In either case, the structure index so defined will only be an approximation.
3.4 Discussion
But the problem, here, is that it’s a form of adaptation that hasn’t been
studied enough in animals and plants, which is that each change in the
species changes what we call the environment, so there is a co-evolution of
organism and environment. [. . . ] The organism by its evolution changes
the conditions of its life and changes what surrounds it. Organisms are
always creating their own hole in the world, their own niche.
—Richard Lewontin [140]
Understanding the effects of spatial extent is a vital part of evolutionary ecology.
Spatial extent changes the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of a model’s
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Figure 3.12: Number of host patches observed as a function of patch area (g = 0.1,
v = 0.2, τ = 0.33). The vertical dashed line indicates the 99th percentile,
that is, the point at which 99% of the patches are that size or smaller.
The sloping dashed line indicates a decay with the inverse of area, for
comparison purposes.
evolutionary behavior, compared to well-mixed models. The short-term success rate
of novel genetic varieties is not indicative of their long-term chance of success relative
to the prevalent type. Standard stability criteria fail to reflect the actual stability
achieved over time. We must instead consider extended timescales because they are
determined by spatial patterns, whose ongoing formation is an intrinsic part of nonequi-
librium evolutionary dynamics. Our analysis provides a clear understanding of why
there are dramatic differences between spatial models and mean-field models, which
simplify away heterogeneity through mixing populations, averaging over variations or
mandating a globally connected patch structure. We have further shown that trans-
planting organisms dramatically changes the dynamics of spatial systems, even when
we preserve local correlations as would be considered in a pair approximation treat-
ment. Our results prove that any model striving to capture the effects of heterogeneity
that does not change its behavior with organism transplanting cannot fully capture
the dynamics of spatial evolution. The following subsections summarize the general
conclusions we draw from these results.
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Figure 3.13: 99th percentile of host patch area versus consumer transmissibility τ ,
for v = 0.2 and v = 0.4 (computed with g = 0.1). The dashed vertical
lines indicate the average transmissibilities which evolve when v and g are
fixed.
3.4.1 Defining Fitness
In our host–consumer models, each individual either survives or it does not, and any
individual has a specific number of offspring and survives over a certain amount of
time; that is to say, an “individual fitness” (in the terminology of [141]) is a well-
defined concept. To find expected individual fitness, or average individual fitness, we
must define a set of individual organisms over which to take an average, which is the
very concept we have established to be problematic. Consequently, derived notions
of fitness, which depend on comparisons between such averages [141], become elusive,
context-dependent quantities. The problem is both temporal and spatial: Average
relative fitness in one generation is not necessarily a good measure of the long-term
success of a strain in one, or a combination of, the broad variety of dynamically-
generated niches. This problem is not, however, the same as the traditional concept
of variation of fitness across a static set of niches, because the niche dynamics of our
spatially explicit model ensures that evolutionary outcomes are not reflected in any
standard definition of the average.
In the previous chapter, we examined the idea of “frequency-dependent fitness” [44,
45], and one might be inclined to apply that term to voracious invasive strains in
this system, as the invasive strain is successful initially when rare but fails when
it becomes more common. The term “frequency-dependent fitness” is, however, a
misnomer in this context, because the organism type is rare and successful when it is
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Figure 3.14: Host and consumer densities as a function of τ , with g = 0.1 and v = 0.2.
Note that the agreement between the simulation results and the pair
approximation is better for the host density than for the consumers. The
pair approximation for this ecosystem was developed by de Aguiar et
al. [95, 100,101] and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
newly introduced, but as it declines to extinction it becomes rare and unsuccessful.
Nor can we attribute the decline to the frequency of hosts: the average population
density of hosts remains essentially unchanged, because the boom and the following
bust are localized. Frequency, being defined by an average over the whole ecosystem, is
only a proper variable to use for describing the ecosystem in the panmictic case. One
might attempt to refine the concept of global frequency by including local frequencies.
However, the breakdown of moment-closure techniques implies that defining fitness
as a function of organism type together with average local environment [142] will, in
many circumstances, not be an adequate solution.
Consequently, we find that trying to assign a meaningful invasion fitness value to
an invasive variety of organism is too drastic a simplification. In turn, this implies
that we cannot assign a fitness value to a phenotypic or genetic characteristic such as
infectiousness or transmissibility. To understand this point, we rephrase the spatial
host–consumer model in terms of alleles. In an invasion scenario, an individual con-
sumer can have one of two possible alleles of the “transmissibility gene”, one coding
for the native value of τ (e.g., τ = 0.33) and the other for the invasive value (e.g.,
τ = 0.45). A mean-field treatment would then involve specifying the fraction of the
population which carries the native allele versus the fraction which carries the invasive
variant. We have seen, however, that the predictions based on such a heavily coarse-
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Figure 3.15: Estimates of the evolved transmissibility as a function of the host death
rate v (with g = 0.1). These values were obtained by combining the re-
sults of pair approximation with the insights from the Gueron–Levin co-
agulation and fragmentation model and the idea that the host-patch-size
cutoff controls the evolution of τ . By searching in the pair approximation
for a region where dqH|C/dτ < 0 and dpH/dτ > −C, we identified that
part of the τ axis where patch splitting is suppressed and the cutoff ele-
vated. We set C = 0.75 based on the pH(τ) curves computed for v = 0.2
and v = 0.4. This value, in turn, provides a reasonable estimate for the
evolved transmissibility obtained at other values of v.
grained caricature of the original model deviate from its actual behavior. In short,
the evolutionary dynamics cannot be characterized using the allele frequencies at a
particular time.
If we can no longer summarize the genetic character of a population by an allele
frequency—or a set of allele frequencies for well-defined local subpopulations—then
computing the fitness of a genotype from its generation-to-generation change in fre-
quency is a fruitless task. In a world which exhibits nonequilibrium spatial pattern
formation, allele frequencies are the wrong attribute for understanding the dynamics
of natural selection. Formally, the conventional assumption that the allele frequencies
are a sufficient set of variables to describe evolutionary dynamics is incorrect. The
spatial structure itself is a necessary part of the system description at a particular
time in order to determine the subsequent generation outcomes, even in an average
sense.
The timescale-dependence issues which arise in spatial host–consumer ecosystems
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exist in a wider context. Multiple examples indicate that initial success and eventual
fixation are only two extremes of a continuum which must be understood in its en-
tirety to grasp the stability of a system. In the study of genetic drift, it has been
found that neutral mutations can fixate and beneficial mutations fail to fixate due to
stochasticity [44]. Likewise, in the study of clonal interference [143,144], one beneficial
mutation can out-compete another and prevent its fixation. Closer to the theme of this
chapter, recent work has also emphasized that selection acting at multiple timescales
is important for the evolution of multicellularity [145,146].
Furthermore, classical genetics makes much use of the Price equation for study-
ing the change in a population’s genetic composition over time [46, 47], and it is
well known that analytic models built using the Price equation lack “dynamic suf-
ficiency”. That is, the equation requires more information about the current gen-
eration than it produces about the next [33, 45, 47, 147, 148], and so predictions for
many-generation phenomena must be made carefully, if they can be made at all. Mod-
eling approaches which are fundamentally grounded in the Price equation, such as
“neighbor-modulated” fitness calculations [46, 59, 89, 149, 150, 151] and their “multi-
level” counterparts [46, 55, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155], are not likely to work well here, as
the analyses in question draw conclusions only from the short-timescale regime. In
addition, those particular analyses which address host–consumer-like dynamics either
rely on moment closures [89] or they assume a fixed, complete connection topology of
local populations which are internally well-mixed [59,152]. These simplified population
structures are quite unlike the dynamical patch formation seen in the host–consumer
lattice model. (Wild and Taylor [156] demonstrate an equivalence between stability
criteria defined via immediate gains, or “reproductive fitness”, and criteria defined
using fixation probability; however, their proofs are explicitly formulated for the case
of a well-mixed population of constant size, neither assumption being applicable here.
Whether fixation probability is equivalent to any other criterion of evolutionary success
generally depends on mutation rates, even in panmixia [33].)
We will discuss invasion fitness and moment-closure calculations in more mathemat-
ical detail in Chapter 8. The Price equation and the ideas which cluster around it will
be our subject in Chapter 9.
In the adaptive dynamics literature, models have been studied in which “the resident
strikes back” [157, 158, 159]. That is, an initially rare mutant variety M can invade
a resident population of type R, but M does not supplant R and become the new
resident variety, even though a population full of type M is robust against incursions
by type R. This is often considered a rare occurrence, requiring special conditions to
obtain [158,159], though the theorems proved to that effect apply to nonspatial models,
and in adaptive dynamics, it is standard to consider small differences between mutant
and resident trait values. The spatial host–consumer ecosystem has the important
property that, if mutation is an ongoing process, the spatial extent allows genetic
diversity to grow. We initialize the system with all the consumers having the same
trait value, but soon enough, different local subpopulations have different trait values.
If the effects of single mutations are small, then the different varieties arising have
roughly comparable survival probabilities, and so the distribution of extant trait values
can spread out. However, the cumulative effect of many mutations which happen to
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act in the same direction on a trait such as transmissibility creates a variety which may
engender its own local Malthusian catastrophe. So, the results of rare, big mutations
tell us about the spread of trait values we see in the case of frequent, small mutations.
Chapter 6 will treat adaptive dynamics in greater depth, exploring the simplifica-
tions which its approximations allow. In essence, adaptive dynamics illustrates the
maxim that when one can apply a Taylor expansion, one can simplify. One finds that
reductions in complexity depend upon assumptions of smoothness that are remarkably
convenient, but are not always applicable.
In our model, transmissibility and consumer death rate are independently adjustable
parameters. One can also build a model in which one of these quantities is tied to the
other, for example by imposing a tradeoff between transmissibility and virulence of a
disease. Different functional forms of such a relationship are appropriate for modeling
different ecosystems: host/pathogen, prey/predator, sexual/parthenogenetic and so
forth. As long as spatial pattern formation occurs and organism type impacts on the
environment of descendants via ecosystem engineering, the shortcomings of mean-field
theory are relevant, as are limitations of pair approximations [90].
3.4.2 Pair Approximations and Stability
Pair approximations have been used to test for the existence of an Evolutionary Stable
Strategy (ESS) in a system—that is, a strategy which, when established, cannot be suc-
cessfully replaced by another [113]. In addition to the limitations of pair approximation
for representing patch structure [104], as we saw in the previous section, the question
of whether a mutant strain can initially grow is distinct from the question of whether
that strain achieves fixation or goes extinct [81, 92, 115, 143, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164].
The former is a question about short-term behavior, and the latter concerns effects
apparent at longer timescales. This distinction is often lost or obscured in analytical
treatments. The reason is that one typically tests whether a new type can invade by
linearizing the corresponding differential equations at a point where its density is negli-
gible. However, this only reveals the initial growth rate (see the fixed-point eigenvalue
analysis in [51,95,103,104]).
Our analysis implies that pair approximations are inadequate for analysis of systems
with spatial inhomogeneity. Even including including triple and other higher-order
corrections does not suffice, as this series approximation is poorly behaved at phase
transitions [111]. Such higher order terms continue to reflect only the local structure
of the system and not the existence of well separated areas that diverge in their ge-
netic composition. Nonequilibrium pattern formation will necessarily also be poorly
described, at least until the order of expansion reaches the characteristic number of
elements in a patch, or an area that encompasses any relevant heterogeneity. Given
the algebraic intricacy of higher-order corrections to pair approximations [95,117,165],
it is useful to know in advance whether such elaborations have a chance at success.
As approximation techniques based on successively refining mean-field treatments are
blind to important phenomena, we therefore need to build our analytical work on a
different conceptual foundation.
70
3.4 Discussion
3.4.3 Percolation
The mathematical connection between pathogen–host and percolation problems can
provide insight into the difficulties in analytical treatment of the biological problem.
Spatial heterogeneity gives rise to failure of traditional analytic treatments of perco-
lation and a need for new methodologies. Since the pathogen problem maps onto the
percolation problem under some circumstances, the same analytic problems must arise
in the biological context. While the presence of a nonequilibrium transition point in-
dicates that traditional analysis techniques fail, it raises the possibility that new tools
from the theory of phase transitions [74, 111, 121, 166] will become applicable. For
example, in Section 3.3.6, we saw that percolation theory enables us to make quanti-
tatively accurate predictions of population growth and of the critical parameter values
which divide one ecological regime from another. Indeed, specific important problems
in public health, such as the growth in number of individuals infected in a pandemic,
can be considered directly within the context of percolation. Simulations of propaga-
tion on approximations of real world networks may help provide accurate predictions,
but the general properties of disease propagation can be understood analytically.
Later, in Chapter 4, we will see that percolation models are also helpful in evolu-
tionary game theory, where they yield quantitative results near phase transitions, as
they do for host–consumer models. Chapter 7 will develop the mathematics necessary
to understand percolation phase transitions. Pursuing this topic in depth will take us
into the subject of statistical field theory.
3.4.4 Adaptive Networks
Our results also have significance in the context of adaptive-network research. This
field studies systems in which a network’s wiring pattern and the states of its nodes
change in interrelated ways. Prior modeling efforts have considered epidemics on
adaptive networks, where the spread of the disease through the network changes the
connections of the network [110, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173]. In such models, if a
susceptible node has an infected neighbor, it can break that connection by rewiring to
another susceptible node. A key point in the analysis is that the new neighbor is chosen
at random from the eligible population. This choice of rewiring scheme is exactly
what makes a pair approximation work for that epidemic model, because it eliminates
higher-order correlations in the system [110]. (Chapter 8 will develop in detail how
this method of rewiring allows us to write differential equations for the model.) In our
system, by contrast, hosts can form new connections by reproducing into empty sites,
but these contacts can only connect geographically proximate individuals.
The difference we have seen between lattice behavior on one hand and RRG or
swapping-enabled behavior on the other emphasizes the need to study the effect of spa-
tial proximity on link rewiring. While the structure-erasing nature of unconstrained
rewiring among susceptible hosts has been acknowledged [170,171], new rewiring rules
which reflect spatial and community structure have yet to be systematically inves-
tigated. The reason that they have not is naturally related to the need for different
analytic approaches. “Myopic” rewiring rules, such as restricting the set of eligible new
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partners to the neighbors of a node’s current partners, have on occasion been consid-
ered, but in contexts other than epidemiology, like evolutionary game theory [174,175],
making the endeavour of exploring such rules in epidemic models all the more worth
pursuing.
3.4.5 Conclusions
Fisher [176] introduced modern genetic theory in large part motivated by the need to
describe the existence of biodiversity.1 However, the expressions he described which
apply in panmictic populations and mean-field treatments lead to a population genetics
that rapidly converges to homogeneous populations. Spatial extents and their violation
of the mean-field approximations are a key to biodiversity in nature. Their proper
theoretical treatment will be a large step forward for evolutionary biology.
Most laboratory experiments, guided by traditional evolutionary thinking, have used
well-mixed populations. The results obtained are consistent with theoretical analysis
precisely because the conditions are consistent with those assumptions. Such exper-
iments do not provide insight into the role of spatial extent and the implications for
real-world biological populations. A growing number of experiments today are go-
ing beyond such conditions and, as is to be expected, are obtaining quite different
results [64,84,87,92,118,119,164,178,179,180].
Mean-field models are often helpful as a first step towards understanding the behav-
ior of systems, but we cannot trust them to provide a complete story, and we should
not let mean-field thinking furnish all the concepts we use to reason about evolution-
ary dynamics. Our analysis of transplanting organisms can be considered parallel to
real world concerns and manifest effects of invasive species introduced by human activ-
ity and the impact of shipping and air transportation on pathogen evolution [81, 91].
These are among the well-established examples of situations in which spatial extent
influences evolutionary dynamics [32,108,164,179,181,182,183,184,185,186,187]. Iden-
tifying specific implications of the issues explored in this chapter for particular biolog-
ical systems [64,84,87,92,118,119,164,178,179,180,188,189,190,191] requires field and
laboratory work, as well as theoretical insight to guide the questions that are being
asked.
This chapter is based in part on a paper by myself, Andreas Gros and Yaneer Bar-
Yam, originally published in October 2011 and updated at the beginning of 2014 [192].
The research reported in that paper was a project I initiated, building on earlier work
by Bar-Yam, de Aguiar, Rauch, Sayama, Werfel and others. I wrote the first version of
the basic simulation code; Andi figured out how to distribute the work across multiple
computers and implemented the organism-swapping idea, which I had after a conver-
sation with him about something tangentially related. The paper-writing process was
a collaboration, in which I produced most of the words and my coauthors provided the
Darwinian editorial pressure.
1His Genetical Theory of Natural Selection also includes the interesting remark, “No practical bi-
ologist interested in sexual reproduction would be led to work out the detailed consequences
experienced by organisms having three or more sexes; yet what else should he do if he wishes to
understand why the sexes are, in fact, always two?” Biology replies, “Always two?” [177]
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The ability of any organism to survive and produce viable offspring depends on its
environment, and that environment consists in significant part other living beings. In
Chapter 3, we studied this in an evolutionary system based on ecological competition:
success required having food to eat. Now, we turn to evolutionary dynamics defined
using game theory. Interactions among organisms will be represented by mathemati-
cal games, and reproductive success will depend on the numerical payoffs won when
individuals play those games together.
We can think of the evolutionary game which will be our focus for this chapter as
a realization of the general idea discussed at the end of Chapter 2. This game, which
we designate the Volunteer’s Dilemma, is a scenario in which organisms must act in
concert to achieve success in the struggle for life.
4.1 Well-Mixed Populations with Carrying Capacity
We introduce the Volunteer’s Dilemma in the context of two species living in the same
environment. The ecosystem is well-mixed, so we can describe it by population densi-
ties. The total number of individuals is restricted, so that the sum of the population
densities is bounded by unity:
v + s ≤ 1. (4.1)
Here, v denotes the population density of Volunteers, and s is the population density
of Slackers. The game is played in the following way: a group of K ≥ 3 agents is
assembled by randomly drawing from the population. Volunteers pay a cost, c. If all
the agents in the group volunteer, then they each gain a benefit, b. A single agent
slacking off deprives all the agents from gaining the benefit. Note that we are here
taking the “benefit” and “cost” of strategies as given parameters of the model, rather
than as emergent consequences derived from some more fundamental dynamics. This
is unlike the way in which the idea of competition is realized in the spatial host–
consumer system of Chapter 3; we can think of these two different styles of modeling
as complementary.
This game is also known as an n-player stag hunt [193,194,195]. We will stick with
the Volunteer’s Dilemma terminology in this chapter in order to avoid ambiguity: the
stag hunt game is typically defined as a two-player interaction, and so “n people play a
stag-hunt game” could be interpreted as one person engaging in two-player stag hunts
with n−1 others, and then receiving the total payoff from these n−1 separate games.
Reproduction in this environment depends upon the availability of empty space, so
the probability of a reproduction event diminishes as the total population density v+s
increases. We take a pessimistic view of volunteerism: the cost of being a volunteer
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must be paid whether or not reproduction happens. This is an idealization of a case
where, for example, volunteering requires additional metabolic products which demand
heightened energy expenditure regardless of the availability of space to reproduce into.
Consequently, we treat the cost c as augmenting the death rate d, while the benefit
b augments the growth rate, which is also modulated by the total population density.
For convenience, we define k = K−1 to be the number of additional Volunteers which
a Volunteer must have in its peer group in order to obtain the benefit. We write the
following coupled equations for the time evolution of the ecosystem:
v˙ = −(d+ c)v +
[
g + b
(
v
v + s
)k]
v(1− v − s), (4.2)
s˙ = −ds+ gs(1− v − s). (4.3)
We follow Durrett and Levin [196] in having the cost and benefit parameters directly
modify the relevant rates. The parameters b, c, d and g are all positive. The increase
in Volunteer reproduction due to the benefit b depends on how likely it is that a pool
of k agents will contain only Volunteers. A generalization is possible to a case where
the size n of the interacting group is larger than the critical number k of Volunteers
required to gain the benefit. This would introduce a term of the form
b
n∑
j=k
(
n
j
)(
s
v + s
)n−j (
v
v + s
)j
. (4.4)
All along the line v + s = 1, the phase-space flow is inward, because both v˙ and s˙
are negative. Equations (4.2) and (4.3) have an obvious fixed point at the origin. If
v = 0, then Eq. (4.3) reduces to
s˙ = −ds+ gs(1− s), (4.5)
which has a stable equilibrium at
s∗ = 1− d
g
. (4.6)
Likewise, if s = 0, then the population is all Volunteers, and
v˙ = −(d+ c)v + (g + b)v(1− v), (4.7)
which has a stable equilibrium located on the v-axis at
v∗ = 1− d+ c
g + b
. (4.8)
When we move off the axes and consider the v–s plane, then the all-Slacker fixed point
is a stable node, while the all-Volunteer fixed point at (v∗, 0) may or may not be stable.
Its stability depends on whether or not there exists another fixed point in the off-axis
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region.
If both v and s are nonzero, then setting s˙ = 0 in Eq. (4.3) shows that
(v∗∗ + s∗∗) = 1− d
g
. (4.9)
Setting v˙ = 0 in Eq. (4.2) and substituting in this expression for the total population
density yields (
v∗∗
v∗∗ + s∗∗
)k
=
cg
bd
. (4.10)
The left-hand side must be less than or equal to unity, so for this to be valid, we must
have cg ≤ bd, or
b
c
≥ g
d
. (4.11)
If this is satisfied, then
v∗∗ =
(cg
bd
)1/k (
1− d
g
)
. (4.12)
The fixed point at (v∗∗, s∗∗) is a saddle point, and if it exists, then the all-Volunteer
equilibrium at (v∗, 0) is a stable node. Otherwise, the equilibrium (v∗, 0) is a saddle
point, unstable to an off-axis push. The location of the all-Volunteer equilibrium on
the v-axis is independent of the group size k; however, its basin of attraction is not.
The region within which evolutionary trajectories go to (v∗, 0) depends on the location
of the coexistence equilibrium, (v∗∗, s∗∗), and as we have just seen, both v∗∗ and s∗∗
depend on k. This is another appearance of the theme we encountered in Chapter 3:
the stability or instability of fixed points does not tell us everything we need to know
about evolutionary dynamics. Note that there is no assortment of like types in this
model: the groups within which individuals interact form at random, without regard to
types. Nor can the effects of social behaviors on individual fitness be decomposed into
a linear combination of pairwise interactions. The success or failure of the Volunteer
type is a genuinely and irreducibly synergistic effect.
We will return to this point and see what it means for the traditional language of
population biology in Chapter 9. In that context, we will see that the stability criterion
we have here, Eq. (4.11), has both familiar and surprising features. To put the matter
briefly, that the rule takes the ratio of a benefit parameter to a cost one is a common-
place attribute [197], but what the rule compares that ratio to is not. Furthermore,
that the rule does not depend on any kind of assortment among genetically similar
individuals is, from a traditional perspective, a surprising outcome. We can interpret
this rule as saying that in an ecosystem containing one Slacker and many Volunteers,
if a group forms which contains the Slacker, that group will on the whole perform
worse than those comprising only Volunteers. Consequently, the Slacker strategy will
be penalized by natural selection, if b/c is sufficiently large.
We now establish the stability conditions for the all-Volunteer equilibrium explicitly,
by linearizing the system’s dynamics near that fixed point. For brevity, we define the
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Figure 4.1: (Left) Phase portrait for the continuous, well-mixed Volunteer’s Dilemma
ecosystem, in the regime where Volunteerism is an unstable strategy
(g = 0.15, d = 0.1, b = c = 0.2, k = 3). Note that of the three fixed
points, the origin is unstable, the all-Slacker equilibrium is stable, and the
all-Volunteer equilibrium is only stable along the v axis. (Right) Phase
portrait in the regime where Volunteerism is stable (g = 0.15, d = 0.1,
b = 0.4, c = 0.2, k = 3). Note the presence of an additional fixed point.
abbreviations
x = v + s, p =
(
v
v + s
)k
. (4.13)
The Jacobian of the dynamics defined by Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) is, in terms of these new
variables,
J =
( −(d+ c) + bkpsx (1− x) + (g + bp)(1− x− v) − bkpsx (1− x)− v(g + bp)−gs −d+ g(1− x− s)
)
.
(4.14)
At the all-Volunteer equilibrium, all terms proportional to s drop out, and the Jacobian
reduces to a conveniently upper-triangular form:
J =
(
(d+ c)− (g + b) (d+ c)− (g + b)
0 −d+ g(d+c)g+b
)
. (4.15)
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The eigenvalues of this matrix are
λ1 = (d+ c)− (g + b), (4.16)
λ2 = −d+ g(d+ c)
g + b
. (4.17)
From Eq. (4.8), we know that d+c is always less than g+ b, if v∗ is a valid equilibrium
distinct from the origin. Therefore, λ1 is guaranteed to be negative. The condition for
λ2 to be negative is exactly Eq. (4.11). As promised, the all-Volunteer configuration is
a stable one, provided that the ratio of the benefit b to the cost c is greater than g/d,
the ratio of the baseline growth and death rates. This rule has the appealing feature
that the game-payoff parameters appear on one side, and the baseline rates on the
other.
Contrast this with what happens if we define the dynamics using the Prisoner’s
Dilemma instead. This game, more widely studied than the Volunteer’s Dilemma, is a
two-player game, rather than a game for an arbitrarily large number of simultaneous
players. We recall its definition from Chapter 2: Again, there are two strategies, which
we can designate by Valiant and Slinker. (This terminology is nonstandard, but it
lets us keep the same variable names.) Also as before, the interaction payoffs depend
upon two parameters, which we can call b and c. Valiant individuals pay a cost c and
gain a benefit b if their interaction partner is also Valiant. Meanwhile, Slinkers gain
the same benefit from playing with a Valiant, but pay no cost. A Slinker who plays
against another Slinker pays nothing and gains nothing. If individuals play with more
than one partner during their lifespans, the total benefit they accrue is the sum of the
payoffs gained in each instance of the game. We can, therefore, introduce a group-size
parameter k, but unlike before, the dependence of growth rates on k will be linear.
As before, we begin by defining a two-variable dynamical system, for which we will
then find equilibrium points. Also as before, we let the cost parameter modify the
death rate, while the benefit parameter modifies the growth rate. The analogues to
Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) are
v˙ = −(d+ c)v +
(
g +
kbv
v + s
)
v(1− v − s), (4.18)
s˙ = −ds+
(
g +
kbv
v + s
)
s(1− v − s). (4.19)
This dynamical system has nonzero fixed points at
v = 0, s = 1− d
g
, (4.20)
s = 0, v = 1− d+ c
g + kb
. (4.21)
An equilibrium with both v and s nonzero is only possible if c vanishes, which is an
uninteresting case.
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Can a population of Valiants withstand an intrusion by Slinkers? At the all-Valiant
equilibrium, the Jacobian is, by straightforward calculation,
J =
(
(d+ c)− (g + kb) (d+ c)− (g + kb)
0 c
)
. (4.22)
The eigenvalues are (d+c)− (g+kb), which is guaranteed to be negative, and c, which
is always positive. Therefore, the all-Valiant equilibrium is never stable to off-axis
perturbations.
Consequently, we see that the socially cooperative strategy is always vulnerable to
invasion in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas in the Volunteer’s Dilemma, it can be
stable if the costs and benefits of playing the game satisfy a criterion which depends
on the death and growth rates. This underlines the importance of studying a variety
of games, both two- and multiplayer, in evolutionary game theory. If we had confined
our attention to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we would have missed a dynamical system
with interesting features.
4.2 Volunteer’s Dilemma in a Networked Population
It has been suggested [56, 198] that this kind of nonlinearity can explain the kinds
of evolutionary outcomes which are usually taken as requiring “assortment” among
genetically similar individuals. Spatial structure is one way to create such assortment,
since limited mobility means that geographically proximate organisms are more likely
to be genetically related as well. However, there is no fundamental reason why nature
should not present us with both nonlinearity and spatial structure, so it is only natural
to see what happens when both occur together.
There are multiple ways to incorporate spatial structure into the evolutionary game
dynamics we have defined here. We will address two possibilities in turn. The first
method essentially takes the dynamical system defined by Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) and
spreads it over a lattice. We start with an L × L square lattice, and we specify that
each lattice site can be empty (0), occupied by a Volunteer (V ) or occupied by a
Slacker (S). Our simulation proceeds in discrete time. At each time step, we pick a
site at random. If the chosen site is empty, we do nothing. If it contains a Slacker, we
pick a neighboring site at random, and if that site is empty, the Slacker can reproduce
into it with probability g. Volunteers reproduce likewise, except that their probability
of budding into an adjacent empty site depends on how many of their neighbors are
also Volunteers. Specifically, if at least two of the neighboring sites contain Volunteers,
the baseline reproduction probability g is augmented by an amount b. Next, if the
individual we chose is a Slacker, we kill it off with probability d, and if it is a Volunteer,
we kill it with probability d + c. One generation is defined to have passed when L2
sites have been sampled.
Figure 4.2 shows what can happen when we implement these stochastic dynamical
rules in a simulation. Having constructed the spatial model in this way, we can analyze
it following the ideas presented in the previous chapter.
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Figure 4.2: (Left) Snapshot of the Volunteer’s Dilemma simulation on a 250 × 250
lattice. Red sites indicate Volunteers, cyan sites indicate Slackers and blue
sites are empty space. In this example, the death rate is d = 0.1, the
baseline growth rate is g = 0.2, the cost of volunteering is c = 0.2 and the
benefit is b = 0.4. The sites were initialized at random for this illustration
and the simulation run for 100 generations. (Right) Another snapshot of
the Volunteer’s Dilemma on a 250× 250 lattice, taken 103 generations into
the simulation. The parameters are the same as at left. Note that Slackers
are much less common, but have yet to disappear completely.
Consider a single Slacker placed in an otherwise empty lattice. It will die, leaving an
empty space behind, with probability d. If the population is not to vanish, the organism
needs to reproduce before then. For budding to be more probable than dying, we must
have g > d. We expect on general grounds that in practice the critical value of g for
having a sustainable population will be somewhat higher than d, thanks to the basic
stochasticity of the system. This is known as “fluctuations suppressing the active
state.” Simulation results, illustrated in Figure 4.3, bear out this expectation. In each
trial, a Slacker population is initialized with a single individual in an otherwise empty
world. The number of trials in which the population survives for 500 generations only
exceeds 10% for g > 0.15. Furthermore, the population density of those trials where
the species does survive only grows to significant amounts when g is substantially
greater than d.
This pattern repeats for Volunteers: a population grown from an initial seed indi-
vidual only becomes viable when g + b is significantly larger than d+ c, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3. Again, we see the effect of stochastic fluctuations, which suppress the
active phase of the system. Recall that thresholds were also elevated above mean-field
expectations in the spatial host–consumer system (Chapter 3, Figures 3.2 and 3.6).
Furthermore, we can understand the behavior near the transition point using per-
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colation theory. The most convenient quantity for numerical exploration is P (t), the
probability that a population grown beginning with a single seed at time 0 is still
alive at time t. We plot a survival probability curve for Slackers in Figure 4.4. The
probability fall-off matches that expected for a process which is near criticality in the
directed-percolation universality class. Figure 4.5 shows that the same holds true for
a population of Volunteers.
We can understand when Volunteerism is favored over Slacking by seeing what
happens when both species are present on the same lattice. We begin by filling the
lattice at random with 5% Slackers and 5% Volunteers, leaving it otherwise empty.
Figure 4.6 indicates that as the benefit parameter b is increased, Volunteers go from
unfavored to favored. Note that the crossover occurs when b/c ≈ 1.75, which is
less than the crossover point computed in the mean-field model: per Eq. (4.11), the
mean-field critical ratio is given by b/c = g/d = 2.0. Spatial structure also promotes
Volunteerism in another way. In the well-mixed model, an even balance between
Slackers and Volunteers will evolve towards the all-Slacker fixed point, even if the all-
Volunteer fixed point is stable, unless b is increased still further. That is, points on
the line s = v can lie in the all-Slacker equilibrium point’s basin of attraction. So,
even though the all-Volunteer configuration is stable against invasion, the Volunteer
strategy does not predominate when starting from an even balance. However, in the
spatial version, this can happen easily.
In addition, as the two strategies become comparable in performance, it takes longer
for one to become predominant. As Figure 4.7 illustrates, the time for the losing
strategy to vanish from the lattice diverges when b is near the critical transition value.
This is reminiscent of the phenomenon known as critical slowing down in statistical
physics [199, 200]. Examining the crossover region in more detail (Figure 4.8) bears
this out. As the performance of the two varieties becomes comparable, the average
time required for one to drive the other to extinction increases, and the variation
in the time to extinction goes up as well (Figure 4.9). Together, the characteristic
exponents and the slowing-down effect demonstrate the relevance of statistical physics
to evolutionary game theory.
4.3 Fully Occupied Networks
Another way of incorporating population structure into evolutionary game theory is
to put the dynamics on a network and keep each network node occupied. This means
that the total population size is constant and equal to the number of nodes in the
network. We take up this approach next, as it connects with ways evolutionary game
dynamics have been studied before [37,201].
Suppose that we’re trying to figure out the fitness of the ith individual, call it fi,
as a function of the genotypes of the organisms with which it interacts, {sj}. To
begin with a simplified case, we might make the assumption that the total effect of
multiple causes taken together is the sum of the effects those causes would have taken
independently, and that the size of the effect grows evenly with the size of the cause.
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So, we write a linear equation,
fi = β
j
i sj , (4.23)
where we’ve written the parameters with a β as an homage to the “regression co-
efficient” jargon common to the art. The idea is that if we had a whole bunch of
measurements from a laboratory or a field station, we could run a regression analysis
and figure out what the values of these coefficients should be. Of course, we can feed
any set of numbers we want into the our statistical software package; saying that the
results have any predictive value is a stronger statement, which requires making a
claim about the linearity of the interactions at work.
An alternative way to measure genotype or trait values is to do so relative to the
social circle to which the individual i belongs [46]. This analogous to the physicist’s
practice of transforming from the laboratory frame to the centre-of-mass-frame, except
we consider instead a “center-of-social-circle” frame. This coordinate change means
that the parameters βji get mixed up with each other, but since the equations for
the next step of the computations—figuring out how the genetic composition of the
population changes as a result of these fitness assignments—are also linear, everything
works out pretty simply. We will return to this point in Chapter 9.
A nonlinear relationship between genotype and fitness is interesting for both math-
ematical and biological reasons [47]. One way to see why, which recalls our discussion
of Requisite Variety in Chapter 2, is to consider situations where success requires coor-
dinated action. For example, suppose three graduate students are moving across town
to a new apartment. They have to transport a heavy object, like a piano or a drill
press left in the living room. To move the piano, all three must heft simultaneously
and walk in the same direction at the same speed. The payoff to flatmate i is, using
si = 0 to denote “doing nothing” and si = 1 to indicate “hefting the piano”,
fi = −csi + b
∏
j
sj . (4.24)
The cost c and benefit b parameterize the situation, which is another realization of
the Volunteer’s Dilemma game. As Nowak et al. write of the payoff function (4.24),
“Clearly in such a game one cannot separate the effects of the action of the second
player on the first from the effects of the action of the first on himself” [201]. Nowak
et al. discuss the three-player version of Eq. (4.24) qualitatively, but they do not treat
it in detail. We now take up that analysis.1
In this section, we will use three different types of connection topology:
• A regular graph, in which each node has the same degree k, and the connection
pattern is highly symmetric, as in a lattice;
• A random regular graph, in which each node has the same degree k, but connec-
tions are otherwise unpatterned;
1They mention the three-player Volunteer’s Dilemma, using the stag-hunt terminology, in an ap-
pendix to a paper [201] which provoked quite a bit of controversy [151]. Judging from the sound
and fury, the people who got upset about the paper didn’t read the appendices.
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• A mixed graph, which we generate anew at each time step of the simulation,
keeping the node degrees fixed at k.
Simulations were carried out for k = 3, k = 4 and k = 6. The regular graph of
degree k = 4 was a 20× 20 lattice. Both periodic and truncated boundary conditions
were studied. For degree k = 3, I used a hexagonal lattice of 391 nodes, and to test
the effects of boundary conditions, I compared against the results for graph F400A in
Foster’s census of symmetric graphs [202]. For k = 6, a trigonal planar lattice of 400
nodes was constructed, and again both periodic and truncated boundary conditions
were studied.
We use a “death-birth” updating scheme [106]. During each generation of the sim-
ulation, we progress through the N nodes of the network in random order. At each
node, we compute the payoffs of the neighbouring players, using Eq. (4.24). The focal
node adopts the strategy of a neighbour chosen stochastically with probabilities based
on the neighbours’ payoffs. The probability of adopting the strategy of a player who
obtained a score f is defined to be proportional to ewf , where the parameter w sets
the strength of selection pressure.
Unlike the version of the Volunteer’s Dilemma we studied in the previous section,
this version allows an individual of one species to displace one of another. Here, no
network node is left empty, whereas in the previous version, populations grow into
available empty spaces on the lattice.
4.3.1 Initially Balanced Population
The results reported in this section concern what happens when a population is ini-
tialized at random with volunteers and slackers (heads it’s one, tails it’s the other).
2000 trials were performed to obtain each data point, and the number of trials ending
in ubiquitous volunteerism was recorded. Error bars in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 indicate
two standard deviations.
A few general patterns emerge during the course of numerical simulations:
1. Boundary conditions can promote volunteerism, probably because nodes on an
edge or in a corner have fewer neighbours, so it’s easier for them to have a
neighbourhood full of volunteers.
2. The greater the number of short loops, the larger the difference between the
regular and random regular cases.
3. Shuffling the network at each time step always depresses the success rate of
volunteerism.
4.3.2 Invasion
We now test invasion fitness, by looking at how often a minority strategy can invade a
population, rather than how a balanced population goes to one extreme or the other.
If neither strategy is favored and the competition is neutral, then any individual in the
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population is as likely as any other to become the ancestor of the entire population.
Because the future population has to be descended from somewhere, this implies that
if an invasive strategy starts with a single individual, the probability it will succeed
and sweep to saturation in neutral competition is 1/N . A strategy which suceeds
more often than this is said to be evolutionarily favored [106]. (Other definitions of
evolutionary success are possible, and the relationships among them are subtle [33].)
Our model offers two broad categories of invasion scenarios: those in which the resi-
dent population is composed of volunteers and those in which it contains only slackers.
Overall, we find that the higher the benefit-to-cost ratio b/c, the more favorable the
situation for volunteers invading slackers, and the less favorable for slackers invading
volunteers. From the results reported above, one would predict a deviation between
the outcomes seen on regular lattices from those on RRGs of the same degree if the
regular lattices contain short loops. Comparing the results for k = 3, Figure 4.12, to
those for k = 6, Figure 4.13, we find this prediction confirmed. We also see that the
b/c ratio necessary to make a volunteer population robust against invasion increases
with the network degree k.
4.3.3 Mutation–Selection Equilibrium
Another way to see the effect of closed loops in the underlying graph topology is to
compare the steady-state distributions for graphs of the same vertex degrees. If there
is a nonzero probability of mutation, then a uniform population does not have to stay
uniform: Volunteers can spontaneously appear in a lattice filled with Slackers, and vice
versa. (We discussed this for frequency-dependent selection in panmictic populations
back in Chapter 2.) Evolutionary success means, in this context, being the more
common strategy.
Figure 4.14 demonstrates that short closed loops can make or break an evolutionary
strategy. This is a direct indication of the important role which the graph topology
plays, and it is also a signal that analytical techniques which are viable for one graph
can fail for another.
4.3.4 Analytical Results
It may be possible to deduce some results analytically for the Volunteer’s Dilemma on
completely filled graphs, at least in certain limiting cases. Our plan is to follow the logic
of earlier work on two-player games [37] and extend it to multiplayer scenarios. The
key is to calculate the expected payoffs obtained by individuals at various distances
from a chosen, focal node. By comparing these quantities at different distances, a
criterion for the success of a strategy can be determined. The criterion which obtains
will depend, in general, on the update rule in effect.
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma with DB updating, this method indicates that the
Valiant strategy can succeed if
b
c
> k. (4.25)
The nonlinearity of the Volunteer’s Dilemma—that is, the presence of higher-scale
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structure in its mapping of strategy combinations to payoffs—makes the situation
more complicated. The numerical results (Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14) indicate that
a success criterion cannot depend on the vertex degrees alone, because two graph
structures with the same uniform degree support different evolutionary outcomes. We
expect that this will generally be the case for multiplayer games on graphs. The reason
why will become clear as we work through the application of the method.
Pick a node in the network, and designate it the focal node. (We assume that the
network has sufficient symmetry that the choice of the focal node is arbitrary, as is the
case in regular lattices.) Let the state of the focal node be 1, that is, Volunteerism.
Next, choose a second node somewhere else in the network. The latter node will also
be the site of a Volunteer if it and the focal agent are related by common ancestry
without intervening mutations. That is, an agent other than the focus will have the
same strategy as the agent at the focal node if they are Identical By Descent (IBD).
It is also possible for two agents to have the same strategy even if they are not IBD,
by accident of fortuitous mutations.
When considering two-player games, it is known [37] that evolutionary success crite-
ria can be derived in the limit of weak selection and low mutation rate, by considering
IBD probabilities derived for neutral drift. If there is no actual difference in payoffs
between the two strategies, then the dynamics are the stochastic copying of labels
without preference. Under neutral drift, death-birth updating reduces to the voter
model, so named because it is an idealization of voters copying their opinions from
their neighbors. With a nonzero mutation rate, it becomes a noisy voter model [203].
We note that the noisy voter model closely resembles the imitation dynamic we studied
in Chapter 2.
In the case of neutral drift and nonzero mutation rate, there exists a unique and well-
defined stationary probability distribution over the possible states of the population.
We will derive our results using expectation values evaluated with respect to this
probability distribution. Let 〈si〉 be the expected value of site i, conditional on the
focal site being occupied by a Volunteer. We will use lower indices to label lattice sites,
and superscript indices to denote the number of steps taken in a random walk. For
example, f¯2 is the expected payoff to the player at site s2, while f¯
(2) is the expected
payoff for a player located at the end of a two-step random walk which starts at the
focal site. From these definitions, it follows that
〈s0〉 =
〈
s(0)
〉
= 1, (4.26)
as well as
f¯0 = f¯
(0). (4.27)
“Evolutionary success” can be defined in multiple ways. For example, we could
say that the Volunteer strategy is successful if it has more than a 50% share of the
population in mutation-selection equilibrium. Or, we could say that Volunteerism is
successful if the probability of its fixation when starting with a population comprising
one Volunteer and N −1 Slackers is greater than the Slacker strategy’s fixation proba-
bility in the reverse scenario. In the low-mutation-rate limit (u 1), these conditions
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are equivalent [33]. Let b0 be the probability that the focal individual reproduces, and
let d0 be the probability that it is replaced by a neighbor. These probabilities will
depend on the lattice topology, the current configuration of site values, the benefit b,
the cost c and the strength of selection w. Then [37] the Volunteer strategy is favored
(for weak selection) if 〈
∂(b0 − d0)
∂w
〉∣∣∣∣
w=0
> 0. (4.28)
For Death-Birth (DB) updating, which we considered in the numerical work reported
above, this condition reduces to
f¯ (0) − f¯ (2) > 0. (4.29)
To see why, note that d0 is constant for DB updating, so we only need to evaluate
b0. Next, we observe that b0 will depend on the payoffs fi of the players at the vertices
adjacent to site 0. Let aij = 1 if vertices i and j are adjacent, and 0 otherwise. Then〈
∂b0
∂w
〉∣∣∣∣
w=0
=
〈
∂
∂w
∑
i
a0ie
wf0∑
j ajie
wfj
〉∣∣∣∣∣
w=0
. (4.30)
Eq. (4.29) follows from the quotient rule. When we carry out the derivative with
respect to w, we obtain a pair of terms:
〈
∂b0
∂w
〉∣∣∣∣
w=0
=
〈∑
i
f0a0ie
wf0
∑
j ajie
wfj − a0iewf0
∑
j ajifje
wfj[∑
j ajie
wfj
]2
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w=0
. (4.31)
The first term gives us the f¯ (0), and the second gives us the f¯ (2), establishing the
desired relation.
Using Eq. (4.38) for a hexagonal lattice, we have that
f¯ (0) − f¯ (2) = f¯ (0) − 1
3
f¯0 − 2
3
f¯4 (4.32)
=
2
3
(
f¯0 − f¯4
)
. (4.33)
This is positive if the expected payoff to the focal individual is greater than that to
an individual two steps away.
The expected payoff to the focal player on a hexagonal lattice is
f¯0 = −c 〈s0〉+ b 〈s0s1s2s3〉 . (4.34)
Because the focal player is by assumption a Volunteer, this simplifies to
f¯0 = −c+ b 〈s1s2s3〉 . (4.35)
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What about a player at a distance of one step from the focus? This player will also
have three neighbors, one of whom is the focal player. So,
f¯1 = −c 〈s1〉+ b 〈s1s4s5〉 . (4.36)
And a player two steps away from the focus—for example, s4—has three neighbors,
one of whom is a player who is adjacent to the focus.
f¯4 = −c 〈s4〉+ b 〈s1s4s6s7〉 . (4.37)
The site s1 is one step from the focus, s4 is two, and s6 and s7 are at a distance of
three.
A random walk which begins at the focus and has a length of two steps can end
either at the focus itself, or at a site two edges away. The first step always goes away
from the focus, and the second will return to it with a probability 1/k = 1/3. By
symmetry, we can let s4 stand in for all the sites at a distance of two steps from the
focus. Therefore,
f¯ (2) =
1
3
f¯0 +
2
3
f¯4. (4.38)
The terms which are moments of a single site variable are easy to evaluate in terms
of IBD probabilities. If the focal site and si are IBD, then si = 1. Otherwise, si will
take the values 0 and 1 with equal probability.
〈si〉 = q¯i + 1
2
(1− q¯i) = 1 + q¯i
2
, (4.39)〈
s(i)
〉
=
1 + q¯(i)
2
. (4.40)
Evaluating the cubic and quadratic terms is more complicated. We can make a first
stab by assuming they factor into products of single-variable expectation values. This
is a mean-field approximation. It’s difficult to say how drastic its effects will be without
doing the calculation, so we press forward.
This is where the fundamental difference with the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
becomes manifest. For that game, we have
f¯ (n) = −c
〈
s(n)
〉
+ b
〈
s(n+1)
〉
, (4.41)
where
〈
s(n)
〉
refers to the expectation value of a site which at the end of an n-step
random walk starting at the focus. The only expectation values which appear are
linear, and we do not have to account for higher-order correlations. We can, therefore,
evaluate directly:
f¯ (n) =
1
2
(
−c+ b− cq¯(n) + bq¯(n+1)
)
. (4.42)
And, in turn, the IBD probabilities q¯(n) can be found for symmetric graphs of arbitrary
degree. From this, one can deduce the success criterion, Eq. (4.25).
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Our primary concern, however, is the Volunteer’s Dilemma on a hexagonal lattice.
The IBD probabilities we need are given by
q¯(1) = 1− u(N − 1), (4.43)
q¯(2) = 1− uN, (4.44)
q¯(3) = 1− uN − u(N/3− 1). (4.45)
These can be found iteratively, through a fairly simple argument. Let p(n) denote the
probability that an n-step random walk returns to its starting point. This is one way
that a site at the end of a random walk can be IBD to the focus: if that site is the
focus. Therefore, one contribution to q¯(n) will be p(n). The other way two individuals
can be IBD is if one is the offspring, without mutation, of a parent which is IBD to
the other. Let si be a site, distinct from s0, which is separated from s0 by an n-step
random walk. The parent of the individual at si is an organism at a site sj which is
separated from s0 by a walk which has n + 1 steps. Furthermore, this walk does not
return to its starting point at the nth step. By combining these two ways to be IBD,
we arrive at the relation
q¯(n) = p(n) +
(
q¯(n+1) − p(n)q¯(1)
)
(1− u). (4.46)
This somewhat heuristic argument can be made precise [37], with the same result.
In the limit n → ∞, symmetry implies that p(n) → 1/N , and q¯(n) tends to some
value which we write q¯. Therefore,
q¯ =
1
N
+
(
q¯ − q¯
(1)
N
)
(1− u), (4.47)
which yields
(1− u)q¯(1) = 1−Nuq¯. (4.48)
This lets us eliminate q¯(1) from Eq. (4.46):
q¯(n) = (1− u)q¯(n+1) +Nuq¯p(n). (4.49)
If mutations do not occur, all individuals are IBD. Sending u → 0 in an expression
for q¯(n) must recover this fact. In the limit of low mutation rate, we consequently have
the useful expansion
q¯(n) − q¯(n+1) = u
(
Np(n) − 1
)
+O(u2). (4.50)
Dropping the higher-order terms and rearranging,
q¯(n+1) = q¯(n) − u
(
Np(n) − 1
)
. (4.51)
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The IBD probabilities we require now follow from the basic relations
p(0) = q¯(0) = 1, p(1) = 0, p(2) =
1
k
=
1
3
. (4.52)
This is enough information to compute q(1), q(2) and q(3) by the recursion relation,
Eq. (4.51).
Simplifying the f¯ quantities by our mean-field approximation yields
f¯ (0) = −c+ b
8
(
1 + q¯(1)
)3
, (4.53)
f¯ (1) = − c
2
(
1 + q¯(1)
)
+
b
8
(
1 + q¯(1)
)(
1 + q¯(2)
)2
, (4.54)
f¯ (2) = − c
2
(
1 + q¯(2)
)
+
b
16
(
1 + q¯(1)
)(
1 + q¯(2)
)(
1 + q¯(3)
)2
. (4.55)
The next step is to substitute in the IBD probabilities. Then, to see whether Volun-
teerism can succeed with DB updating, we check the difference f¯ (0) − f¯ (2). We only
care about the results to first order in the mutation rate u, because our recursion
relation (4.51) is only valid in that limit.
Calculating f¯ (0) − f¯ (2) is a matter of straightforward but tedious algebra. The
result has a form which makes sense, but as we shall see, the numerical details are
problematic. For the hexagonal lattice, to first order in the mutation rate u,
f¯ (0) − f¯ (2) = Nu
(
5b
6
− c
2
)
. (4.56)
This implies that for DB updating, Volunteerism can succeed if
b
c
>
3
5
. (4.57)
A criterion in terms of the ratio b/c makes sense: it is much like the result we found
in the well-mixed case, back in Eq. (4.11). However, the threshold we have found is
less than one, which is a puzzling feature. Can the Volunteer strategy really succeed
if adopting it brings less benefit than cost?
This strongly suggests that our mean-field approximation was too severe.
Before moving on, we can make one observation. On the hexagonal lattice, it takes
a minimum of three steps for separate paths from the focus to converge. At shorter
distances, the hexagonal lattice looks like a Cayley tree graph, where all the vertices
have degree k = 3. The logic we used to find f¯ (0), f¯ (1) and f¯ (2) in terms of expectation
values works just as well on the k = 3 Cayley tree graph. However, due to the presence
of short closed loops, this will not be the case for the square or triangular lattices.
Even without being able to compute the expectation values, we can say that under
DB updating, Volunteer success on a hexagonal lattice will resemble that on the k = 3
Cayley tree, whereas differences will manifest between the square lattice and the k = 4
tree, and likewise for the triangular lattice and its tree counterpart. This is, indeed,
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what we observe in Figures 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.14.
One way to make progress, in the absence of a more sophisticated calculation of
higher-order expectation values, is to combine the analytical and numerical techniques
in a hybrid approach. We can simulate the neutral-drift process, and use the results
of these Monte Carlo computations to assign values to 〈s4〉, 〈s1s2s3〉 and 〈s1s4s6s7〉.
Then, we can deduce a threshold benefit-to-cost ratio:(
b
c
)
crit
=
1− 〈s4〉
〈s1s2s3〉 − 〈s1s4s6s7〉 . (4.58)
In this way, we can obtain a result valid for the weak-selection regime, using data from
the case of no selection.
Carrying out this procedure, we find(
b
c
)
crit
= 4.05± 0.37. (4.59)
This value was obtained by simulating 10,000 generations of the neutral-drift dynamics
in equilibrium (mutation rate u = 0.05) and averaging over the appropriate time series
to compute values for the moments in Eq. (4.58). A total of 1,000 simulation runs
were made, and the critical ratio computed for each one. Eq. (4.59) reports the mean
and standard deviation of those results. The average is comfortably above unity (and,
indeed, so were the ratios found in each trial). This is a clear improvement upon the 3/5
threshold we found by the mean-field argument, and it is also in the range consistent
with the numerical results for the actual Volunteer’s Dilemma process (Figures 4.10
and 4.12).
Consequently, we can say that the hybrid approach is fairly effective. It also has
the advantage that Monte Carlo results for the neutral drift process can be applied
to multiple different evolutionary games. When we study different games, the success
criterion will depend on the fitness function and the update rule, but expectation
values of the same form will appear, and so knowledge of the neutral-drift process will
be useful in all cases. This means that we can run Monte Carlo simulations once and
apply the results to a variety of scenarios, potentially saving ourselves quite a bit of
computer time.
One way to improve the rather na¨ıve mean-field factorization of the expectation
values is to introduce two-site correlations. We define the pairwise correlation function
〈sisj〉c = 〈sisj〉 − 〈si〉 〈sj〉 . (4.60)
Recall that each of the quantities on the right are evaluated with the condition that
s0 = 1. Therefore, this condition applies to the correlation function on the left as
well. If, given that s0 = 1, the sites si and sj fluctuate completely independently, then
〈sisj〉c vanishes.
There is a specific, principled and well-established way to simplify a higher-order
expectation value in the approximation that no correlations more complicated than
Eq. (4.60) are significant. We will review this method in Chapter 5. For the moment,
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we simply avail ourselves of the results. First, the quantity which governs the expected
benefit to the focal individual is
〈s1s2s3〉 ≈ 〈s1〉 〈s2〉 〈s3〉+ 〈s1〉 〈s2s3〉c + 〈s2〉 〈s1s3〉c + 〈s3〉 〈s1s2〉c . (4.61)
This expression reduces to the mean-field, factorized version if the pairwise correlations
vanish. And, for the higher-order expectation value we need in order to compute f (2),
we obtain the sum
〈s1s4s6s7〉 ≈ 〈s1〉 〈s4〉 〈s6〉 〈s7〉
+ 〈s1s4〉c 〈s6s7〉c + 〈s1s6〉c 〈s4s7〉c + 〈s1s7〉c 〈s4s6〉c
+ 〈s1s4〉c 〈s6〉 〈s7〉+ 〈s1s6〉c 〈s4〉 〈s7〉+ 〈s1s7〉c 〈s4〉 〈s6〉
+ 〈s4s6〉c 〈s1〉 〈s7〉+ 〈s4s7〉c 〈s1〉 〈s6〉
+ 〈s6s7〉c 〈s1〉 〈s4〉 . (4.62)
How good is this improved approximation for neutral drift on the hexagonal lattice?
Monte Carlo computations, under the same conditions as before, show that this ap-
proximation for 〈s1s2s3〉 is accurate to within 0.3%, while it somewhat overestimates
〈s1s4s6s7〉, by about 8%.
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Figure 4.3: (Top) Average Slacker density of surviving populations for d = 0.1 (and
b = 0.4, c = 0.2, but those don’t matter for Slackers). (Bottom) Average
Volunteer density of surviving populations for d = 0.1, b = 0.2 and c = 0.2.
In both panels, results were computed with 100 trials per point; each trial
was run for 500 generations.
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Figure 4.4: Survival probability for a Slacker population initialized with a single seed
on a 250×250 lattice (d = 0.1, g = 0.159). The dotted line shows the char-
acteristic fall-off expected for the directed-percolation universality class, a
power-law decay with exponent −0.451. At longer times, an upward devi-
ation indicates a finite-size effect.
Figure 4.5: Survival probability for a Volunteer population initialized with a single
seed on a 250 × 250 lattice (d = 0.1, g = 0.23, b = c = 0.2). As with the
Slacker population in Figure 4.4, the dotted line shows a fall-off character-
istic of the directed-percolation universality class, a power-law decay with
exponent −0.451.
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Figure 4.6: Population densities of Volunteers and of Slackers after 10,000 generations
or the extinction of the other species, whichever comes first. (d = 0.1,
g = 0.2, c = 0.2.)
Figure 4.7: Time until simulation completion, set to be 10,000 generations or the
extinction of a species, whichever comes first. (d = 0.1, g = 0.2, c = 0.2.)
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Figure 4.8: Population density of Slackers and of Volunteers, recorded when one of
the two populations goes extinct. Computed on a 50× 50 lattice, with 10
trials for each value of b. (The other parameters were fixed at d = 0.1,
g = 0.2, c = 0.2.)
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Figure 4.9: (Top) Average time for a population to go extinct in the crossover region,
signaling the end of a simulation run. (Bottom) Standard deviation of
simulation durations. Computed on a 50 × 50 lattice, with 10 trials for
each value of b. (The other parameters were fixed at d = 0.1, g = 0.2,
c = 0.2.)
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Figure 4.10: Volunteer success rate on various topologies with degree k = 3, as a
function of benefit b (with cost c = 1.0 and strength of selection w = 0.1).
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Figure 4.11: (Top) Volunteer success rate on various topologies with degree k = 4,
as a function of benefit b (with cost c = 1.0 and strength of selection
w = 0.1). (Bottom) Volunteer success rate on various topologies with
degree k = 6, as a function of benefit b (with cost c = 1.0 and strength of
selection w = 0.1).
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Figure 4.12: (Top) Invasion success rate on the F400A topology [202], a regular lat-
tice with degree k = 3, as a function of benefit b (with cost c = 1.0 and
strength of selection w = 0.1). The solid horizontal line indicates the ex-
pected success rate in the neutral case, 1/N . (Bottom) Invasion success
rate on a 400-node RRG with uniform degree 3.
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Figure 4.13: (Top) Invasion success rate on a 400-node trigonal lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, a topology in which all nodes have degree k = 6,
as a function of benefit b (with cost c = 1.0 and strength of selection
w = 0.1). The solid horizontal line indicates the expected success rate
in the neutral case, 1/N . (Bottom) Invasion success rate on a 400-
node RRG with uniform degree 6. Note the substantial difference in the
slacker-invasion curve as compared to the trigonal lattice case.
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Figure 4.14: (Top) Histogram indicating the steady-state distribution of the Volun-
teer population density, on graphs whose vertices all have degree k = 3.
(Mutation rate u = 0.01, with b = 4, c = 1, w = 0.1; computed for 10,000
Monte Carlo generations.) The distributions for the regular lattice and
the random regular graph are quite similar. (Bottom) As above, but for
graphs with vertex degree k = 4 and benefit parameter b = 5. Here, on
the square grid lattice, the distribution piles up in the majority-Volunteer
region, while on the RRG, the population is dominated by Slackers.
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Probability theory is a way of managing uncertainty and making choices when equipped
with incomplete information. In a sense, it is a theory of knowledge and learning, one
which is applicable when our attitude about each proposition we consider, or each
event we might encounter, can be encapsulated in a real number.
5.1 Basic Properties
One way (but not the only way) to motivate the basic postulates on which this theory
relies is a parable: the story of the android and the Ferengi bartender. The android
walks into a bar, and the bartender, after a quick assessment of the situation, offers a
bit of friendly sport between soon-to-be-friends. The bartender proposes to buy or sell
a lottery ticket for any event the android chooses, at any price the android desires. For
any event E, the android assigns a numerical weight p(E), which the android deems
to be the fair price of the lottery ticket
Pays $1 if the event E occurs. (5.1)
The android will buy or sell this ticket for $p(E).
The bartender offers the android the opportunity to strike a deal on any combination
of events, hoping to catch the android in an inconsistency, forcing a sure loss. The
goal of the android is to avoid this eventuality.
For example, if the android assigns a price p(E) < 0 for some event E, then the
android will sell a ticket for a negative amount of money, and the bartender wins.
Likewise if the android assigns p(E) > 1: this indicates a willingness to sell a ticket
for more than it could ever be worth.
Consider two events, E and F , which the android believes are mutually exclusive.
The bartender proposes the following three lottery tickets:
Worth $1 if (E or F ) , (5.2)
along with
Worth $1 if E (5.3)
and finally
Worth $1 if F . (5.4)
The value of ticket (5.2) should be the same as the total value of tickets (5.3) and
(5.4). If the android professes p(E or F ) > p(E)+p(F ), then the bartender wins. The
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bartender sells ticket (5.2) and buys tickets (5.3) and (5.4) leaving the android in the
red, and whatever happens, the android can never recoup the loss. For example, if
event E takes place, the android gains $1 for the first ticket, but has to pay it back
out again by the second.
So, for mutually exclusive events,
p(E or F ) = p(E) + p(F ). (5.5)
By a similar argument, the android must price the ticket
Worth $mn if E (5.6)
at $mn p(E), if m and n are positive integers. A continuity argument shows that a
similar statement holds for a positive real number x in place of the rational number
m/n.
Furthermore, if “not E” is the event that E does not happen, then we have two
mutually exclusive events, and the sum of the fair prices for their lottery tickets must
be the fair price for a ticket that is worth $1 no matter what happens. Therefore,
p(E) + p(not E) = 1. (5.7)
The weights of an event and its complementary event must, to be consistent, sum up
to unity.
Now, the bartender proposes a new game: conditional lottery tickets. For any two
events E and F , a conditional ticket will be worth $1 if both E and F occur, but the
cost of the ticket will be returned if the event E does not occur.
Worth $1 if (E and F ). But money back if (not E). (5.8)
This is a gamble on the event “F given E,” which we can denote F |E. The price of
this ticket is, by definition, $p(F |E). So, this ticket is the same as one written
Worth $1 if (E and F ). But refund $p(F |E) if (not E). (5.9)
To avoid a sure loss at the bartender’s hands, the android must price this ticket as the
total price of these:
Worth $1 if (E and F ) , and Worth $p(F |E) if (not E). (5.10)
The price of the final ticket must be $p(F |E)p(not E). So, consistency requires that
p(F |E) = p(E and F ) + p(F |E)p(not E). (5.11)
The weights of E and its complement add up to 1, which implies
p(F |E) = p(E and F ) + p(F |E)(1− p(E)). (5.12)
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We cancel the p(F |E) from both sides and rearrange to find that
p(E and F ) = p(F |E)p(E). (5.13)
We saw earlier that the ticket prices for events deemed mutually exclusive must add.
What if the android contemplates two events, E and F , and decides that they are not
mutually exclusive? In this case, the events “E and (not F )” and “not F” are still
automatically mutually exclusive in the android’s judgment. Therefore,
p ([E and (not F )] or F ) = p (E and (not F )) + p (F ) . (5.14)
By the distributive rule of Boolean logic,
[E and (not F )] or F = [E or F ] and [(not F ) or F ], (5.15)
which simplifies to
[E and (not F )] or F = [E or F ]. (5.16)
Substituting this into the left-hand side of Eq. (5.14) yields
p (E or F ) = p (E and (not F )) + p (F ) . (5.17)
Using the definition of conditional lotteries, we have
p(E and (not F )) = p(not F |E)p(E). (5.18)
By normalization, this is
p(E and (not F )) = (1− p(F |E)) p(E). (5.19)
Distributing p(E) over the sum and identifying p(F |E)p(E) = p(F and E), we find
that
p(E and (not F )) = p(E)− p(F and E) = p(E)− p(E and F ). (5.20)
We can substitute this back into Eq. (5.17), yielding
p (E or F ) = p(E) + p(F )− p(E and F ). (5.21)
One way to remember this relationship is in terms of areas: if each event is represented
by a geometrical shape, then the total area of the shape representing the event “E or
F” is the area of the E-shape, plus the area of the F -shape, minus the area of the
region where they overlap, which would otherwise be double-counted.
In summary, the requirement that the android avoid a sure loss in any single deal
imposes a rather intricate set of constraints on the fair-price function! Specifically, we
have shown that prices must be bounded:
0 ≤ p(E) ≤ 1. (5.22)
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Also, for events believed to be mutually exclusive, the prices add:
p(E or F ) = p(E) + p(F ). (5.23)
For an event C which the android believes is certain to occur,
p(C) = 1. (5.24)
If the set {Ei} is an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events, then∑
i
p(Ei) = 1. (5.25)
And conditional prices are related to joint prices, in accordance with
p(F |E) = p(E and F )
p(E)
. (5.26)
It is known [204, 205, 206] that the android can avoid defeat at the hands of the
bartender if and only if the price assignment function satisfies Eqs. (5.22), (5.23) and
(5.24). An assignment which meets these criteria is called coherent.
Note that the bartender does not have to pick any numbers or make any price as-
signments. All the choices are made by the android; the bartender merely exposes
inconsistencies in the numerical weightings which the android attaches to events. In-
deed, we could restate the whole scenario as an inner challenge the android poses in
the pursuit of self-consistency. Furthermore, note that we have not mentioned repeated
experiments or sequences of trials at all. Avoiding loss at the bartender’s hands im-
poses consistency conditions on numerical weightings, even for events which can only
happen once.
The chain of inferences leading to Eqs. (5.22)–(5.24) is typically known as a Dutch
book argument. The players whom we have designated as the android and the bar-
tender are, in the standard parlance, the bettor and the bookie, and the bettor strives
to achieve Dutch-book coherence. The choice of terminology in this section emphasizes
the importance of these ideas for machine learning [207,208,209], while in addition un-
derscoring the distinction between a mathematicized standard of behavior and the way
human beings actually conduct themselves in gambling establishments. Furthermore,
the historical origin of the “Dutch book” term is rather obscure, anyway [210,211].
The coherence conditions (5.22), (5.23) and (5.24) are familiar: together, they say
that p is a probability distribution. Dutch- or Ferengi-book coherence provides an oper-
ational meaning to probability, which as we saw earlier is relevant even for experiments
which can be performed only once. We could, on a purely mathematical level, have
defined probability axiomatically, declaring that a probability distribution is a set with
a particular kind of additional structure. Such a definition [212] might read like the
following:
A probability space (Ω,B,P) is a tuple comprising a set Ω, a nonempty
collection B of subsets of Ω such that B satisfies the properties of a σ-
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algebra, and a function P : B → [0, 1] which sends each element of B to
a real number in the unit interval. The function P is countably additive,
and P(Ω) = 1.
In fact, a mathematician might elect to abstract further from this definition and work
with an algebra of random variables and expectation values, eliding the basic set Ω,
the event set B and the mapping P. This turns out to be useful for some subjects,
such as random matrix theory [212], but it is not a perspective we will need to pursue
for this chapter.
Moreover, we will not have to stress greatly over questions of continuous versus
discrete sets of propositions for events. We will casually switch between discrete prob-
ability distributions, normalized as ∑
i
p(Ei) = 1, (5.27)
and continuous probability densities, which are normalized as∫ ∞
−∞
dx p(x) = 1. (5.28)
The interpretation of the function p(x) is as follows: for any real number x0, the
quantity p(x = x0)dx is the probability of the event that x lies between x0 and x0 +dx.
We will not have to be more exacting in our definitions than this. In other words, we
will be living by the physicists’ standard, which is indifferent to mathematical subtleties
until they become unavoidable, treating them as niceties which are no more relevant
than the question of how best to construct the real numbers from the integers in the
first place [213].
All of our considerations so far in this section have concerned the android’s proba-
bility ascriptions at a single time. Even the conditional probabilities, as in Eq. (5.26),
are statements of how the android is willing, at a particular moment, to gamble on
events, even if one of those events may chronologically precede the other. We have
yet to address how the android might make changes to probability assignments in a
self-consistent way.
When we consider probabilities changing with time, our android’s probability as-
criptions gain a time index. Let p0 be a function from events to the interval [0, 1]
which expresses the android’s gambling commitments at the time t = 0. Similarly, pτ
denotes the android’s gambling commitments at a later time, t = τ . Our problem is
to relate p0 and pτ according to some standard of consistency.
Some probability assignments may carry two time indices. For example, the bar-
tender can suggest a wager on how many drinks the bar patrons will order in an hour.
We can define an event E(N,T ) as the event that N drinks will be bought during the
interval from time T until one hour later. A probability ascription for this event has
one time label in the event itself, and another index which denotes the time at which
the ascription is made: pt(E(N,T )). Our concern here is to relate probabilities with
different subscripts, which is a problem distinct from the question of how pt(E(N,T ))
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relates to pt(E(N,T
′)). Starting in section §5.7, we will address the latter question to
a larger extent, and much of Chapter 6 will be devoted to examining it for a particular
example.
Suppose that at t = 0, the android is willing to gamble on two events, E and D, in
such a way that
p0(E|D) = p0(E and D)
p0(D)
= q. (5.29)
Now, if the event D occurs between t = 0 and t = τ , what should pτ (E) be? The
simplest choice is to use the number we already have on hand, and force it equal to q:
pτ (E) = p0(E|D) = q, if D occurs. (5.30)
However, we cannot deduce this from a coherence argument like we have used so far,
because all those coherence arguments concern probability assignments at a single
time. They are, to use a Greek-derived word, synchronic statements, when what we
need is a diachronic rule.
We will now investigate the conditions under which Eq. (5.30) is a reasonable up-
dating scheme. Suppose that at time t = 0, the android regards $p0(E) as the fair
price for a lottery ticket worth $1 if the event E occurs. Then, at some later time
t = τ , the android’s evaluation of the world has changed, perhaps in response to new
information, and the new fair price is $pτ (E), where pτ (E) < p0(E). There is nothing
irrational or inconsistent about this: Being willing to sell a ticket at a lower price is
just a matter of cutting one’s losses.
However, after the android explains this, the bartender proposes a new gamble, this
time wagering on the android’s own future beliefs. The bartender offers to buy or sell
a ticket of the form
Worth $1 if pτ (E) = q . (5.31)
Already at t = 0, the android can assign a fair price for this ticket, which would be
$p0(pτ (E) = q). If the android is supremely confident that pτ (E) will be q, then the
fair price of this ticket is $1.
Now, if q < p0(E), then the android will be willing to buy a ticket for $p0(E) and
then sell that ticket for a lower price later. The android faces a sure loss, one that
is already apparent at t = 0, and the bartender has won. Likewise, if q > p0(E), the
android will sell a ticket for $p0(E) and buy it back later at a higher price, ensuring a
sure loss again.
What can the android do to avoid this eventuality? Defeating the bartender in this
scenario requires adhering to the condition
p0(E|pτ (E) = q) = q. (5.32)
Like all the consistency conditions derived so far, this is a requirement placed upon the
current gambling commitments, though in this case, the space of events include the
android’s future declarations of belief. This condition is an example of the reflection
principle, an idea due to van Fraassen [206,214]. It can be derived from a more relaxed
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assumption: instead of p0(pτ (E) = q) = 1, we can deduce Eq. (5.32) if
p0(pτ (E) = q) > 0. (5.33)
We are now in a position to apply the reflection principle to the task of choosing a
probability-updating scheme. Let E be an event, and let Qq be the event that at time
t = τ , we will have pτ (E) = q. Next, suppose that there exists a set {Dq} of possible
data-acquisition events, such that there is a bijection between {Dq} and the possible
values for pτ (E). Then
p0(E|Dq) = p0(E|Dq, Qq) = p0(E|Qq). (5.34)
The reflection principle states that
p0(E|Qq) = p0(E|pτ (E) = q) = q. (5.35)
Therefore,
p0(E|Dq) = q. (5.36)
This is a statement of a gambling commitment made at time t = 0: the android is, at
t = 0, willing to pay $q for the lottery ticket
Worth $1 if (E and Dq). But money back if (not Dq). (5.37)
By definition, q is pτ (E) if the event Qq occurs. Consequently, if the android goes
ahead and does what the android had been confident about doing, then
pτ (E) = p0(E|Dq). (5.38)
This is just the rule we guessed in the first place, Eq. (5.30). It is known as the Bayes
rule.
We can, again, arrive at this point from a more relaxed assumption. The essential
requirement is that the android be able to identify at t = 0 an event which, the android
expects, can determine the future gambling commitments. That is, there must be some
event D such that
p0(pτ (E) = q|D) = 1. (5.39)
What if no such event D exists, and Eq. (5.39) does not hold? For example, the
android may expect that whatever happens between t = 0 and t = τ , the data will
be too ambiguous to warrant upgrading the confidence in any proposition to 100%.
Instead, the android expects that some uncertainty will necessarily remain, which can
be represented by a probability distribution over data-acquisition events:∑
D
pτ (D) = 1. (5.40)
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In this case, we can use a more general probability-updating scheme, the Jeffrey rule:
pτ (E) =
∑
D′
p0(E|D′)pτ (D′). (5.41)
This reduces to the Bayes rule, Eq. (5.30), if
pτ (D
′) = δD,D′ , (5.42)
for some event D. And, like Eq. (5.30), the Jeffrey rule (5.41) can be justified using
the reflection principle [215].
Diaconis and Zabell [216] give an example where this more general scheme of up-
dating would be applicable:
suppose we are about to hear one of two recordings of Shakespeare on the
radio, to be read by either Olivier or Gielgud, but are uncertain as to which,
and have a prior with mass 12 on Olivier and
1
2 on Gielgud. After hearing
the recording, one might judge it fairly likely, but by no means certain,
to be by Olivier. The change in belief takes place by direct recognition of
the voice; all the integration of sensory stimuli has already taken place at
a subconscious level. To demand a list of objective vocal features that we
condition on in order to affect the change would be a logician’s parody of
a complex psychological process.
Furthermore [217],
If the only impact of hearing the recording is to change the odds on
Olivier and Gielgud, in the sense that for any A, Pτ (A|O) = P0(A|O)
and Pτ (A|G) = P0(A|G), then after assessing Pτ (O) we may proceed to
apply Jeffrey’s rule. (Of course, the former might well not be the case; for
example the quality of the recording might convey additional information
as to its date or manufacture.)1
In general, we may say that the updating of probabilities is a subtle subject. The
next section will relate this question, which seems to live in the realm of machine
learning, to mathematical biology. When we establish this connection, the idea of
mesoscale environmental structure will make an appearance.
5.2 An Analogy with Evolutionary Dynamics
Let {Hi} be a set of n mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, so that at any
time t,
n∑
i=1
pt(Hi) = 1. (5.43)
1I have adjusted the notation slightly in this passage to be consistent with the rest of this section.
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In the previous section, we showed that at least under some circumstances, if an
event E happens in between times t = 0 and t = τ , we are justified in updating the
probabilities according to the following rule:
pτ (Hi) =
p0(E|Hi)p0(Hi)
p0(E)
. (5.44)
This follows from the simple method for updating probabilities, the Bayes rule that
we wrote down in Eq. (5.30).
Now, we jump sideways and consider a simple model of evolutionary dynamics in
a panmictic population [45]. We suppose there are n types of organism. These could
be different species, different genotypes in the same species, or in principle, geneti-
cally identical individuals who adhere to different social behaviors. We represent the
configuration of the population by an n-tuple of nonnegative real numbers:
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). (5.45)
By assuming panmixia, we deliberately blur over all spatial organization or other
kinds of population structure. We neglect stochasticity, and we assume that at each
instant, the population configuration is definitely specified. In other words, for this
problem we consider evolution as a deterministic dynamical system, one which we will
take to operate in discrete time. We establish the dynamics by writing an update rule,
which yields a new tuple x′ when given x.
That a model which neglects all stochasticity should relate to probability theory
may be surprising, but we shall soon see that it is the case, and the relationship is
quite direct.
To implement the idea of natural selection in this context, we introduce a fitness
function which maps population tuples to real numbers. Each of the n types has its
own fitness function:
fi = fi(x1, x2, . . . , xn). (5.46)
Types which are more fit should be represented more strongly in the next generation.
Our update rule for xi should, consequently, have the form
x′i ∝ xifi(x). (5.47)
It is convenient to keep the overall population size constant, and in that case, we might
as well use the xi to represent proportions:
n∑
i=1
xi = 1. (5.48)
To ensure that this normalization is maintained, we introduce the average fitness
f¯(x) =
n∑
i=1
xifi(x). (5.49)
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Our dynamical update law, the replicator equation, is
x′i =
xifi(x)
f¯(x)
. (5.50)
This is formally analogous [218] to the rule for updating probabilities by conditional-
ization, Eq. (5.44). To see the relationship, we make the following substitutions:
{p0(Hi)} → x = (x1, . . . , xn), (5.51)
p0(E|Hi)→ fi(x), (5.52)
p0(E)→ f¯(x), (5.53)
pτ (Hi)→ x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n). (5.54)
Natural selection, in the situation modeled by the replicator equation, can be thought
of as a learning process, in which the population gains information about the fitness
landscape.
What about the more flexible Jeffrey rule? Adapting Eq. (5.41) to this context, we
find that
pτ (Hi) =
∑
E′
p0(Hi|E′)pτ (E′) =
∑
E′
p0(Hi)p0(E
′|Hi)
p0(E′)
pτ (E
′). (5.55)
This reduces to the simpler updating scheme, Eq. (5.44), if pτ (E
′) = δE,E′ . If pτ (E′) is
not a delta function, then multiple potential events E′ are relevant. The evolutionary
analogue of this is the possibility of multiple fitness landscapes.2
Imagine that we have a test tube filled with various types of bacteria. We pipette a
fraction wj of its contents into each of m new test tubes. The conditions in these tubes
can differ from one another: perhaps they are illuminated under different frequencies
of light, or they contain varying nutrient mixtures. The bacteria interact, and their
population proportions change due to natural selection. We then pour the contents
of the m tubes all back together again. The total population size remains constant
throughout the whole process.
Let f
(j)
i be the fitness function for type i in tube j. As before, the fitness depends
on the proportions of the different types present in the environment. If all of the
populations are scaled down by the same factor wj , the relative proportions remain
the same. Therefore, the initial proportions in each of the new tubes are the same
as those in the original source, and we can write the fitnesses as f
(j)
i (x). The mean
fitness in tube number j is
f¯ (j)(x) =
∑
i
xif
(j)
i (x), (5.56)
and this is true no matter what the value of wj .
2To my knowledge, the question of an evolutionary analogue of the Jeffrey rule hasn’t been raised
before. Harper [218] and Baez [219], for example, stop with the Bayes rule, Eq. (5.44).
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Because a fraction wj of each xi experiences the environment in the j
th tube, the
new value x′i will be
x′i = xi
m∑
j=1
f
(j)
i (x)
f¯ (j)(x)
wj , with
m∑
j=1
wj = 1. (5.57)
This is the analogue of the Jeffrey rule, Eq. (5.55).
5.3 Biased Coin-Flips and Urn Models
Consider the prototypical probability problem of repeatedly flipping a coin. Let p
be the probability ascribed to the outcome that the coin comes up heads. What
probability should we ascribe to the event Em of seeing the coin land on heads exactly
m times out of N? For this event to transpire, we must see heads m times and tails
N −m times. The probability of first seeing m instances of heads, followed by N −m
instances of tails, is pm(1 − p)N−m. However, this is not the only way the event Em
can happen: Our specification of the event Em coarse-grains over the details of the
order in which the desired outcomes arrive. So, the probability p(Em) is the value we
computed before, multiplied by the number of ways we can distribute the m heads
throughout the total of N flips:
p(Em) =
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m, (5.58)
This defines the binomial distribution, in which we have used the binomial coeffi-
cients [220] more explicitly given as(
N
m
)
=
N !
m!(N −m)! . (5.59)
We can think of this scenario in a slightly different way, which leads to some useful
modifications. Consider an urn filled with a total of NB balls, and let R = NBp, where
p is the parameter we used before. Exactly R of the balls in the urn are red, the other
G = NB −R being green. We draw a ball from the urn at random, check its color and
drop it back into the urn. The probability that the ball we pick will be red is just p.
If we repeat the draw-and-replace operation N times, the probability that we see red
in exactly m trials is given by Eq. (5.58).
What happens if we do not replace a ball after we withdraw it? Then, the population
of the urn changes from one trial to the next. Call Em the event of seeing red in exactly
m trials out of N . The probability of this event is
p(Em) =
(# of ways to get m red balls)× (# of ways to get N −m green balls)
(total # of ways to make a selection)
.
(5.60)
Each factor in this expression can be found using combinatorics. In fact, each quantity
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which enters this formula is a binomial coefficient:
(# of ways to get m red balls) =
(
R
m
)
,
(# of ways to get N −m green balls) =
(
G
N −m
)
, (5.61)
(total # of ways to make a selection) =
(
R+G
N
)
.
Putting these together, we have
p(Em) =
(
R
m
)(
G
N−m
)(
R+G
N
) . (5.62)
This defines the hypergeometric distribution. Expanding out the binomial coefficients
per Eq. (5.59),
p(Em) =
R!G!
m!(R−m)!(N −m)!(G−N +m)!
N !(R+G−N)!
(R+G)!
. (5.63)
The third variation of the urn problem is the following: Every time we draw out a
ball, we check its color, and we return two balls of that color to the urn. This is the
Po´lya urn model [221,222], and in this case, if we begin with R red balls and G green
balls,
p(Em) =
N !
m!(N −m)!
(m+R− 1)!(N −m+G− 1)!
(N +R+G− 1)!
(R+G− 1)!
(R− 1)!(G− 1)! . (5.64)
In terms of the gamma function,
p(Em) =
Γ(N + 1)
Γ(m+ 1)Γ(N −m+ 1)
Γ(m+R)Γ(N −m+G)
Γ(N +R+G)
Γ(R+G)
Γ(R)Γ(G)
. (5.65)
This is the beta-binomial distribution we encountered in Chapter 2, as the steady-state
solution to imitation dynamics on a complete graph, Eq. (2.34).
These probability distributions are related in another way, other than their common
appearance in variations of the urn scenario [223]. We can find this relationship by
revisiting the conditionalization rules that we studied in the previous sections. Take
the Bayes rule (5.44), which effects a map from one probability distribution to another:
p(θ)→ p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
. (5.66)
When confronted with a transformation, we typically like to know what it leaves
unchanged. For example, the eigenvectors of a matrix are the vectors which the trans-
formation represented by that matrix changes only by a scaling factor. Likewise, it is
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useful to identify probability distributions which, under the conditionalization map,
keep the same form. The input to the map is known as the prior, and its output is
the posterior. If the prior and posterior have the same functional form, then they are
conjugate. This relation is dependent on the likelihood function p(y|θ) used in the
mapping, but that can often be taken as fixed on other grounds.
Suppose that
p(y|θ) =
(
N
y
)
θy(1− θ)N−y, (5.67)
for a positive integer N and all integers y satisfying 0 ≤ y ≤ N . Then, the conjugate
prior of the binomial distribution (5.58) is the Beta distribution,
p(θ) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
θα−1(1− θ)β−1, (5.68)
and the conjugate prior of the hypergeometric distribution (5.62) is the beta-binomial,
Eq. (5.65).
We now have the tools to dig a little more deeply. Consider a scenario in which
we wish to repeat an experiment. That is, we have the budget to carry out a long
experiment, made up of many successive trials [224]. We can represent the outcome of
each trial by a random variable xj , and we can assign a joint probability distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) over the possible outcomes of an N -trial experiment. Motivated by
common experiences in the workaday life of a scientist, we now impose two conditions
on this joint probability distribution. These conditions will help dramatically in nar-
rowing down the possible forms of the joint distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ). First, we
require that it be finitely exchangeable: its value is invariant under permutations of its
arguments. If pi is any permutation of the numbers {1, . . . , N}, then
p(x1, . . . , xN ) = p(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(N)). (5.69)
This property recalls the exchange symmetry we invoked in Chapter 2 to simplify the
complexity profile.
Second, we require that p(x1, . . . , xN ) be extensible, in the following manner. For
any integer M > 0, there is a finitely exchangeable distribution with more arguments,
pN+M , such that
p(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∑
xN+1,...,xN+M
pN+M (x1, . . . , xN , xN+1, . . . , xN+M ). (5.70)
These two requirements make precise the idea that our probability assignment p derives
from an arbitrarily long sequence of random variables, the order of which is inconse-
quential. We say that a p which satisfies both conditions, finite exchangeability and
extensibility, is exchangeable.
Let us say we have an exchangeable probability assignment for M binary random
variables x1, . . . , xM . Define p(n,N) to be the probability of obtaining n 1’s in N
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trials. Because the n appearances of the outcome 1 can arrive in any order, this is
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xN = 0). (5.71)
This is equal to
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
) M∑
m=0
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xM = 0|m,M)p(m,M).
(5.72)
Exchangeability means that all sequences with m occurrences of “1” in M trials are
equiprobable. So, we have again an urn problem, specifically, the one that led us to
the hypergeometric distribution. If we stock an urn with M balls, m of which are red,
then the hypergeometric distribution tells us how likely we are to find n red balls in N
draws made without replacement.
p(x1 = 1, . . . , xn = 1, xn+1 = 0, . . . , xM = 0|m,M) =
(
m
n
)(
M−m
N−n
)(
M
N
) . (5.73)
Defining
(r)q =
q−1∏
j=0
(r − j) = r!
(r − q)! , (5.74)
we have after a spot of algebra that
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
) M∑
m=0
(m)n(M −m)N−n
(M)N
p(m,M). (5.75)
We can rewrite this sum as an integral:
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)∫ 1
0
dz
(zM)n[(1− z)M ]N−n
(M)N
PM (z), (5.76)
where we have defined
PM (z) =
M∑
m=0
p(zM,M)δ(z −m/M). (5.77)
Thanks to the extendibility property, we can take the limit M →∞. In this limit, we
find that PM (z) approaches a continuous curve, P∞(z), and the rest of the integrand
goes to zn(1− z)N−n.
p(n,N) =
(
N
n
)∫ 1
0
dz zn(1− z)N−nP∞(z). (5.78)
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Interestingly, the result has the form of an integral over what we might call a “meta-
probability.” Note that zn(1− z)N−n, times the binomial coefficient out front, has the
form of a binomial distribution with probability equal to z. The curve P∞(z) has, by
construction, the normalization property of a probability density:∫ 1
0
dz P∞(z) = 1. (5.79)
It is as if we can write the function p(n,N) in terms of “the meta-probability P∞(z)
that the probability is z.”
Eq. (5.78) can be generalized readily enough beyond the case of binary random vari-
ables. The result is de Finetti’s theorem. Let ∆k denote the space of valid probability
assignments over k outcomes:
∆k =
~p : pj ≥ 0 for all j and ∑
j
pj = 1
 . (5.80)
Then, exchangeability implies that
p(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) px1 · · · pxN =
∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) pn11 · · · pnkk , (5.81)
where P (~p) is properly normalized over ∆k:∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) = 1. (5.82)
When we used the parable of the Ferengi bartender to motivate the basic rules
of probability, the story left no room for an “unknown probability,” per se. The
android’s probability assignments at any time are known to the android, and the idea
of an “unknown known” sounds like a contradiction in terms. However, de Finetti’s
theorem gives meaning to it. The locution “unknown probability” is a shorthand for
a scenario in which the android is gambling on a sequence of trials that the android
judges to be exchangeable.
5.4 Shannon Information
Intuitively speaking, information is that which removes our uncertainty. We can quan-
tify an amount of information by specifying how many questions are necessary to
overcome the uncertainty we have about something. For example, suppose we have
an experiment which yields one of M different outcomes, stochastically. If we repeat
this experiment N times, the number of different possible sequences of outcomes is M
to the N th power. Each of these sequences can be represented as a string of symbols,
drawn from an alphabet of size M . The number of yes-or-no questions we would need
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to narrow down this set of possibilities to a single result is log2M
N = N log2M . How-
ever, we may have expectations about the experiment, meaning that we will find some
strings of outcomes less surprising than others. Suppose that we ascribe a probability
pi to each of the M possible outcomes of an individual trial in the sequence. We have
a set of nonnegative numbers which together satisfy
M∑
i=1
pi = 1. (5.83)
This set defines a random variable. We do not know in advance exactly how many
times the ith outcome will occur, but the number of such occurrences we will find least
surprising is easily computed:
Ni = Npi. (5.84)
How many of the MN possible strings are, in terms of our probability assignment,
unsurprising? A minimally surprising string is one where each of the M symbols in
our alphabet occurs Ni times. The number of such strings having total length N is,
by elementary combinatorics,
K =
N !∏M
i=1Ni!
=
N !∏M
i=1(Npi)!
. (5.85)
How many bits do we need to specify one message out of a set of this size? Applying
the algebraic properties of logarithms, this is
log2K = log2N !−
M∑
i=1
log2(Npi)!. (5.86)
Here, it is useful to invoke Stirling’s approximation,
logN ! ≈ N logN −N. (5.87)
With this, we can evaluate the natural log of K as
logK ≈ N logN −N −
∑
i
[Npi log(Npi)−Npi] . (5.88)
We have assumed here that each of the Ni is large enough for Stirling’s approximation
to be viable. Now, we simplify. By normalization, the pi must sum up to one, so we
can cancel the second and final terms, leaving
logK ≈ N logN −N
∑
i
pi [logN + log pi] . (5.89)
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Invoking normalization again, we see that we are left with
logK ≈ −N
∑
i
pi log pi, (5.90)
which we can easily convert to a base-2 logarithm by division. Then, if we divide by N ,
we can obtain a result in terms of bits per symbol.
This result provides us with a measure of information associated with the probability
distribution {pi}. If the probabilities pi express our expectations of the stochastic
experiment, then the number of yes-or-no questions which we should expect to require
in order to remove our uncertainty about each iteration of that experiment is
H[{pi}] = −
∑
i
pi log2 pi. (5.91)
This is the Shannon information of the probability distribution, also known variously
as the Shannon entropy and the Shannon index. The base of the logarithm is a
convention which depends on the subfield of science that one is currently studying. The
quantity H[{pi}] vanishes if pi = δij for some j, and it is maximized by the uniform
probability distribution over all i. This expresses the fact that if our expectations favor
all possibilities equally, we cannot expect to gain any advantage by asking questions
cleverly (as we could, for example, with English text: “Is the next letter an E?”).
Contrariwise, if we are supremely confident that a particular outcome will obtain, we
expect that we will require zero questions to ascertain the result.
Back in Chapter 2, we used a general idea of an information function to quantify the
concept of multiscale structure. We can apply Shannon information in that context if
we consider not just one random variable, but combinations of them. If we have two
random variables X and Y and a joint probability distribution p(x, y), the total joint
information of X and Y considered together is, by the Shannon formula,
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(x, y). (5.92)
If we only care about one of the two random variables, we can sum over the other:
pX(x) =
∑
y
p(x, y), pY (y) =
∑
x
p(x, y). (5.93)
In turn, we can use these probability distributions in the Shannon formula just as well.
When we developed our formalism in Chapter 2, we considered a measure of shared
information which satisfied the relation
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(X)−H(X,Y ). (5.94)
Is there a formula for I(X;Y ) in terms of Shannon indices? We start by re-expressing
the Shannon indices of the individual variables in terms of their probability distribu-
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tions:
I(X;Y ) = −H(X,Y )−
∑
x
pX(x) log pX(x)−
∑
y
pY (y) log pY (y). (5.95)
This, in turn, is the same as
I(X;Y ) = −H(X,Y )−
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log pX(x)−
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log pY (y)
= −H(X,Y ) +
∑
x,y
p(x, y)[− log pX(x)− log pY (y)]. (5.96)
Using the definition of H(X,Y ) and the familiar properties of logarithms, we arrive
at the mutual information between X and Y :
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log
(
p(x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
)
. (5.97)
Note that I(X;Y ) vanishes if p(x, y) factors neatly into pX(x) and pY (y). In this case,
knowing the value of x does not reduce the number of questions we require to ascertain
the value of y, and vice versa.
Consider a set A of random variables, described by a joint probability distribution
over all possible outcomes of all the variables in the set. The Shannon index can be
shown to satisfy the following two properties.
• Monotonicity: The Shannon index of a subset U ⊂ A that is contained in a subset
V ⊂ A cannot be larger than that of V . That is, if U ⊂ V , then H(U) ≤ H(V ).
• Strong subadditivity: Given two subsets, the Shannon index of their union cannot
exceed the Shannon index of each separately minus the index of their intersection:
H(U ∪ V ) ≤ H(U) +H(V )−H(U ∩ V ). (5.98)
Therefore, Shannon’s formula is an information function which can be used in the
multiscale structure formalism of Chapter 2.
Moreover, the Shannon index is a natural information function in the context of
probabilities and random variables, because it is the unique functional which satisfies
certain basic and fairly intuitive desiderata [225]. First, the value of information
function applied to a probability distribution should not change if we expand the
set of outcomes with new elements which are assigned probability zero. Second, an
information function should be invariant under permutations of the probabilities: we
are just as uncertain if our expectations are
p0 = x, p1 = 1− x, (5.99)
as we are if
p0 = 1− x, p1 = x. (5.100)
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Third, for two experiments represented by random variables X and Y , an information
function should always satisfy
H(X ∪ Y ) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ). (5.101)
This follows from strong subadditivity, if we take U = {X} and V = {Y }. Fourth,
if the random variables X and Y are independent, we should have equality in the
previous relation.
If we impose these four desiderata, then the only possible information functions are
linear combinations of the Shannon index and the quantity
K[{pi}] = log2 |{pi|pi 6= 0}| , (5.102)
which counts the number of outcomes assigned greater than zero probability. This
is known as the Hartley entropy. We can rule out a contribution of this form if we
require in addition that for a random variable which has two possible outcomes, the
information is small if the probability of one outcome is near zero.
Many other derivations of the Shannon index from sets of desiderata have been
made. For a recent example, see Baez, Fritz and Leinster [226]. The characterization
described here has the advantage that it relates fairly clearly to the axioms of the
multiscale structure formalism.
5.5 Moments and Cumulants
The mean of a probability distribution p(x) is
〈x〉 ≡
∞∑
x=∞
p(x)x,
or for a continuous distribution,
〈x〉 ≡
∫
dx p(x)x.
This expression readily generalizes to that for the expectation value of a function f ,
〈f(x)〉 ≡
∫
dx f(x)p(x). (5.103)
Expectation values of powers of x are called moments of x:
〈xn〉 =
∫
dx p(x)xn. (5.104)
Moments are interesting things to know about a probability distribution, but they are
not always the most convenient values for characterizing how such distributions work.
119
5 Techniques of Probability
For example, suppose we have two random variables, X and Y , which independently
of one another take values according to probability distributions pX(x) and pY (y).
What can we say about a third random variable Z ≡ X + Y ? And, is there some
characterization of pX and pY such that we can just add properties of pX and pY to
obtain the corresponding property of pZ?
If Z takes the value z and X takes the value x, then Y must have taken the value
z − x. Following the basic rules of probability, we deduce that because X and Y are
independent, the probability of X taking the value x and Y the complementary value
z − x is pX(x)pY (z − x). But this is only one way for a measurement of Z to give
the value z; the sum x + y can work out to z for any value of x. So, adding up the
probabilities, we find
pZ(z) =
∫
dx pX(x)pY (z − x). (5.105)
The probability distribution for the sum of two random variables is the convolution of
the distributions for the random variables being added. This indicates that the higher
moments of pX and pY will not combine neatly when we construct pZ .
A useful result, the convolution theorem, says that the Fourier transform of a con-
volution is the product of the Fourier transforms of the functions convolved, up to a
constant depending on how the transformation was normalized. (The proof is both
standard and fairly direct; see a good text on mathematical methods [227].) This
suggests a way to proceed.
The characteristic function of a probability distribution is just its Fourier transform,
which we can write as an expectation value:
p˜(k) ≡ 〈e−ikx〉 = ∫ dx p(x)e−ikx. (5.106)
Thus,
p(x) =
1
2pi
∫
dk p˜(k)eikx. (5.107)
When we add random variables, their characteristic functions multiply, which means
that the logarithms of their characteristic functions add. So, if we want to define quan-
tities which are like moments but which add conveniently when we combine random
variables, we should look at logarithms of characteristic functions.
Recall that
ez = 1 + z +
z2
2!
+
z3
3!
+ · · · , (5.108)
so we can expand the characteristic function as
p˜(k) =
〈 ∞∑
n=0
(−ik)n
n!
xn
〉
=
∞∑
n=0
(−ik)n
n!
〈xn〉 . (5.109)
This relates the characteristic function to the moments.
As indicated, we’re interested in logarithms of characteristic functions, because char-
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acteristic functions multiply under convolution, and logarithms turn products into
sums. Expanding the logarithm of p˜(k) as we expanded p˜(k) itself, we define the
cumulants of x, written with the notation 〈xn〉c.
log p˜(k) ≡
∞∑
n=1
(−ik)n
n!
〈xn〉c . (5.110)
When manipulating logarithms, it is sometimes useful to recall the Taylor expansion
of the logarithm function for arguments near 1:
log(1 + ) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 
n
n
. (5.111)
How do the cumulants relate to the moments?3 Can we find a simple formula for one
set of numbers in terms of the other? We have two formulas involving the characteristic
function p˜(k), one using moments and the other using cumulants. If we equate the
expressions for p˜(k) in Eqs. (5.109) and (5.110), we can derive the relationship between
the moments {〈xn〉} and the cumulants {〈xn〉c}. From Eqs. (5.109) and (5.110), we
see that
∞∑
m=0
(−ik)m
m!
〈xm〉 = exp
[ ∞∑
l=1
(−ik)l
l!
〈
xl
〉
c
]
=
∞∏
l=1
exp
[
(−ik)l
l!
〈
xl
〉
c
]
=
∞∏
l=1
∞∑
nl=0
[
(−ik)lnl
nl!
(〈
xl
〉
c
l!
)nl]
. (5.112)
The powers of (−ik)m on both sides have to be equal, so
〈xm〉
m!
=
′∑
{nl}
∏
l
〈
xl
〉nl
c
nl!(l!)nl
, (5.113)
in which the prime on the Σ means we are restricting the sum such that
∑
lnl = m.
Moving the m! to the right-hand side, we find
〈xm〉 =
′∑
{nl}
m!
∏
l
1
nl!(l!)nl
〈
xl
〉nl
c
. (5.114)
The numerical factor multiplying
〈
xl
〉nl
c
turns out to have a fairly simple combinatorial
interpretation: it is the number of ways of breaking m points into clusters, satisfying
3This discussion is based on Kardar [49,199], but with more intermediate steps worked out.
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the condition that for each value of l, the assignment has nl clusters of l points.
This is easiest to see if we work out a simple example first. Suppose we have three
points, which we wish to regroup into a set of two points and a third point left to
itself. We can do this in three distinct ways, grouping together 1 and 2, 1 and 3 or 2
and 3. In other words, there exist three ways to assign a total of three particles to a
1-cluster and a 2-cluster.
If we write n1 for the number of 1-clusters and n2 for the number of 2-clusters in
our decomposition, we can say that the number of ways W to organize our 3-point set
is
W (n1 = 1, n2 = 1) = 3. (5.115)
We now explore the behavior of W for a general set of m points. First, because
every point has to be placed within one cluster or another, the cluster sizes times the
number of clusters used have to add up to the total size of the set:∑
l
lnl = m. (5.116)
We know that we can order an m-element set in m! ways. We can find a general
formula for W if we divide these m! total permutations by the number of equivalent
ones, that is, by the number of permutations which give indistinguishable results.
Inside each subset of l elements, we can permute the labels in l! different ways and
still get an equivalent grouping. Furthermore, we can rearrange nl subsets in nl! ways.
The former gives us a factor of (l!)nl , and the latter a factor of nl!. Thus,
W ({nl}) = m!∏
l nl!(l!)
nl
. (5.117)
To sanity-check this formula, note that for n1 = n2 = 1,
W (1, 1) =
3!
(1!1!1)(1!2!1)
=
3 · 2
2
= 3. (5.118)
Putting everything together, we use this combinatorial notation to rewrite Eq. (5.114):
〈xm〉 =
′∑
{nl}
W ({nl})
∏
l
〈
xl
〉nl
c
, where
∑
l
lnl = m. (5.119)
Given any sequence {〈xl〉
c
} of cumulants, we can compute the moments. This means
that if we have two independent random variables X and Y , described by the probabil-
ity assignments pX and pY , we can compute the moments of the new random variable
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X + Y . We will apply this to very good effect in section §5.7.
It is a straightforward matter to work out the first few moments in terms of the first
few cumulants. (And these relations are convenient to have on hand for reference.)
First, because there’s only one way to make a linked cluster out of one point, the first
moment is the same as the first cumulant:
〈x〉 = 〈x〉c . (5.120)
The second moment,
〈
x2
〉
, will have two terms, because we can make a diagram with
two disconnected points (that is, two one-point clusters) and a diagram with two
connected points (a 2-cluster). 〈
x2
〉
=
〈
x2
〉
c
+ 〈x〉2c (5.121)
The third moment
〈
x3
〉
is slightly more complicated, since we can chop up the three-
vertex diagram into a 2-cluster and a 1-cluster in three ways. (We worked this out
explicitly earlier.) This means that our formula will have a symmetry factor.
In diagram form,
(5.122)
An alternate way to draw this picture is as a forest of trees:
(5.123)
Here, the filled circles on the upper row indicate factors of x, and they belong to the
same group if they are linked to the same circle on the bottom row. Each group, which
stands for a cumulant, is a rooted tree, and each little forest is a term in the expansion
of
〈
x3
〉
. Either way, the equivalent in algebraic symbols is〈
x3
〉
=
〈
x3
〉
c
+ 3
〈
x2
〉
c
〈x〉c + 〈x〉3c . (5.124)
The expectation value of x4 works analogously. Expanded out as products of cumu-
lants,
〈
x4
〉
is a sum of five terms:〈
x4
〉
=
〈
x4
〉
c
+ 4
〈
x3
〉
c
〈x〉c + 3
〈
x2
〉2
c
+ 6
〈
x2
〉
c
〈x〉2c + 〈x〉4c . (5.125)
Note that the total degree of each term on the right-hand side is equal to 4. If x
is a quantity which carries units, this is necessary for dimensional consistency. The
coefficients are combinatorial symmetry factors that come from the number of ways a
set of four points can be partitioned. There are four ways to pull out a single point,
three ways to divide the set into two pairs, and six ways to group together a pair of
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points while leaving the other two points out. As before, we have multiple equivalent
ways to derive this: by counting ways to circle points, by counting our options to make
forests out of trees, or by plugging into our algebraic formula for W ({nl}). In fact, we
can also build up these formulas recursively, by considering the operation of merging
a new tree into a forest in all possible ways.
We have derived the first four moments in terms of the first four cumulants, using
Eq. (5.119). Inverting these relationships yields the first four cumulants in terms of
the first four moments:
〈x〉c = 〈x〉〈
x2
〉
c
=
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2〈
x3
〉
c
=
〈
x3
〉− 3 〈x2〉 〈x〉+ 2 〈x〉3〈
x4
〉
c
=
〈
x4
〉− 4 〈x3〉 〈x〉 − 3 〈x2〉2 + 12 〈x2〉 〈x〉2 − 6 〈x〉4 . (5.126)
The first cumulant is just the mean. The second cumulant, the variance, is a measure
of spread about the mean. Together, they are the cumulants referred to and made
use of most regularly. Soon, in §5.7, we will see why this is the case. The relations in
Eq. (5.126) are, in practice, about as high-order as one needs to calculate. Cumulants
〈xn〉c with n > 4 aren’t invoked as often.
We are now in a position to understand the approximations we made in §4.3.4. The
only extra wrinkle is that in those calculations, we used cross-cumulants of multiple
different random variables (for example, s1 and s2). This breaks the symmetry which
yields the numerical coefficients, but the logic is otherwise the same:
〈xyz〉 = 〈xyz〉c + 〈xy〉c 〈z〉c + 〈yz〉c 〈x〉c + 〈zx〉c 〈y〉c + 〈x〉c 〈y〉c 〈z〉c . (5.127)
We obtain the result we used in the previous chapter, Eq. (4.61), by imposing the
approximation that the third-order cross-cumulant 〈xyz〉c vanishes. If the second-
order cross-cumulants vanish as well, then the expectation value of the product is just
the product of the means.
The coefficients in Eq. (5.125) show up somewhere else, too. Consider two functions,
f(x) and g(x). Composing them yields a new function, f(g(x)), and the chain rule
tells us its derivative:
d
dx
[f(g(x))] =
df
dg
dg
dx
. (5.128)
Now, let’s differentiate again. Using the product rule,
d2
dx2
[f(g(x))] =
d2f
dg2
(
dg
dx
)2
+
df
dg
d2g
dx2
. (5.129)
We can repeat this process, cranking through the algebra:
d3
dx3
[f(g(x))] = 3
(
dg
dx
)
d2f
dg2
d2g
dx2
+
(
dg
dx
)3
d3f
dg3
+
df
dg
d3g
dx3
. (5.130)
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And, taking it one more step,
d3
dx3
[f(g(x))] =
d4f
dg4
(
dg
dx
)4
+ 6
d3f
dg3
d2g
dx2
(
dg
dx
)2
+ 3
d2f
dg2
(
d2g
dx2
)2
+ 4
d2f
dg2
d3g
dx3
dg
dx
+
df
dg
d4g
dx4
. (5.131)
This is sufficient to see a pattern take shape.
The coefficients in each sum are the same numbers, W ({nl}), which we encountered
when converting between moments and cumulants. In the ordinary chain rule, we have
one term, and its coefficient is 1. For the second derivative, we get two terms, each of
which has a coefficient of 1. In the third derivative, one term has a coefficient of 3,
and when we go to the fourth derivative, the coefficients are the same as those in the
expression for the moment
〈
x4
〉
in terms of the first four cumulants.
We can make the constructions exactly analogous if we identify a connected cluster
of k points with the kth derivative of g(x). Each term is a derivative of f , times
one or more factors which are derivatives of g. The diagram we used to demonstrate
Eq. (5.115) also tells us the coefficients in the third derivative of f(g(x)).
Why should this be the case? We shall see in the next section.
5.6 Generating Functions
Our diagrammatic methods assign a weight to a graph, by interpreting that graph as
an integral over a probability distribution. By construction, these graph weightings
satisfy two properties. First, the weight of any graph is the product of the weights of
its pieces, and second, the total weight of any collection of graphs is the sum of the
weights of the individual graphs. These properties combine to yield an interesting and
quite general result.
The moment 〈xn〉 is the summed weight of all graphs having n vertices. To under-
stand this series better, we “hang it on a clothesline” [228] by writing its generating
function:
Q(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
〈xn〉 . (5.132)
Using Eq. (5.119), we can rewrite this generating function in terms of the cumulants
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〈xn〉c:
Q(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
′∑
{nl}
W ({nl})
∏
l
〈
xl
〉nl
c
, where
∑
l
lnl = n. (5.133)
The l-th cumulant
〈
xl
〉
c
is the weight of an l-vertex connected graph.
Because we are summing over all n, we can remove the restriction on the summation
over {nl}. First, we recall the definition of W ({nl}).
Q(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
′∑
{nl}
n!∏
l nl!(l!)
nl
∏
l
〈
xl
〉nl
c
. (5.134)
One way to think of this is as follows: having “primed” the summation symbol means
that we’ve inserted an implicit delta function. We can really sum over all sets {nl},
as long as it’s understood that each term is multiplied by a Kronecker delta which is
zero whenever
∑
l lnl is not equal to n. But the outer summation symbol means that
we have terms for all values of n, meaning that we can really take {nl} to be anything
we like, as long as in that term, n is set equal to
∑
l lnl.
In frighteningly abstracted notation, we are saying that
∞∑
n=0
∑
{nl}
δ∑
l lnl,n
=
∑
{nl}
, (5.135)
so we can rewrite the generating function as
Q(z) =
∑
{nl}
z
∑
l lnl
∏
l
〈
xl
〉nl
c
nl!(l!)nl
=
∑
{nl}
∏
l
1
nl!
(
zl
〈
xl
〉
c
l!
)nl
. (5.136)
Interchanging the product and summation symbols and employing the definition of
the exponential,
Q(z) =
∏
l
exp
(
zl
〈
xl
〉
c
l!
)
, (5.137)
or,
Q(z) = exp
( ∞∑
l=1
〈
xl
〉
c
l!
zl
)
. (5.138)
The generating function over all graphs turns out to be the exponential of the gener-
ating function for connected graphs. This is known as the linked-cluster theorem.
We used only very general properties of graph weights in order to derive Eq. (5.138).
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As long as those basic conditions are met, the same relationship will hold, no matter
what interpretation we give to the vertices and edges of our graphs.
Another application occurs in statistical physics. If the vertices of our graphs repre-
sent particles and the graph weighting is determined by pairwise interactions between
particles, then the generating function Q(z) has the form of the grand partition func-
tion, with the formal variable z playing the role of the fugacity eβµ/λ3, which represents
the difficulty of changing particle number by thermal fluctuations [49]. The grand par-
tition function includes all “Mayer graphs”, connected or not; Eq. (5.138) states that
the sum of all graphs is given by the exponential of the sum over connected graphs.
Now, we can see why the pattern of coefficients we saw in the iterated chain rule
relates to moments and cumulants. If f(z) is a generating function over some formal
variable z,
f(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
fn, (5.139)
then we can extract the coefficient fn by differentiating n times and evaluating the
result at zero:
fn =
dn
dzn
f(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=0
. (5.140)
The differentiations remove all terms of lower order than n, and setting z = 0 removes
all terms of higher order, leaving only fn.
Consider the generating function defined by
f(z) = exp [g(z)] , (5.141)
where g(z) is itself a generating function,
g(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
gn. (5.142)
If we associate the expansion coefficients gn with connected diagrams, then we are
back to the linked-cluster theorem again. The values of fn depend on the gn. But we
know that f(z) is the composition of g(z) with the exponential function, and we know
that the fn relate to the derivatives of f(z), so we can compute the fn by iterating
the chain rule. The pictorial interpretation is that the operation of merging a new
tree into a forest in all possible ways represents the product rule, which says that a
derivative acts on a product to create a sum of new products, each of which has one
factor modified. In probability theory, we also merge a new tree into a forest, when
we go from the cumulant expansion of 〈xn〉 to that of 〈xn+1〉.
5.7 Central Limit Theorem
What happens when we add together many independent random variables? The same
logic we used in §5.5 still applies: cumulants of their distributions add. If the random
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variable Y is given by
Y =
N∑
i=1
Xi, (5.143)
where Xi are independent random variables described by distributions p(xi), then the
nth cumulant of Y , 〈yn〉c, is simply the sum
〈yn〉c =
N∑
i=1
〈xni 〉c . (5.144)
To take the simplest case, suppose that the distributions of all the Xi are identical.
Then 〈yn〉c = N 〈xn〉c, meaning that the new random variable
Z ≡ Y −N 〈x〉c√
N
(5.145)
has a mean of zero, and higher cumulants which scale as 〈zn〉c ∝ N1−n/2. For N
sufficiently big, all cumulants higher than the second die off, and Z becomes Gaussian.
lim
N→∞
p
(
z =
∑
i xi −N 〈x〉c√
N
)
=
1
2pi 〈x2〉c
exp
(
− z
2
2 〈x2〉c
)
. (5.146)
We have arrived at the Central Limit Theorem: the sum of many uncorrelated
random variables is itself a random variable, whose probability distribution is approx-
imately Gaussian. A Gaussian distribution is specified by two parameters, which we
denote here as µ and σ:
p(x) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
. (5.147)
The Fourier transform of a Gaussian curve is itself a Gaussian:
p˜(k) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2piσ2
e−ikx exp
(
− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
= exp
(
−ikµ− k
2σ2
2
)
. (5.148)
We can read off the cumulants:
〈x〉c = µ,
〈
x2
〉
c
= σ2, (5.149)
and 〈xn〉c = 0 for all n > 2. The Gaussian distribution is characterized entirely by its
first two cumulants, namely the mean µ and the variance σ2.
A neat thing happens when we take Eqs. (5.120) through (5.125) and set all cumu-
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lants of higher order than the variance to zero. Carrying this out, we get,
〈x〉 = µ〈
x2
〉
= σ2 + µ2〈
x3
〉
= 3σ2µ+ µ3〈
x4
〉
= 3σ4 + 6σ2µ2 + µ4. (5.150)
In diagram language, our graphs are allowed to have clusters of one point and clusters
of two points, but clusters of three or more points cause the graph value to vanish.
Alternatively, in the forest picture, trees with more than two leaf nodes evaluate to
zero. The numerical value of a forest is the product of the values of its constitutent
trees, so any forest containing a tree with too many leaf nodes will, likewise, contribute
nothing to the sum total.
Recall the approximation we made in §4.3.4, in order to understand random neutral
drift (and, thus, weak-selection evolutionary dynamics) on the hexagonal lattice. As
explained above, that approximation involves setting cross-cumulants of third and
higher order to zero. We can, therefore, consider it a Gaussian closure.
One of the many applications of the Central Limit Theorem is to random walks. Con-
sider a walker that starts at x = 0 takes steps whose direction and length are chosen at
random, according to a probability distribution p1(l). We can choose, conventionally,
that negative increments are motion toward the left, and positive increments are steps
toward the right. What is the probability to be at position x after N steps? How do
we characterize this probability distribution, and how does it change over time, as the
walker takes more steps?
The position after N steps is
x = l1 + l2 + · · ·+ lN . (5.151)
Because the li come from identical independent distributions, the average displacement
is
〈x〉 = 〈l1〉+ · · ·+ 〈lN 〉 = N 〈l〉 . (5.152)
However, the final displacement of the walker can be greater or smaller than this value.
The probability distribution for the net displacement will have some variance,
〈
x2
〉
c
=
N∑
i,j=1
(〈lilj〉 − 〈li〉 〈lj〉) (5.153)
=
n∑
i,j=1
〈
l2
〉
c
δij (5.154)
= N
〈
l2
〉
c
. (5.155)
All the cumulants follow this general pattern: after N steps, their value is multiplied
by N . This is a specific example of the general property which we established for
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cumulants of independent random variables added together. By the Central Limit
Theorem, we can neglect the higher-order cumulants for N  1. Thus, the final
probability distribution for large N will be a Gaussian, which we can write
p(x,N) = exp
[
− (x−N 〈l〉)
2
2N 〈l2〉c
]
1√
2piN 〈l2〉c
. (5.156)
Because p(x,N) is an exponential function, taking its derivative yields back p(x,N)
again. We work out the first two derivatives with respect to position, and the first
derivative with respect to N :
∂p
∂x
= −x−N 〈l〉
N 〈l2〉c
p, (5.157)
∂2p
∂x2
=
(x−N 〈l〉)2
N2 〈l2〉2c
p− 1
N 〈l2〉c
p, (5.158)
and, formally,
∂p
∂N
=
[ 〈l〉 (x−N 〈l〉)
N 〈l2〉c
+
(x−N 〈l〉)2
2N2 〈l2〉c
− 1
2N
]
p. (5.159)
We can use the first two formulae to simplify the third:
∂p
∂N
= −〈l〉 ∂p
∂x
+
〈
l2
〉
c
2
∂2p
∂x2
. (5.160)
Instead of expressing how p changes with the number of steps N , we can say how p
changes over time, if we introduce a timestep τ . Define
v =
〈l〉
τ
, D =
〈
l2
〉
c
τ
. (5.161)
Then, we obtain a diffusion equation, which relates the spatial and temporal partial
derivatives of the probability density:
∂p(x, t)
∂t
= −v ∂p
∂x
+
D
2
∂2p
∂x2
, (5.162)
If the random walk is unbiased, then v = 0, and the diffusion equation simplifies to
∂p(x, t)
∂t
=
D
2
∂2p
∂x2
. (5.163)
We derived this diffusion equation in terms of the probability that a single random
walker will arrive at position x. The equation codifies how our expectations for the
walker at different times relate to each other. If we have many walkers moving along
the same axis but not interacting with each other, then the fraction of those walkers
which we expect to fall within a given interval scales with the integral of the proba-
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bility density p(x, t) over that interval. That is, the probability density governs our
expectation for the number density.
This picture would become significantly more involved if the different random walk-
ers in the population interacted with one another. In that case, we would have no
reason to assume that the joint probability distribution over all walker positions should
factor nicely into a product of single-walker probability densities.
The left-hand side of the diffusion equation (5.163) is a time derivative, so its units
are those of p divided by time. On the right-hand side, we have a second derivative with
respect to position, which introduces units of length−2. In order for the dimensions
on both sides to match, the constant D must have units of length2 per time. This is
one way to remember the intuition that for a diffusive process, variance grows linearly
with time, or to say it another way, a characteristic length scale increases with the
square root of the time elapsed.
5.8 Variations on Diffusion
Diffusion becomes more complicated when multiple types of particle are moving to-
gether through the same space, and the overall amount of space available to move
through is limited. By considering the effect of volume limitations at the rate-equation
level, we can derive in a simpler way some interesting modifications to the ordinary
diffusion equation, alterations which have been seen to emerge from a highly involved
analysis [132,133].
We consider three sites, with occupation numbers a1, a2 and a3. Particles jump
away from a site at an overall rate k, and jumps are equally likely in either direction.
We make the approximation that the actual flow is the same as the most probable flow,
so we can quantify everything in terms of average rates. The change of the population
at site 2 is a result of flows into site 2 from sites 1 and 3, and the flows out of site 2
into its neighbors:
da2
dt
=
k
2
a1 − ka2 + k
2
a3. (5.164)
We rearrange this as follows:
da2
dt
=
k
2
(a1 − 2a2 + a3) (5.165)
=
k
2
(a1 − a2 + a3 − a2) (5.166)
=
k
2
[(a3 − a2)− (a2 − a1)]. (5.167)
The time derivative of a2 is the difference of two differences, which we can express as
da2
dt
=
k
2
[(∆a)2 − (∆a)1], (5.168)
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or in terms of the discrete Laplacian operator as
da2
dt
=
k
2
(∆2a)2. (5.169)
This is exactly the discrete analogue of the diffusion equation for a continuous line,
Eq. (5.163).
A more intricate case is the diffusion of two substances through a common space,
with a limit imposed on how much total substance can be at any point:
ai + bi ≤ N, ∀ i. (5.170)
Writing ei for the amount of empty space at location i, we can turn this inequality
into an equality:
ai + bi + ei = N. (5.171)
Because flow can only happen into empty space, the population of type a at site 2
changes as
da2
dt
= −k(e1 + e3)a2 + k
2
a1e2 +
k
2
a3e2. (5.172)
Solving for ei in terms of ai and bi, this becomes
da2
dt
=
kN
2
(a1 − 2a2 + a3) + k
2
[(b1 + b3)a2 − b2(a1 + a3)] . (5.173)
The first term, which carries a factor of N , has the same functional dependence on
the {ai} that we saw before, with the ordinary diffusion process. The second term is
more complicated, having an interdependence between the {ai} and the {bi}. A bit of
algebra reveals a convenient way to state that interdependence:
(b1 + b3)a2 − b2(a1 + a3) = a2(b1 + b3)− 2a2b2 − b2(a1 + a3) + 2b2a2 (5.174)
= a2(b1 − 2b2 + b3)− b2(a1 − 2a2 + a3). (5.175)
This has the structure of “self times the Laplacian of the other, minus the other times
the Laplacian of the self.” The same holds true for the time evolution of bi, with the
roles of the a- and b-variables interchanged.
Now, we express the {ai} and the {bi} as fractions of the volume at each site, N :
ai = Nfi, bi = Ngi. (5.176)
The time derivative of a2 tells us the time derivative of f2, which in terms of the f -
and g-variables works out to be
df2
dt
=
kN
2
(f1 − 2f2 + f3) + kN
2
[(g1 + g3)f2 − g2(f1 + f3)] . (5.177)
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Using the discrete Laplacian operator,
dfi
dt
=
kN
2
(∆2f)i +
kN
2
[
fi(∆
2g)i − gi(∆2f)i
]
. (5.178)
The differential equation we had before is modified by cross-diffusion terms, which
couple the time evolutions of the two fields. These new terms arise from the fact that
limiting the total available volume at each site curtails the maximum possible flow
rate.
What if spreading happens by reproduction instead of by hopping? This is, for
example, characteristic of the spatial host–consumer model we studied at length in
Chapter 3, and the evolutionary game-based lattice model of Chapter 4. As before,
we require empty space to move into, so the growth rate from site i into site j should
go like
kaiej = kai(N − aj − bj). (5.179)
There is no hopping out of a site, only the possibility of budding into it. So, the
rate of change at site a2 must be given by the rate at which budding events can
happen, which depends upon the number of particles present at the neighboring sites,
modulated by the amount of empty space availabe at a2. Implementing this idea in
equations,
da2
dt
= ka1(N − a2 − b2) + ka3(N − a2 − b2) (5.180)
= k(N − a2 − b2)(a1 + a3) (5.181)
= k(N − a2 − b2)
[
(∆2a)2 + 2a2
]
. (5.182)
Examining this result, we see an effective diffusion term appear: as before, the time
derivative of a2 can be written using (∆
2a)2.
Cross-diffusion terms like those in Eq. (5.178) become important in the study of
reaction-diffusion systems. Suppose we have two substances, whose densities are given
by the functions a(x, t) and b(x, t). The particles of both substances can spread diffu-
sively, but when they bump into each other, reactions can take place, which introduce
the possibility of creating or destroying particles. How many such reactions happen
depends on the concentration of particles present. So, we write a system of equations
to express how the densities should change:
∂a(x, t)
∂t
= D1
∂2a
∂x2
+ f1(a, b), (5.183)
∂b(x, t)
∂t
= D2
∂2b
∂x2
+ f2(a, b). (5.184)
It is a common practice to start with a model defined with a single location, writing
functions f1 and f2 to represent the local dynamics, and then promote this construction
to a spatial model by making a and b position-dependent and adding the diffusion
terms. However, if the effective available volume at each position is limited, then this
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is not correct [132,133]. We have in that case to include the cross-diffusion terms:
∂a(x, t)
∂t
= D1
[
∂2a
∂x2
+ a
∂2b
∂x2
− b∂
2a
∂x2
]
+ f1(a, b), (5.185)
∂b(x, t)
∂t
= D2
[
∂2b
∂x2
+ b
∂2a
∂x2
− a ∂
2b
∂x2
]
+ f2(a, b). (5.186)
The cross-diffusion terms introduce an extra interdependence between the a(x, t) and
b(x, t), above and beyond that which might be defined in the reaction terms f1(a, b)
and f2(a, b).
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In Chapter 4, we examined the dynamics of evolutionary games with a discrete set of
strategies, and we wrote coupled differential equations to define dynamical systems.
The competing populations in our dynamical systems were continuously variable in
size. Now, we consider a complementary type of scenario, in which the game-players’
strategies themselves are continously variable. For example, the amount to which an
individual is willing to contribute to a group-level effort to attain some social good
could be a continuous quantity.
To simplify our analysis, we shall follow a precedent set in the literature and focus
on cases where the total population size is constant. This is another way in which the
current chapter is complementary to Chapter 4. The models we study in this chapter
belong to an area of evolutionary theory known as adaptive dynamics. Our goal will
be to extend recent results in adaptive dynamics beyond the deterministic limit and
into a stochastic regime.
6.1 Justifying the Fokker–Planck Equation
Consider a random walk over a set of sites, in which the walker moves from site i
to site j at a rate Πji. That is, the probability to jump in a short time dt is Πjidt.
How do the occupation probabilites {Pi(t)} change over time? A given occupation
probability can change because the walker is likely to jump to that site or because a
walker at that site is likely to jump away. In mathematics,
dPi
dt
= −
∑
j
ΠjiPi +
∑
j
ΠijPj . (6.1)
This relation is known as the master equation. By taking the continuu¨m limit, in
which the sites are very closely squished, we can arrive at another useful relation. We
essentially make the transformations
i→ x, Pi → P (x, t), Πji → Π(x′ − x, x). (6.2)
Note that we have re-parametrized the jump probability to use the difference of posi-
tions, rather than the positions themselves. (The two parametrizations are, of course,
entirely equivalent.) The result of transforming Eq. (6.1) in this fashion is
∂
∂t
P (x, t) = −
∫
dx′Π(x′ − x, x)P (x, t) +
∫
dx′Π(x− x′, x′)P (x′, t). (6.3)
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The transition rates depend on the separation between the old position and the new
position, y = x′ − x. A small change in the new position x′ implies a small change in
the separation: dx′ = dy. Using the new variable y, Eq. (6.3) becomes
∂
∂t
P (x, t) = −
∫
dyΠ(y, x)P (x, t) +
∫
dyΠ(y, x− y)P (x− y, t). (6.4)
For most physical applications, we expect typical changes to be local, i.e., that Π is
dominated by small y. We can then expand the second integral in Eq. (6.4) as a Taylor
series. The first term in this expansion cancels with the first integral in Eq. (6.4). The
next two terms yield
∂
∂t
P (x, t) = −
∫
dy y
∂
∂x
(Π(y, x)P (x, t)) +
1
2
∫
dy y2
∂2
∂x2
(Π(y, x)P (x, t)). (6.5)
We can take the derivatives outside of the integrals, like so:
∂
∂t
P (x, t) = − ∂
∂x
[
P (x)
∫
dy yΠ(y, x)
]
+
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[∫
dy y2(Π(y, x)P (x, t))
]
. (6.6)
This becomes a close analogue of the diffusion equation, which we derived in Eq. (5.163).
Each term involves a factor which is essentially a moment of Π(y, x) with respect to y.
Define
F (x) =
∫
dy yΠ(y, x), (6.7)
and
D(x) =
∫
dy y2Π(y, x). (6.8)
Then
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[F (x)P (x, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[D(x)P (x, t)] . (6.9)
Eq. (6.9) is known as the Fokker–Planck equation. For many applications, D(x) can
be taken as a constant, and so,
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[F (x)P (x, t)] +
D
2
∂2P (x, t)
∂x2
. (6.10)
An appropriate change of variables can in fact transform away the position dependence
of D(x), so this special case can be used even when the ease of diffusion is position-
dependent [229].
If we apply the product rule, we can expand the derivatives in Eq. (6.9), obtaining
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= −D
2
P ′′ + (D′ − F )P ′ +
(
D′′
2
− F ′
)
P. (6.11)
Note that this expression includes both the first derivative of F (x) and the second
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derivative of D(x). This will be important soon.
To find the steady-state solution, P ∗(x), for the Fokker–Planck equation with con-
stant diffusion, set the derivative with respect to time equal to zero. This implies
∂
∂x
[F (x)P ∗(x)] =
D
2
∂2P ∗(x)
∂x2
, (6.12)
or
∂2P ∗(x)
∂x2
=
2
D
∂
∂x
[F (x)P ∗(x)] . (6.13)
Integrating once over x,
∂P ∗(x)
∂x
=
2F (x)
D
P ∗(x). (6.14)
When the derivative of a function gives back the function itself, the function is an
exponential. The question is, an exponential of what? The derivative of its argument
with respect to x must be 2F (x)/D. Recall that the derivative of an integral with
respect to its upper limit is the integrand evaluated at that limit. So,
P ∗(x) ∝ exp
(
2
D
∫ x
dx′ F (x′)
)
. (6.15)
The choice of the lower limit and the constant of integration glossed over earlier can
be absorbed into the prefactor which establishes the proper normalization,∫
dxP ∗(x) = 1. (6.16)
If the diffusion function D(x) is not constant, then we can find the steady-state
distribution in much the same way. The result is the slightly modified formula
P ∗(x) ∝ 1
D(x)
exp
(
2
∫ x
dx′
F (x′)
D(x′)
)
. (6.17)
In what follows, we will use the Fokker–Planck equation in the following way. The
variable x will denote the value of a genetic trait in a population. We will assume that
the population is uniform: each time we survey it, all the organisms have the same
genotype. However, in between observations, mutations can occur, creating individuals
with slightly different genotypes. If the offspring of a mutant take over the population,
then the value of x will change by a small amount. If the mutants fail to supplant the
native population, then x stays the same. The timescale of this ecological competition
will, in our analysis, be much shorter than the timescale over which we follow the
variable x.
Even though the population is genetically uniform at each observation, we might
not be certain about its genetic composition. For example, in a practical context we
might only be able to carry out a few observations, and the measurements we take
might be confounded by environmental factors, meaning that multiple values of x
could be consistent with the data we gather. We therefore summarize our knowledge
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of the population by a probability distribution over x. If we know how mutations
can happen, then we can say something about what x might be at a later time.
However, because the outcomes of mutation events and competition are not certain,
our statements about what x might be in the future must also be probabilistic. The
function P (x, t) expresses what we can deduce about what x might be at time t, given
the information currently at hand. When the time t actually rolls around, we might go
out and gather new data, allowing us to refine our information about what genotypes
could be present. (This is the kind of problem for which we derived probability-update
rules in Chapter 5.) For the most part, we will not be concerned here with that side of
the problem; we will in this chapter focus on the computation of expectations in the
absence of new information.
6.2 The Deterministic Limit
We define an evolutionary process in the following way: at any time, a mutant can arise
in an otherwise uniform population. The mutation rate can in general depend upon the
current trait value, and the mutated trait value is near that of the resident population,
but displaced by a random small amount. Whether the mutant variety takes over the
population or not depends upon how the two varieties interact, which we codify as a
game. The payoff for a mutant individual with trait value xM playing against another
individual drawn from a population having trait value xR is A(xM ;xR).
An article by Allen, Nowak and Dieckmann [230] studies this scenario in considerable
detail, and for the remainder of this section, we follow their notation fairly closely.
As time progresses, the population’s trait value can change. Let
aij = A(xi;xj), i, j ∈ {M,R}. (6.18)
We write the payoff matrix for mutant- and resident-type individuals interacting via
two-player games as
G =
(
aMM aMR
aRM aRR
)
. (6.19)
The probability that a variety with trait value x′ takes over a population with trait
value x is ρ(x′;x), which is some function of the matrix G.
Because we are considering two-player games with a set of two strategies, we can
make use of a considerable amount of theory that has been developed for that case. It
can be proved that, in a two-player game with two strategies, if the effect of selection
is not too strong, then a strategy R is favored over another strategy M if the following
inequality is satisfied:
σ(aRR − aMM ) + aRM − aMR > 0. (6.20)
Here, σ denotes the Tarnita structure coefficient, a number that depends on the pop-
ulation structure and the update rule, but is independent of the payoff matrix [231].
If this inequality is satisfied, then the fixation probability of R is greater than that
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of M : a single R-type individual in a population of type M is more likely to take
over the ecosystem than a single M -type individual in the reverse scenario. Structure
coefficients have been calculated for several different cases of interest [197,230,231].
Denote the mutation rate per individual by u(x), and let the mutation step size be
described by a probability density µ(z), which we take to be centered at zero. We
assume that µ(z) is a narrow distribution, such that the expectation value of |z|2
is much greater than that of |z|3. Because many of our expressions will involve the
variance of µ(z), we’ll abbreviate it as ν:
ν =
∫
dz z2µ(z). (6.21)
Suppose the current trait value is established to be x. By how much can we expect
the trait value to change? We find this by integrating over the step size z:
〈∆x〉 =
∫
dz zNu(x)µ(z)ρ(x+ z;x) = Nu(x)
∫
dz zµ(z)ρ(x+ z;x). (6.22)
If we expand the probability ρ(x+ z;x) to first order in the jump distance z,
ρ(x+ z;x) = ρ(x;x) + z
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
+O(|z|2), (6.23)
then our expectation value 〈∆x〉 becomes
〈∆x〉 = Nu(x)ρ(x;x)
∫
dz zµ(z)
+Nu(x)
∫
dz z2µ(z)
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
(6.24)
+O
[∫
dz µ(z)|z|3
]
.
The first term vanishes by symmetry, and the third is negligible by assumption. There-
fore,
〈∆x〉 = Nu(x)
∫
dz z2µ(z)
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
= Nu(x)ν
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
. (6.25)
This relates the expected change in x to the derivative of the fixation probability
ρ(x′;x).
The simplest way to turn this into a dynamical system is to impose the condition
that the actual change in x is given by this expected change in x. Doing so, we arrive
at the canonical equation for the time evolution of the trait value:
dx
dt
= Nu(x)ν
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
. (6.26)
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The derivative on the right-hand side can be written using the chain rule as
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
=
1
A(x;x)
∑
j,k
∂ρ
∂ajk
∣∣∣∣
G=J
∂ajk
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
. (6.27)
6.3 A Fokker–Planck Equation for Adaptive Dynamics
Having derived Eq. (6.26) for the deterministic limit, we now push our understanding
into new territory by including the effects of stochastic fluctuations. Instead of a
single coordinate value which depends on time, x(t), we will consider a time-varying
probability density over the possible population states, P (x, t).
In the previous section, we equated expected change in x with actual change, thereby
establishing a deterministic dynamic. Now, we relax that requirement. Our calculation
of the expected change, Eq. (6.25), is still valid, but it no longer tells the full story.
Looking back over our derivation of the Fokker–Planck equation, we see that need a
quantity which represents how much the probability density P (x, t) spreads out over
time. If we define 〈
(∆x)2
〉
=
∫
dz z2u(x)µ(z)ρ(x+ z;x), (6.28)
then we find that 〈
(∆x)2
〉
= u(x)νρ(x;x). (6.29)
We can use Eqs. (6.25) and (6.29) to construct a Fokker–Planck equation for the
time evolution of P (x, t). The result is
∂P (x, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
[
u(x)ν
∂ρ(x′;x)
∂x′
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
P (x, t)
]
+
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[u(x)νρ(x;x)P (x, t)] .
(6.30)
Note that the time evolution of the probability density depends on second deriva-
tives of ρ. In contrast, the deterministic system defined by the canonical equation,
Eq. (6.26), depends only on first derivatives of ρ.
We said that the game which governs the invasion dynamics is a two-player in-
teraction. What if it is a multiplayer game instead? Recently, Allen, Nowak and
Dieckmann [230] proved that for the deterministic system based on Eq. (6.26), a mul-
tiplayer interaction is actually equivalent to a two-player game. If the payoff function
for the multiplayer game is B(x; y1, y2, . . . , yn−1), and the game is symmetric under
permutations of the y-arguments, then the dynamics are equivalent to those of a model
defined in terms of the pairwise game
A(x; y) = B(x; y, y, . . . , y). (6.31)
However, their proof depends crucially on the fact that the time-evolution equation
uses only first derivatives of ρ. This means that it does not apply in the general
stochastic context.
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The Fokker–Planck equation (6.30), which we can think of as a “canonical diffusion
equation for adaptive dynamics,” is equivalent to the stochastic differential equation
derived by Champagnat and Lambert [232]. The route we have taken is more in line
with a physicist’s approach to stochastic processes. A similar derivation was recently
given by Van Cleve [233].
From the steady-state solution to the Fokker–Planck equation, (6.17), we can derive
the mutation-selection equilibrium for stochastic adaptive dynamics:
P ∗(x) ∝ 1
u(x)νρ(x;x)
exp
(
2
∫ x
dx′
1
ρ(x′;x′)
∂ρ(y;x′)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x′
)
. (6.32)
The integrand in the exponential includes a first derivative of ρ, but not any higher
derivatives. We might be able to rescue the theorem of Allen, Nowak and Dieckmann!
Specifically, we might be able to relate the mutation-selection equilibrium distribution
for a multiplayer game to that of a pairwise game, even if the approach to equilibrium
does not match. However, before we can do that, we have to understand ρ(x;x), the
probability that a mutant organism with the same genotype as the resident population
can take over the ecosystem by genetic drift. This depends on the population structure
and the update rules. So, in order to reduce multilateral interactions to pairwise ones,
we have to construct an appropriate structure of pairwise relationships and rules of
succession.
That is a very general problem. For the moment, we focus instead on a more specific
one, zeroing our attention in on a particular two-player game. In Chapters 2 and 4, we
examined the Prisoner’s Dilemma, implementing the basic idea of it in two different
settings. Can we do the same here? Within the world of adaptive dynamics, strategies
are continuously variable, rather than binary. And indeed, simplifying multiplayer
games to dyadic ones hinges upon that smooth variation.
We can write the payoff function for a continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma as
A(x; y) = −C(x) +B(y). (6.33)
The value C(x) is the cost which an individual having genotype x pays in order to
benefit another, and the amount of benefit which the other obtains is given by the
function B. We set
C(0) = B(0) = 0, (6.34)
and we require that both C(x) and B(x) are strictly increasing, with the inequality
C(x) < B(x) satisfied for x > 0. For the mathematics to work smoothly, we also posit
that C(x) and B(x) are twice differentiable.1
Assuming that the neutral-drift takeover probability can be given in terms of an
1We note here a difference between our approach and that of Van Cleve [233]. In this chapter, the
continuously variable trait x is a strength of cooperation, while in Van Cleve’s study, the evolvable
trait is the fraction of time in which an agent cooperates in a discrete game.
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effective population size Ne, we find that
P ∗(x) ∝ Ne
u(x)ν
exp
(
2Ne
∫ x
0
dx′
∂ρ(y;x′)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=x′
)
. (6.35)
Plugging in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this becomes
P ∗(x) ∝ Ne
u(x)ν
exp
(
2Ne
∫ x
0
dx′
A(x′;x′)
[
−C ′(x′) + σ − 1
σ + 1
B′(x′)
])
, (6.36)
where σ is the Tarnita structure coefficient, which as we said earlier depends on the
population structure and on the update rule [231]. To simplify matters, take the muta-
tion rate u(x) to be constant. Carrying out the integral in the exponential is difficult;
however, we can understand a great deal about the solution by using the fact that the
exponential will be peaked where its argument is maximized. To find this extremum,
we can differentiate the argument with respect to x, and by the Fundamental Theorem
of Calculus, this just extracts the integrand, evaluated at x′ = x.
If σ ≤ 1, then the argument of the exponential is always nonpositive, so the prob-
ability density P ∗(x) piles up at x = 0. On the other hand, if σ > 1, then P ∗(x) is
peaked at the value of x which satisfies
B′(x)
C ′(x)
=
σ + 1
σ − 1 . (6.37)
Ratios of benefits to costs are commonplace in the study of how social behaviors evolve.
Recall that in Chapter 4, we found the stability criterion for the nonspatial Volunteer’s
Dilemma in terms of just such a ratio. We will see similar ratios again in Chapters 8
and 9. Eq. (6.37) is an interesting variant, in that it is a comparison of marginal
quantities, i.e., of the derivatives of the benefit and cost functions. It tells us that the
peak of P ∗(x) depends on the population structure and the details of the organisms’
life cycles, through the structure coefficient σ.
Note that if the mutation rate u is not constant but instead varies with x, then
the shape of the mutation-selection equilibrium curve P ∗(x) will change. This is
another example of a theme noted by Allen and Tarnita [33]: standards of evolutionary
success depend upon mutation rates. We saw this issue arise in Chapter 2, where the
mutation rate had a strong effect upon the shape of the mutation-selection equilibrium
curve, and in turn, upon the complexity profile. It is a general, but underappreciated,
phenomenon [234].
Another scenario of evolutionary interest is the Snowdrift game. Doebeli et al. [235]
provide a good description:
[T]wo drivers are trapped on either side of a snowdrift and have the option
of staying in their cars or removing the snowdrift. Letting the opponent
do all the work is the best option, but if both players refuse to shovel
they can’t get home. The essential feature of the snowdrift game is that
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defection is better than cooperation if the opponent cooperates but worse
if the opponent defects.
If the amount of cooperation is a continuously variable quantity, then this fits into the
framework we have developed in this chapter. The payoff to an agent who cooperates
an amount x when met with another agent who cooperates to the extent y is
A(x; y) = −C(x) +B(x+ y). (6.38)
Note that if we take a partial derivative with respect to x or with respect to y, we pick
up a B′ either way.
The mutation-selection equilibrium distribution for the Snowdrift game is
P ∗(x) ∝ Ne
u(x)ν
exp
(
2Ne
∫ x
0
dx′
A(x′;x′)
[
−C ′(x′) +
(
1 +
σ − 1
σ + 1
)
B′(2x′)
])
. (6.39)
Again, simplifying the integral is not straightforward, but we can find the position
where P ∗(x) is peaked.
Defining the convenient abbreviation
r =
σ − 1
σ + 1
, (6.40)
the argument of the exponential is extremized where
B′(2x)
C ′(x)
=
1
1 + r
. (6.41)
In the deterministic limit, the Snowdrift game is known to exhibit interesting be-
havior with the quadratic cost and benefit functions
C(x) = c2x
2 + c1x, B(x) = b2x
2 + b1x. (6.42)
Given these forms for the cost and benefit curves, then Eq. (6.41) is satisfied when
x =
c1 − (1 + r)b1
4(1 + r)b2 − 2c2 . (6.43)
At σ = 1, we have r = 0, and our expression for x reduces to
x =
c1 − b1
4b2 − 2c2 , (6.44)
which is the equilibrium value that Doebeli et al. derive for deterministic dynamics in
a panmictic population [235].
The values of b1, b2, c1 and c2 govern whether or not the fixed point of the deter-
ministic dynamics is stable. By adjusting these parameters appropriately, we can have
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Figure 6.1: Steady-state probability distributions for the Snowdrift game, computed
with three different choices of the effective population size Ne. As we
increase Ne from 1 to 10 and then 100, the distribution becomes narrower.
The peak of the distribution is, in each case, located at the ESS value of the
deterministic dynamics, x = 0.6 (b1 = 7, b2 = −1.5, c1 = 4.6, c2 = −1.0,
σ = 1.0).
fixed points at the same value of x but opposite stabilities. For example,
b1 = 7, b2 = −1.5, c1 = 4.6, c2 = −1.0 (6.45)
yields a fixed point at x = 0.6, as does
b1 = 3.4, b2 = −0.5, c1 = 4.0, c2 = −1.5. (6.46)
However, in the former case, x = 0.6 is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy, while in the
latter, it is a repellor point [235]. The analogue of this in the stochastic case is the fact
that two probability distributions can have extrema in the same positions, one having
a minimum and the other a maximum in that location. Now, we investigate this issue
in more detail. In particular, we’d like to know how varying the structure coefficient
σ affects stability.
Whether an extremum of P ∗(x) is a minimum or a maximum depends on the second
derivative of the integral inside the exponential, which is the first derivative of the in-
tegrand. Applying the quotient rule to the integrand yields a ratio whose denominator
is A(x;x)2. This is always positive, so the sign can only depend on the sign of the
numerator. Furthermore, the numerator itself simplifies at an extremum, leaving us
with the condition
2(1 + r)B′′(2x)− C ′′(x) < 0. (6.47)
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For quadratic cost and benefit functions, this becomes
2(1 + r)b2 − c2 < 0. (6.48)
If this inequality is satisfied, then the extremum x is a maximum, and thus is evolu-
tionarily stable.
Incorporating stochastic effects by way of our Fokker–Planck equation goes beyond
prior work on the continuous Snowdrift game. We can go further by varying the
structure coefficient σ, which corresponds to implementing the Snowdrift game with
different short-term ecological dynamics. We plot typical results in Figure 6.2. Gen-
erally, as we increase σ, the peak of the steady-state distribution moves to higher x,
indicating an increased disposition to cooperation.
Figure 6.2: Steady-state probability distributions for the Snowdrift game, computed
with three different choices of the Tarnita structure coefficient σ. As we
increase σ, the peak of the steady-state distribution moves to higher x,
indicating an increased disposition to cooperation (b1 = 7, b2 = −1.5,
c1 = 4.6, c2 = −1.0, Ne = 100).
6.4 Concurrent Mutations, Discreteness and
Multi-strategy Games
The message of adaptive dynamics, whether deterministic or stochastic, is that cal-
culations become easier when traits vary continuously and mutations are both small
and rare. In essence, adaptive dynamics illustrates the principle that when we can use
Taylor expansion, we can simplify. Now, we consider factors that can spoil that clean
conceptual simplicity.
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Suppose that each player in a population can choose from the same set of n strategies,
where n is possibly larger than two. Let’s assume that the game interactions still occur
on a pairwise basis. That is, we can write the payoffs as a matrix aij , where i and j
both range from 1 to n. We can define four different meaningful averages:
a¯∗∗ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
aii, (6.49)
a¯r∗ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ari, (6.50)
a¯∗r =
1
n
n∑
i=1
air, (6.51)
a¯ =
1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
aij . (6.52)
If the effect of selection is not too strong, then the condition for strategy r to be
evolutionarily favored is
σ1(arr − a¯∗∗) + σ2(a¯r∗ − a¯∗r) + σ3(a¯r∗ − a¯) > 0. (6.53)
The coefficients σ1, σ2 and σ3 depend upon the population structure and the update
rule, just as σ did for two-strategy games, but they are independent of the payoff
function [236, 237]. By dividing through by a nonzero structure coefficient, we can
convert Eq. (6.53) into a two-parameter condition.
This becomes relevant to adaptive dynamics if multiple mutations can be present
in the population at the same time, even if only for brief intervals. This is, in fact, a
biologically important scenario [144]. If an individual in the population can pick from
among more than two strategies, then we will in general require at least two structure
coefficients in order to decide which strategy will end up dominant. This rather spoils
the convenience of having one σ that controls the outcome.
What if the trait value of interest is not continuously variable, but instead dis-
cretized? One problem which motivates an investigation into discretized adaptive
dynamics is the evolution of drug resistance. Take Plasmodium falciparum, a para-
sitic protozoan that is responsible for malaria. The standard treatment for it was a
drug called chloroquine, but over the years, P. falciparum evolved the ability to resist
the medication [66, 238]. Chloroquine resistance (CQR) arose independently multiple
times during the twentieth century—quite probably, more times than we know about,
because any mutation that arises in the wild must proliferate to an extent before re-
searchers can detect it. A recent study [239] examined the evolution of CQR in detail
and found that there exist multiple paths of mutations leading from low resistance
to high. Intermediate stages provide partial resistance, the levels of which can be
quantified.
Drug resistance can be treated in terms of evolutionary games, particularly when
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some organisms produce compounds that are harmful to others [240]. Furthermore,
we expect the same general pattern—a spread of intermediates between extreme trait
values, discretized fundamentally by the genetic code—in other microbial social be-
haviors.
This suggests the following idealized scenario:
Most of the time, the population is genetically uniform. Occasionally, a mutation
arises, and the new variety challenges the established resident type for dominance. We
again make the approximation that at most one mutant type is ever present at any
given time, but unlike before, we do not treat the trait value or the mutation step size
as continuously variable. Mutations are rare, but they are no longer small.
In a two-player game with two strategies, a resident strategy x is favored over a
mutant strategy x′ provided that
σ[A(x;x)−A(x′;x′)] +A(x;x′)−A(x′;x) > 0. (6.54)
Let the separation between the possible values of x be ∆. This defines the mutation
step size. If a strategy x is favored over both x+ ∆ and x−∆, then we must have
σ[A(x;x)−A(x+ ∆;x+ ∆)] +A(x;x+ ∆)−A(x+ ∆;x) > 0,
σ[A(x;x)−A(x−∆;x−∆)] +A(x;x−∆)−A(x−∆;x) > 0. (6.55)
A value of x where these conditions are met is a local equilibrium.
Because the mutational steps are discrete, we cannot trust the decomposition of
a multiplayer game into dyadic ones. Therefore, if the basic game is a multiplayer
interaction, then we need a criterion analogous to Eq. (6.54) for K-player games with
two strategies.
Denote the strategies by A and B. Let aj and bj be the payoffs to a focal A- or B-
type player, respectively, given that they interact with j neighbors who play strategy
A. Assuming weak selection, strategy A is favored if
K−1∑
j=0
σj(aj − bK−1−j) > 0. (6.56)
That is, for two-strategy games, the number of structure coefficients grows linearly with
the number of players [237,241]. This means that when the trait value x is discretized,
we will need more than one structure coefficient to locate the equilibrium point, even if
mutations are rare and the population is monomorphic in between competition events.
A more general and potentially more realistic modeling method is to picture the
allowed trait values not as points on a line, but as vertices in a graph. Each vertex
represents a possible genotype, for example, one of the variations of the PfCRT gene
responsible for chloroquine resistance. We connect two vertices with an edge if a
mutation, like a substitution of nucleotides, can convert between those two forms of
the gene. If we treat the competition between two types as an evolutionary game,
we can use the payoff function and the structure coefficients to assign a direction
to each edge of the graph. Local equilibria are sinks of the flow, i.e., vertices that
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have all their edges pointing inwards. (More specifically, such points should “collect
probability,” even though it is not guaranteed that the system must always move along
the direction of the edges. The σ-rule analysis tells us which fixation probability is
greater, not the probabilities themselves. Moving against an arrow is possible, but
we bet against its happening. This is another place where the discrete case is more
complicated than the continuous. In the adaptive dynamics of continuous quantities,
the smoothness of all the functions involved means that we only need to know which
fixation probability is greater, not their specific values [230].) Assuming that none
of the mutations fundamentally change the population structure and life cycle, then
we can use the same structure coefficients for all the edges. This may not always
be a reasonable assumption. For example, a mutation in a virus could allow it to
jump into a new host species. In that event, using the same σ values before and
after the mutation would clearly not be reasonable. However, for mutations of lesser
consequence, it seems a viable starting point.
Up until this point, we have treated the mutation rate u(x) as independent of the
trait value x. But we can argue that this does not have to be the case. We saw back
in Chapter 2 that many different nucleotide sequences can map to the same protein.
Because these sequences are equivalent as far as their products are concerned, within
the space of all possible sequences there exist regions inside of which movement is
unaffected by selection pressure.
Mutations happen stochastically with a certain probability per base pair. With
more genetic material overall, we expect more mutations. The rate at which we see
changes in the trait value x depends upon how easily a mutation can push a genetic
sequence from the space that maps to one phenotype into a space that maps to another.
The volumes and surface areas of these spaces do not have to be constant over x!
Consequently, some values of x can be more robust than others. We can define the
robustness of a nucleotide sequence quantitatively: we consider the set of all sequences
that can be produced from the original by mutations, and we find the fraction of that
set for which the phenotype is unchanged. Then, we can average this quantity over
all sequences that map to the same phenotype in order to define a robustness for that
phenotype [242]. For systems that are small enough to study with simulations—the
folding of short RNA sequences is a popular choice—values of the robustness can vary
over an order of magnitude from one phenotype to another [243]. In order to apply
adaptive dynamics, we originally assumed that the trait value x could vary smoothly.
A heritable trait with an effectively continuous spectrum of possible values will almost
certainly be the product of many individual genes and regulatory elements, acting in
concert. The number of nucleotide sequences that will map to the same value of x
will, therefore, be vast. Nevertheless, the same considerations should apply. If the
robustness varies with x, then so too will the effective mutation rate u(x). The more
rapid the variations in u(x), the more the effects will be seen in the mutation–selection
equilibrium distribution P ∗(x), particularly for smaller population sizes.
We have discussed the cases of discrete and of continuous x. Somewhat of a con-
ceptual intermediary is the case where x is continuous, but mutation step sizes can be
large. When we derived the Fokker–Planck equation (6.9), we assumed explicitly that
changes are dominated by small increments, and larger fluctuations are all negligible.
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Then we carried this assumption over into adaptive dynamics, where we said that the
mutation step size distribution µ(z) was sufficiently narrow that we only needed to
know its variance. However, considerations of systems biology suggest that in some
situations, we ought to allow µ(z) to be much wider. The interaction networks of in-
tracellular components often have long-tailed degree distributions: most components
have few interaction partners, but a few have many, and there is a continuum of varia-
tion in between the extremes [244]. This hints that many mutations will have limited
effects, while a small number—those that directly impact the components of highest
network degree—will sway the trait value x much more strongly.
The distribution of mutation effect sizes is currently a research topic with a great
many question marks, both empirically and theoretically [245]. Furthermore, it is
not clear how applicable the extant theoretical results are to our problem; their basic
assumptions were not formulated with adaptive dynamics in mind. We therefore have
a certain freedom to go off in new directions. One interesting possibility comes from
the study of Le´vy flights, random walks in which the distribution of step lengths is
long-tailed. Investigating this type of stochastic process reveals that the Fokker–Planck
equation must be replaced with an analogue that is written using fractional derivatives.
Again, this is a situation in which we should not expect that we could decompose a
many-player game into dyads.
6.5 Interspecies Interactions
We now return to the continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma. Pleasingly, the peak value
of x computed by Eq. (6.37) is also the equilibrium value for the deterministic time-
evolution equation derived by Allen, Nowak and Dieckmann [230]. Up to a constant
prefactor of little interest,
dx
dt
∝ −C ′(x) + σ − 1
σ + 1
B′(x). (6.57)
What must be satisfied for an equilibrium point of this dynamical rule to be stable?
Let dx/dt = 0 at x = x¯, and define the separation from equilibrium by ξ = x − x¯.
Rescale time as convenient, so that the proportionality becomes an equality. Then
dξ
dt
=
d
dt
(x− x¯) (6.58)
= −C ′(x¯+ ξ) + σ − 1
σ + 1
B′(x¯+ ξ) (6.59)
≈ − [C ′(x¯) + ξC ′′(x¯)] + σ − 1
σ + 1
[B′(x¯) + ξB′′(x¯)] (6.60)
= ξ
[
−C ′′(x¯) + σ − 1
σ + 1
B′′(x¯)
]
. (6.61)
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This is a linear response equation for the displacement ξ:
dξ
dt
= −ξ
[
C ′′(x¯)− σ − 1
σ + 1
B′′(x¯)
]
. (6.62)
Since we required that both B(x) and C(x) be twice differentiable, this is fine. The
condition that the equilibrium x¯ be stable is that the quantity in square brackets is
positive. Therefore, stability requires
C ′′(x¯) >
σ − 1
σ + 1
B′′(x¯). (6.63)
Now, let us consider what happens if we have multiple species, each evolving in
accord with the deterministic dynamics specified by a cost function and a benefit
function. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , we have, if the species do not interact,
dxi
dt
∝ −C ′i(xi) +
σi − 1
σi + 1
B′i(xi). (6.64)
We assume that a stable equilibrium x¯i exists for each species. So, in terms of the
displacements ξi = xi − x¯i,
dξi
dt
= −ξi
[
C ′′i (x¯i)−
σi − 1
σi + 1
B′′i (x¯i)
]
. (6.65)
What happens if the species in this ecosystem start to interact with one another? The
most straightforward way to incorporate interactions into this dynamical system is to
include cross terms:
dξi
dt
= −ξi
[
C ′′i (x¯i)−
σi − 1
σi + 1
B′′i (x¯i)
]
+ α
M∑
j=1
Jijξj . (6.66)
The parameter α controls the strength of the interactions, and the matrix element Jij
indicates how much species j influences species i.
We lose nothing of real interest if we assume that the factors multiplying the ξi are
equal for all i, and so we can set them to unity. This is a further simplification, but a
reasonable one, since we expect that the timescales with which each species in isolation
settles to its own equilibrium are roughly equal.
The equilibrium we had without interactions was stable. It will remain stable with
the interactions turned on if the eigenvalues λa of the coupling matrix J all satisfy the
inequality
αλa − 1 ≤ 0, (6.67)
which is the same thing as saying that the largest eigenvalue is less than or equal
to 1/α. Consequently, if the elements of the matrix J are chosen at random, then the
probability that the equilibrium will remain stable is the probability that the largest
eigenvalue of J is bounded by 1/α.
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This is exactly the kind of problem studied in random matrix theory. In fact, we
have recovered (with a new meaning for the symbols) an old problem of May [246],
which has deep connections to the statistical physics of coupled random variables [247].
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The goal of this chapter is to provide, by analytical means, quantitative predictions
for the values of some observations made in Chapters 3 and 4. We will do this not
by solving the specific models we studied there, but rather by understanding related
models, and seeing how results gleaned from those solutions can be translated over
to our original problems of interest. We touched upon this method of exploration in
Chapter 3, when we introduced the concept of a universality class (§3.3.6). We learn
about one system in a universality class by studing another and finding the features
which apply across the class in its entirety. Now, it is time to apply this method in
detail. We will begin by grounding ourselves in the essential ideas of renormalization
theory, which underpins the study of universality classes. Then, we will build the
infrastructure necessary to express the stochastic spatial models of Chapters 3 and 4
analytically. With that development complete, we will be able to justify the theoretical
predictions to which we compared the phase-transition phenomena of those models.
Our subject for the next few sections will be “the renormalization group.” This
term is a little like the Holy Roman Empire, in that the latter, as Voltaire observed, is
neither holy, Roman nor an empire. The word group in this context is a technical term,
but mathematically speaking, it is not really the right technical term. Renormalization
is a bit of jargon that hails from quantum electrodynamics, and it dates to a time many
years before people figured out what they were doing and why their techniques actually
worked. Consequently, it is not very indicative. Even the isn’t quite right: it carries
the implication that “the renormalization group” is a single, specific construction, like
“the quadratic formula.”
Since the full name of the subject is a misnomer, it is convenient to elide that name
as much as possible, and so we will use the common abbreviation RG. We begin,
therefore, our discussion of RG theory and RG transformations.
7.1 The Central Limit Theorem by RG Transformations
To ease ourselves into RG theory, we will revisit a topic we addressed before, this time
approaching it from a different, albeit related perspective. Our first example of RG
theory is the central limit theorem, which we first proved in §5.7. A loose but useful
statement of this result is that the sum total of many uncorrelated small influences is
statistically distributed following a Gaussian curve.
When we introduced complex systems, back in Chapter 2, we defined systems made
of components, and we quantified relationships among those components using infor-
mation theory. Let us bring the central limit theorem into this context. Consider a
system with many components, each of which is a random variable. We describe the
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system probabilistically by ascribing a joint distribution to the set of random variables.
In this case, we postulate that all higher-order complexities vanish, meaning that the
probability distribution factors neatly into single-variable distributions:
p(X1 = x1, X2 = x2, X3 = x3, . . .) = p(X1 = x1)p(X2 = x2)p(X3 = x3) · · · (7.1)
To start with, let the components of our system be coins, which we say are inde-
pendent of each other and equally likely to come up either heads (+1) or tails (−1).
A snapshot of this system will be, we expect, a speckling of pluses and minuses in
roughly equal proportions (we might get a large fluctuation one way or the other, but
we’re not gambling on that). What happens if we blur our view, grouping together
pairs of components?
The total value of a pair of coins can be −1, 0 or +1. For a single coin, we have
p1(−1) = 1
2
, p1(+1) =
1
2
. (7.2)
There are two ways the total could sum to 0, and so
p2(−2) = 1
4
, p2(0) =
1
2
, p2(+2) =
1
4
. (7.3)
We see that the distribution stays symmetrical and becomes peaked in the middle.
Following the same logic, we can repeat the blurring procedure. The arithmetic
becomes more involved, but the concept is straightforward. After just a few repetitions,
the symmetrical, peaked distribution comes to resemble a Gaussian curve, as shown
in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Discrete probability distribution obtained by coarse-graining uncorrelated
fair coins four successive times. The solid curve is a Gaussian with mean
zero and variance σ2 = 16.
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What happens if we start our gambling on the assumption that the coins are biased?
Say, for example, that we had chosen
p1(−1) = 0.1, p1(+1) = 0.9. (7.4)
Then we would have
p2(−2) = 0.01, p2(0) = 0.18, p2(+2) = 0.81. (7.5)
This p2 is not symmetrical at all! However, as we repeat the blurring procedure, the
asymmetry partially washes out. Examinining Figure 7.2, we see that the statistics
for the coarse-grained view are still approximately Gaussian, but the mean of the
Gaussian curve has shifted in the direction of the original tilt.
Figure 7.2: Discrete probability distribution obtained by coarse-graining uncorrelated
loaded coins six successive times. The solid curve is a Gaussian with mean
51.2 and variance σ2 = 23.0.
Let’s explore the effects of successive coarse-graining in more generality. Take p(x)
to be the probability distribution for each of our original variables, and suppose for
convenience that its mean is zero. When we convolve p(x) with itself, we double all its
cumulants. Now, after we coarse-grain, let us rescale the axis by a factor 1/
√
2. This
restores the variance to its original value, because the variance involves two powers
of x. We repeat the operations of coarse-graining and rescaling K times in succession.
The mean and the variance remain unchanged, but what about the higher cumulants?
The cumulants of the original distribution are 〈xn〉c. Each coarse-graining doubles
〈xn〉c, and each rescaling multiplies 〈xn〉c by a factor (1/
√
2)n. So, if 〈znK〉c denotes
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the result of K iterations, then
〈znK〉c = 〈xn〉c
(
2
2n/2
)K
= 〈xn〉c
(
21−n/2
)K
. (7.6)
For n > 2, repeating the operations of coarse-graining and rescaling will send 〈znK〉c
to zero. This is just the conclusion we drew in §5.7, phrased in terms of an iterative
procedure. We say that the higher cumulants are irrelevant, because they shrink under
the iteration.
If we hadn’t invested time in developing our understanding of cumulants, we could
have arrived at the same conclusion by going back to the basics of Fourier transforms.
(This is the approach taken, for example, in Sethna’s textbook [248].) We define the
Fourier transform of a probability density function p(x) as
F [p](k) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx e−ikxp(x) = p˜(k). (7.7)
The inverse transformation is
p(x) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dk eikxp˜(k). (7.8)
We coarse-grain by convolution:
(p ? p)(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dy p(x− y)p(y). (7.9)
By the convolution theorem, the Fourier transform of a convolution is the product of
the Fourier transforms of the functions convolved. In this case, convolving a curve
with itself,
F [p ? p](k) = (p˜(k))2 . (7.10)
The next step is to re-scale the curve, under the assumption that the mean is zero.
This has the effect of creating a new function,
S√2[p](x) =
√
2p(
√
2x). (7.11)
The prefactor of
√
2 is necessary to preserve normalization, as we can see by integrating:∫ ∞
−∞
dxS√2[p](x) =
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx p(
√
2x)
=
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy√
2
p(y)
= 1. (7.12)
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The change of length scale is equivalent to an inverse change of frequency:
F [S√2[p]] (k) = ∫ ∞
−∞
dx e−ikx
√
2p(
√
2x)
=
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy√
2
e−iky/
√
2p(y)
= p˜(k/
√
2). (7.13)
It follows that the Gaussian curve
p∗(x) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
(7.14)
is a fixed point of the coarse-grain-and-rescale transformation. We shall now prove
this explicitly.
For brevity, we denote this composite transformation by T . The T operator effects
a convolution and a rescaling:
T [p](x) = S√2[p ? p](x) =
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy p(
√
2x− y)p(y). (7.15)
Explicitly,
T [p∗](x) =
√
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy
1
2piσ2
exp
(
− (
√
2x− y)2
2σ2
)
exp
(
− y
2
2σ2
)
. (7.16)
Expanding out and combining the arguments of the exponentials,
T [p∗](x) =
√
2
2piσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
dy exp
(
−2x
2 − 2√2xy + 2y2
2σ2
)
. (7.17)
With a bit of algebra,
2x2 − 2
√
2xy + 2y2 = 2y2 − 2(
√
2y)x+ 2x2
= 2y2 − 2(
√
2y)x+ x2 + x2
= (
√
2y − x)2 + x2, (7.18)
we can make the integral over y a Gaussian integral, which we know how to evaluate.
This eliminates the y dependence, leaving us with
T [p∗](x) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
= p∗(x), (7.19)
as desired.
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The Fourier transform of p∗ is
p˜∗(k) = F [p∗] =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2piσ2
e−ikx−x
2/(2σ2) = exp
(
−k
2σ2
2
)
. (7.20)
Generally, the Fourier transform of a T -transformed function is
T˜ [p˜](k) = F [T [p]] (k) =
(
p˜(k/
√
2)
)2
, (7.21)
with which it is easy to verify that
T˜ [p˜∗](k) = F [T [p∗]] (k) = p˜(k). (7.22)
That is, p∗ is a fixed point in the space of probability distributions, and p˜∗ is a fixed
point of the analogous transformation in the space of Fourier representations.
Let p be a distribution which is close to p∗:
p(x) = p∗(x) + f(x). (7.23)
Then, because the Fourier transform is linear,
p˜(k) = p˜∗(k) + f˜(k). (7.24)
What are the eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of T ?
T [p∗ + fn] = p∗ + λnfn +O(2), (7.25)
T˜ [p˜∗ + f˜n] = p˜∗ + λnf˜n +O(2). (7.26)
Using Eq. (7.21),
T˜ [p˜∗ + f˜n] =
[
p˜∗(k/
√
2) + f˜n(k/
√
2)
]2
(7.27)
=
[
p˜∗(k/
√
2)
]2
+ 2p˜∗(k/
√
2)f˜n(k/
√
2) +O(2) (7.28)
= p˜∗(k) + 2p˜∗(k/
√
2)f˜n(k/
√
2) +O(2). (7.29)
Therefore,
f˜n(k) =
2
λn
p˜∗
(
k√
2
)
f˜n
(
k√
2
)
. (7.30)
Proposal: let
f˜n(k) = (ik)
np˜∗(k). (7.31)
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With this ansatz,
p˜∗
(
k√
2
)
f˜n
(
k√
2
)
=
(
ik√
2
)n
p˜∗
(
k√
2
)
(7.32)
=
(ik)n
(
√
2)n
p˜∗(k) (7.33)
=
1
(
√
2)n
f˜n(k). (7.34)
Consequently,
f˜n(k) = (
√
2)np˜∗
(
k√
2
)
f˜n
(
k√
2
)
, (7.35)
meaning that the eigenvalue λn is given by
2
λn
= (
√
2)n = 2n/2 ⇒ λn = 21−n/2. (7.36)
The first eigenmode, associated with the eigenvalue λ0 = 2, is
f˜0(k) = p˜
∗(k). (7.37)
When applied as a perturbation to p˜∗, this yields
p˜(k) = p˜∗(k) + p˜∗(k), (7.38)
meaning that
p(x) = (1 + )p∗(x). (7.39)
This is not a normalized probability distribution function, unless  = 0. Therefore, we
can neglect the λ0 mode as meaningless.
The next eigenfunction is
f˜1(k) = ikp˜
∗(k). (7.40)
Applying this perturbation to p˜∗ yields a probability distribution
p(x) =
1
2pi
∫
dk (1 + ik)eikxp˜∗(k). (7.41)
Because  is a small number, we can use a Taylor approximation:
p(x) =
1
2pi
∫
dk eikeikxp˜∗(k) =
1
2pi
∫
dk eik(+x)p˜∗(k). (7.42)
Therefore,
p(x) = p∗(x+ ). (7.43)
That is, perturbing in the λ1 eigenmode is equivalent to shifting the mean of p
∗(x).
The operation of coarse-graining and then rescaling is our first example of an RG
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transform, and the cumulants provide our first encounter with the concept that pa-
rameters can be relevant or irrelevant under an RG transform. We think of a flow in
the space of parameters: in this case, the flow induced by the RG transform is the
change in the cumulant values. The flow takes us to a fixed point which is, in this
example, a Gaussian curve. Generally, a quantity is relevant if repeated applications
of the RG transform cause it to grow, and a quantity is irrelevant if it shrinks as we
approach the RG fixed point. (Quantities can also be marginal, if a linear stability
analysis of an RG fixed point fails to indicate whether they will increase or decrease.)
This example also illustrates how fixed points of RG flows relate to universality.
Gaussian curves show up throughout the sciences, because they arise whenever one
considers the sum total effect due to a large number of uncorrelated small influences.
Furthermore, once you understand one Gaussian curve, you’ve pretty much understood
them all. This is the essence of a universality class, as we defined that concept in
Chapter 3. It is the fact that so many details are irrelevant, in the RG sense, that
makes the Central Limit Theorem so powerful.
Using the calculus of variations, one can show that Gaussian curves maximize the
Shannon index (also known as the Shannon entropy) for a given variance. That is, if
we fix the variance to be σ2, then the largest value of the Shannon index compatible
with this constraint is
SG(σ
2) =
1
2
log2(2pieσ
2). (7.44)
As we repeat the RG transform, the variance remains constant, and the probability
distribution looks more and more Gaussian, meaning that the Shannon index will
approach SG from below. The Shannon index is an example of a quantity which
increases along with the RG flow, attaining a maximum at the flow’s fixed point. When
RG ideas are applied in the realm of field theory, this idea becomes the c-theorem of
Zamolodchikov [249].
Finally, we saw that exponents turn out to be important quantities: in this example,
they are the eigenvalues λn = 2
1−n/2. The importance of exponents that govern scaling
behavior holds true across RG theory.
7.2 Isotropic Percolation
In the previous section, we did not put any spatial structure on the set of system com-
ponents. When we decided to coarse-grain two variables together, any two variables
were as good as any other pair. Now, we will move on to a problem where we can
apply RG theory to a system that has spatial structure. Our next example of an RG
analysis, which will move us closer to eco-evolutionary models, is the topic of isotropic
percolation.
In Chapter 3, we introduced percolation as the study of flow through randomized
media. Our focus was on directed percolation, in which there is a preferred direction
(e.g., downhill). It turns out to be somewhat easier to obtain quantitative results
by relaxing this restriction and considering isotropic percolation, in which no spatial
orientation is picked out as special.
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Typically, the first step in defining an isotropic percolation problem is to construct
a regular lattice. Each point, or vertex, in the lattice is connected to the same number
of other vertices. One way to proceed is to imagine that each edge can be colored with
one of two possible pigments, e.g., white and black. The color of each edge is picked at
random, independently of the choices for all other edges. For example, we can say that
the probability an edge is marked with black is p, and so an edge chosen at random
will be white with probability 1 − p. We can then ask, for any value of p, what the
sizes of the clusters formed by black edges will be. This defines a bond percolation
problem.
Alternatively, we can make the lattice points our variables of interest. For example,
we can say that each lattice point is either filled or empty, and we fill sites at random
with probability p. Depending on the value of p, we will have different statistical
distributions for the sizes of the clusters formed by adjacent filled points. This variant
is known as site percolation.
What constitutes an RG transform in this context? It is easy to imagine what
coarse-graining a lattice might mean: we can simply blur out the fine-scale details.
This operation will create a new lattice based on the configuration of the original.
One way to do this for site percolation is to consider each lattice point together with
its immediate neighbors. We “collapse” this set of points down to a single site in the
new lattice, and we choose whether the new site is filled or not based on how many of
the original sites are filled. Applying this to all the sites in the original lattice creates
a new graph in which the small-scale information has been blurred away. It is then
convenient to “step back from the picture,” rescaling the lengths of the lattice edges
so that neighboring points in the derived lattice are separated by the same distance
as those in the original. This combination of coarse-graining followed by rescaling is
an RG transform.
Suppose that p is small. Then the lattice sites will mostly be empty, though we
will have some small islands of filled sites amidst the sea of emptiness. Applying the
RG transform will tend to make each of these islands smaller, because filled sites on
the edges of the islands will have too many empty neighbors for their coarse-grained
images to be filled. So, heuristically speaking, the RG transform will create a new
lattice configuration that looks like what we would find for a smaller value of p.
At the opposite extreme, suppose that p is close to 1. Then most of the sites will
be filled, with some low density of empty regions. The RG transform will blur away
small details, making the smallest empty regions vanish. Empty regions which aren’t
quite small enough to vanish entirely will be shrunk in the transformed image. So, the
result will be a lattice configuration that looks like what we would typically find for a
larger initial choice of p.
If small values of the filling probability flow to even smaller ones, and large values
flow to even larger ones, then there must be a “continental divide” somewhere in the
middle, where p is mapped to itself. At this point, we expect to find clusters in a
continuous range of sizes: the RG transform erases the smallest clusters, so there must
be slightly larger ones to replace them, and so forth. When p equals this critical value
pc, the distribution of cluster sizes will be scale-invariant. Because the lattice will
contain clumps of all sizes, when we study the overall properties of the system, the
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details of how the connections between vertices look at the smallest scale should not
matter much. This is the root of why we can group these systems into universality
classes.
To make these qualitative considerations concrete, we will work through an example
of site percolation. We take a triangular lattice and fill in the lattice sites at random.
Let p denote the probability that a lattice site chosen at random is filled. We will see
how a simple RG transform can send one value of p to another.
The coarse-graining operation should preserve the connectedness of clusters. This is
rather tricky to enforce with a simple mapping, but one way of coming close is to use a
majority rule. We map a triplet to a filled site if at least two of the original three sites
are filled. This turns out to provide a simple approximation that gives remarkably
good agreement with the best known results for the triangular lattice.
How does the majority rule create a mapping between values of p? With probability
p3, all three vertices of a triangle will be filled, and when this configuration occurs, we
coarse-grain it to a single occupied site:
(7.45)
Likewise, if two out of three vertices are occupied, the corresponding site in the
coarse-grained lattice is filled:
(7.46)
Because there are three ways to choose which vertex is unoccupied, this situation
carries a symmetry factor, occuring with probability 3p2(1− p).
We obtain an empty vertex in the coarse-grained lattice if two sites are open:
(7.47)
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Or if all three vertices in the original triangle are unfilled:
(7.48)
Let p′ denote the probability that a randomly chosen site in the coarse-grained
lattice is filled. From the relations above, we see that
p′ = p3 + 3p2(1− p). (7.49)
The fixed points of this mapping are given by
pc = p
3
c + 3p
2
c(1− pc). (7.50)
Trivially, this equation is solved by 0 and by 1, and it has a less obvious solution at
pc =
1
2
. (7.51)
We will call this the critical value of the site-filling probability. What happens if p
is almost but not quite equal to the critical value? Let us define
p = pc + δp, p
′ = pc + δp′. (7.52)
We can relate p and p′ by the RG flow equation (7.49):
pc + δp
′ = (pc + δp)3 + 3(pc + δp)2(1− pc − δp). (7.53)
Expanding out the binomials, multiplying and simplifying, we arrive at
pc + δp
′ = pc + 6pc(1− pc)δp. (7.54)
Therefore,
δp′ =
3
2
δp. (7.55)
We see that a small deviation from the critical value becomes a larger one.
Are there exponents for the percolation problem as there were in the probability
scenario we studied in the previous section? In fact, there are. The most important in
practice is ν, which relates the characteristic length scale—the typical size of connected
clumps—to the distance from the critical threshold:
ξ ∝ |p− pc|−ν . (7.56)
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Here, we are measuring length in units of the lattice spacing. That the characteristic
length ξ varies in this fashion is perhaps most directly appreciated by numerical simu-
lation. We expect that the characteristic length will diverge at the critical threshold,
thanks to the scale-invariance we described above.
Coarse-graining a lattice will produce a new grid in which the vertices are further
apart. It is traditional to denote the factor by which the vertex separation is increased
by the letter b. If ξ(p) is the characteristic cluster size for filling probability p, then ξ(p′)
is the characteristic cluster size on the lattice produced by coarse-graining, measured
in units of the coarse-grained lattice spacing. But this must be related to the original
average cluster size by the scaling factor:
ξ(p) = bξ(p′). (7.57)
For example, if we projected our original lattice on a wall and measured the typical
cluster size to be four centimeters, then coarse-graining will produce a new image,
containing fewer pixels per unit area, in which the typical cluster size must still be
four centimeters.
If we rewrite our previous expression in terms of the distance from the threshold,
ξ(pc + δp) = bξ(pc + δp
′), (7.58)
substituting in the scaling form involving the exponent ν yields
|δp|−ν = b|δp′|−ν . (7.59)
We know from Eq. (7.55) how δp and δp′ are related, and so we can say that
|δp|−ν = b
(
3
2
)−ν
|δp|−ν . (7.60)
Canceling the common factor and solving for ν,
ν =
log b
log(3/2)
. (7.61)
We can show geometrically that for this coarse-graining operation on the triangular
lattice, b =
√
3. Therefore,
ν =
log
√
3
log(3/2)
≈ 1.355. (7.62)
The critical exponents like ν are constant across all members of a universality class.
However, other quantities, like the locations of the critical thresholds, are typically
model-specific. This means that ν will be the same on a square lattice, for example,
while pc will be different (in fact, it is roughly 0.593).
In order to illustrate the RG concepts, this section has worked through an example
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where the theory is fairly straightforward to apply. It turns out that had we chosen to
start with a square lattice instead of a triangular one, our task would have been signif-
icantly more difficult, and we’d have to sweat a bit more even to get an approximation
for ν and for pc.
We have seen RG theory at work in two rather different contexts. It can be deployed
in many more, and I am not aware of a comprehensive reference that covers them
all, or even the ones that are by now well-established. Introductory texts include
those by Creswick, Farach and Poole [250] and by McComb [251]. The textbooks by
Kardar [199] and by Zee [252] cover some aspects of RG in field theory. Bar-Yam [253]
provides a succinct first course on RG that includes its classic use in chaos theory. The
admirably slim volume by Cardy [254] includes a study of directed percolation, which
is relevant to our concerns here.
7.3 Doi Formalism
The next step is to write stochastic dynamical processes in such a way that RG theory
is applicable. We can employ the operator tools pioneered by Masao Doi [111, 112,
166, 255, 256, 257, 258] to do so. After some preliminaries, we will be able to use this
formalism to describe evolutionary ecological systems.
We can take our system to consist of a series of components indexed by i, where i
might range over individuals, genes or sites of a lattice or other network, as appropri-
ate. The state of the i-th component will be denoted xi; we can then represent the
configuration of the entire system as x. The probability of being in the state x can
increase if the system can transition into it, and it can decrease if transitions can take
the system out of it. We thus write the master equation for the system dynamics:
dp(x)
dt
=
∑
y
pi
(
y → x) p (y)−∑
y
pi
(
x→ y) p (x) . (7.63)
The form of the transition rates pi
(
x→ y) depends upon the detailed interactions of
the system—how hosts reproduce, how infections are transmitted and so forth. We can
make the master equation Eq. (7.63) tractable if we make a simplifying approximation;
of course, any such specialization carries its own cost in biological realism.
The mean-field simplification of Eq. (7.63) is
dp(x)
dt
=
∑
y
pi(y → x)p(y)−
∑
y
pi(x→ y)p(x). (7.64)
In Eq. (7.63), the “vector” x labeled a microstate; in Eq. (7.64), x without the arrow
labels a macrostate to which many distinct microstates map under a coarse-graining
transformation.
To take a concrete example, consider a Lotka–Volterra model of hosts (prey) and
consumers (predators). The number of hosts, H, changes through birth and predation,
while the number C of consumers increases through predation and decreases due to
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death. The differential equation for the probability p(C,H) will have a predation
term proportional to p(C − 1, H + 1) and to the consumer voraciousness λ, since each
consumption act must increase C by 1 and decrement H by the same amount. By the
same reasoning, the consumer death term must be proportional to p(C + 1, H) and to
the death rate µ; likewise, prey reproduction generates a term involving p(C,H − 1)
and the growth rate σ. Finally, we must have a negative term reflecting how p(C,H)
decreases due to death, birth and predation “taking probability away” from the (C,H)
macrostate. We can thus write the mean-field master equation [99]
dp(C,H)
dt
= λ(C − 1)(H + 1)p(C − 1, H + 1)
+ µ(C + 1)p(C + 1, H)
+ σ(H − 1)p(C,H − 1)
− (µC + σH + λCH)p(C,H). (7.65)
To rewrite this equation in a form more accessible to the tools we have from our physics
education, we introduce creation and annihilation operators. In this case, we require
one pair of operators for each species; more generally, the operators will be indexed
by some variable i. Annihilation operators ai and creation operators a
†
j satisfy the
commutation relation [
ai, a
†
j
]
= δij . (7.66)
A person excessively steeped in category theory would say that this is just the natural
thing to do when dealing with a set of objects whose size can be incremented or
decremented [259]. The reason is that we are really considering the number of ways
to perform some manipulation on a collection of objects: there are n ways to draw a
toy out of a box containing n of them, but only one way to drop a new toy in, and
so the operations of “removing a toy” and “adding a toy” fail to commute by one
unit. Thanks to the product rule, differentiation and multiplication by a variable x
satisfy the commutator in Eq. (7.66). This is ultimately why we can discuss probability
distributions using generating functions.
We build up states by acting on the vacuum |0〉 with creation operators. The state
so built will be labeled by the occupation numbers, i.e., by how many times we acted
with a†i , for all allowed values of i.
|n〉 =
(∏
i
(
a†i
)ni) |0〉 . (7.67)
The normalization we have chosen implies that the action of ai is to lower the label of
a state and produce a prefactor. In the simplest case, where we have only one type of
object,
a |n〉 = a(a†)n |0〉 = n(a†)n−1 |0〉 = n |n− 1〉 . (7.68)
From this, we can conclude
a†a |n〉 = n |n〉 . (7.69)
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We turn occupation probabilities into state vectors by
|φ(t)〉 =
∑
n
P (n, t)
∏
i
(
a†i
)ni |0〉
=
∑
n
P (n, t) |n〉 . (7.70)
Of special importance will be the coherent states, defined via
∣∣η) = exp(∑
i
ηia
†
i
)
|0〉 . (7.71)
These will play an important role in the path integrals studied later. One particular
coherent state,
|1) = e
∑
i a
†
i |0〉 , (7.72)
is an essential part of calculating probabilities. We know that the scheme for turning
state vectors into probabilities cannot be the same as that we use in quantum mechan-
ics; physically, we’re working with a wholly classical system, while mathematically, a
Dirac bracket 〈φ(t)|O|φ(t)〉 would be bilinear in the occupation probabilities instead
of linear.
If we have only one type of particle, then we only need one number to label a
coherent state:
|η) = eηa† |0〉 =
∞∑
n=0
ηn(a†)n
n!
|0〉 =
∞∑
n=0
ηn
n!
|n〉 . (7.73)
The Poisson distribution is a probability distribution over the nonnegative integers,
defined by
pn =
ηne−η
n!
. (7.74)
The mean of this distribution is equal to η. (In fact, all of the cumulants are equal
to η.) So, up to normalization, a coherent state is “an over-educated way of talking
about a Poisson distribution” [258]. This will be important later, because we will often
want to initialize a stochastic dynamical system with Poissonian starting conditions.
The coherent states defined by Eq. (7.71) are eigenstates of the annihilation opera-
tors ai with eigenvalue ηi; the proof of this goes through just as that for the quantum
harmonic oscillator. Consequently, the adjoint coherent states
(
η
∣∣ = 〈0| exp(∑
i
ηiai
)
(7.75)
are left eigenstates of the creation operators a†i . In particular, because 〈0| e
∑
i ai is a
left eigenstate of a†i with eigenvalue unity, we can write the expectation value of an
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operator O as
〈O(t)〉 = (1|O|φ(t)〉 . (7.76)
It is useful to know the inner product of two coherent states:
(φ1|φ2) = exp
(
−1
2
|φ1|2 − 1
2
|φ2|2 + φ∗1φ2
)
. (7.77)
Using these tools, we can rewrite the Lotka–Volterra system of Eq. (7.65) in operator
language. To do so, we introduce two sets of creation and annihilation operators, which
for brevity we denote with c and h, satisfying[
c, c†
]
=
[
h, h†
]
= 1, [c, h] =
[
c, h†
]
= 0. (7.78)
In terms of these operators, Eq. (7.65) takes the form of an imaginary-time Schro¨dinger
equation:
∂t |φ(t)〉 = −H |φ(t)〉 , (7.79)
where
H = λc†ch†h+ µc†c+ σh†h
− λc†c†ch†h− µc+ σh†h†h, (7.80)
which we can reorganize into
H = λ(1− c†)c†ch†h+ µ(c† − 1)c+ σ(1− h†)h†h. (7.81)
This example illustrates the general way of constructing stochastic Hamiltonian
operators, which we can summarize as follows [260]:
[F]or each new particle species additional occupation numbers, second-
quantized operators, and fields are to be introduced. The details of the
reaction are coded into the master equation, though after some practice,
it is actually easier to directly start with the Doi time evolution opera-
tor, as it is a more efficient representation. The general result is as fol-
lows: For a given reaction, two terms appear in the quasi-Hamiltonian
(as in the original master equation). The first contribution, which is posi-
tive, contains both an annihilation and creation operator for each reactant,
normal-ordered. For example, for the A+A→ 0 and A+A→ A reactions
this term reads aˆ†2aˆ2, whereas one obtains for the A + B → 0 reaction
aˆ†bˆ†aˆbˆ. These contributions indicate that the respective second-order pro-
cesses contain the particle density products a2 and ab in the correspond-
ing classical rate equations. The second term in the quasi-Hamiltonian,
which is negative, entails an annihilation operator for every reactant and
a creation operator for every product, normal-ordered. For example, in
A + A → 0 this term would be aˆ2, whereas for A + A → A it becomes
aˆ†aˆ2, and for A + B + C → A + B it would read aˆ†bˆ†aˆbˆcˆ. These terms
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thus directly reflect the occurring annihilation and creation processes in
second-quantized language.
As mentioned, it becomes fairly easy with practice to write the time-evolution oper-
ator directly from the description of the reactions. We will do this for some examples
in the next section. Before moving on, however, we note one subtlety which is relevant
on occasion when reading papers in this field.
Calculating probabilities using Eq. (7.76) introduces a new wrinkle as we move into
more advanced computations, because the standard machinery of field theory expects
operators to be normal-ordered, that is, to have annihilation operators to the right
of creation operators in all products thereof. Since the coherent state (1| involves an
exponential of annihilation operators ai, expressions involving (1| and an operator like
the Hamiltonian of Eq. (7.81) will not be normal-ordered. To resolve this, we can
commute e
∑
i ai through the Hamiltonian. Because
eaa† =
∞∑
n=0
an
n!
a†
=
∞∑
n=0
a†an + nan−1
n!
=
(
1 + a†
)
ea,
the effect of commuting the exponential through the operator being bracketed is to
shift a†i → a†i + 1.
7.4 Examples
First, let’s apply the procedure described above to the reaction A→ 0, which we shall
say happens at rate λ. The Hamiltonian operator is
H = λ(a†a− a) = λ(N − a). (7.82)
We would like to know how the expected number of particles present, 〈N〉, will change
with time. From Eqs. (7.76) and (7.79), we have
d
dt
〈N〉 = − (1|NH|φ(t)〉 (7.83)
= −λ (1|N(N − a)|φ(t)〉 . (7.84)
At this juncture, it is useful to note a couple relations that follow from the actions
of the a and a† operators on the vectors |n〉:(
1
∣∣a†∣∣φ〉 = (1|φ〉 , (7.85)
(1|a|φ〉 = (1|N |φ〉 = 〈N〉 . (7.86)
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In addition, the fundamental commutator between a and a† implies that
[a,N ] = a. (7.87)
Now, we compute:
λ (1|N(a−N)|φ〉 = λ (1∣∣(Na−N2)∣∣φ〉 (7.88)
= λ
(
1
∣∣(aN −N −N2)∣∣φ〉 (7.89)
= λ
(
1
∣∣(N2 −N −N2)∣∣φ〉 (7.90)
= −λ (1|N |φ〉 . (7.91)
Therefore,
d
dt
〈N〉 = −λ 〈N〉 . (7.92)
We have shown that the reaction A→ 0 implies exponential decay.
Likewise, we can see that the reproduction reaction A→ A+A produces exponential
growth. The stochastic Hamiltonian for this reaction is
H = λ [a†a− (a†)2a] . (7.93)
As before, we find the time derivative of the expectation value 〈N〉:
d
dt
(1|N |φ〉 = −λ (1∣∣N [a†a− (a†)2a]∣∣φ〉 . (7.94)
The expression in the middle is equivalent to
N
[
N − (a†)2a] = N2 −Na†N. (7.95)
We can commute the a† through the number operator N , producing
N
[
N − (a†)2a] = N2 − a†(N + 1)N. (7.96)
Therefore,
−λ (1∣∣[N2 − a†(N + 1)N]∣∣φ〉 = λ (1∣∣[(N + 1)N −N2]∣∣φ〉 (7.97)
= λ (1|N |φ〉 . (7.98)
And we see that indeed
d
dt
〈N〉 = λ 〈N〉 . (7.99)
We conclude this section with an example in which there are multiple locations at
which particles can be present. Suppose that we have two boxes, which we call box 1
and box 2, and particles can hop stochastically from one site to the other. We can
treat this as a particle being annihilated in box 1 and a replacement being created
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within box 2. If this takes place at a rate λ, then
H1→2 = λ(a†1 − a†2)a1. (7.100)
For the reverse process,
H2→1 = λ(a†2 − a†1)a2. (7.101)
If we let transitions happen in both directions,
H = H1→2 +H2→1 = λ(a†1a1 − a†2a1 + a†2a2 − a†1a2), (7.102)
which we can factor as
H = λ(a†1 − a†2)(a1 − a2). (7.103)
Generalizing this to a large set of boxes, we can write a stochastic Hamiltonian for
hopping between adjacent locations, in terms of a sum over nearest-neighbor sites:
H = λ
∑
〈kj〉
(a†k − a†j)(ak − aj). (7.104)
This models a diffusion process, if we take the rate λ as given by a diffusion coefficient
D, divided by the square of an inter-site spacing ∆x.
7.5 Coherent-State Path Integrals
Path integrals in field theory are much like partition functions in statistical mechanics.
In both cases, we take a sum over terms, each of which is an exponential of a formula
encoding the system dynamics, the sum running over all possible ways the system
can do something. When we calculated a partition function in elementary statistical
mechanics, we summed over all the states of a system; when we compute a path
integral, we sum over all paths which the system can take from one state to another.
Start with some initial state |φ(0)〉, which we produce by acting on the vacuum |0〉
with some combination of raising operators. This state evolves in time according to
Eq. (7.79); at some later time t, we compute the expectation value of some operator
O:
〈O(t)〉 = (1∣∣Oe−Ht∣∣φ(0)〉 . (7.105)
We could find the same expectation value by time-advancing the system in M repeated
small increments of size ∆t = t/M .
exp(−Ht) = lim
M→∞
(1−H∆t)M . (7.106)
Various ways of developing the path integral all come from different choices for writing
the options available to the system at each timestep. This amounts to a choice of basis.
We have a long string of factors of (1−H∆t), each one denoting the advance from ti
to ti+1, where ti = i∆t. At time ti, a system in any one state has some probability
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of transitioning into any other state; a path is a set of M such transitions. The
normalization of our basis states gives us a “resolution of unity”: between every two
successive factors of (1 − H∆t), we insert a sum over expressions of the form |x〉 〈x|
which works out to 1. In our case, we employ the coherent-state resolution of unity,∫
dη˜dη
piN
∣∣η) (η∣∣ = 1. (7.107)
The factors of pi are introduced to cancel those which arise from Gaussian integrals over
the state labels. (Recall the normalization of the basic Gaussian curve in Eq. (5.147).)
The coherent-state representation of an operator O is
O[ψ˜(t), φ(t)] ≡ 〈ψ(t)|O(t)|φ(t)〉 . (7.108)
When we insert the coherent-state resolution of the identity into our formal solution
for 〈O(t)〉, we end up with an integral of the form∫
· · · |φt+∆t) (φt+∆t| e−H∆t |φt) (φt| e−H∆t |φt−∆t) (φt−∆t| · · · , (7.109)
where we are integrating over t/∆t different variables. Each factor in the long integrand
is of the form
(φt| e−H∆t |φt−∆t) = e−H(φ∗t ,φt−∆t)∆t (φt|φt−∆t) . (7.110)
Using the overlap between coherent states, Eq. (7.77), this becomes
(φt| e−H∆t |φt−∆t) = e−H(φ∗t ,φt−∆t)∆t exp
(
−1
2
|φt|2 − 1
2
|φt−∆t|2 + φ∗tφt−∆t
)
.
(7.111)
We can approximate this by
(φt| e−H∆t |φt−∆t) ≈ e−H(φ∗t ,φt)∆t exp
(
−1
2
|φt|2 − 1
2
|φt−∆t|2 + φ∗tφt−∆t
)
. (7.112)
And, by considering the terms produced by adjacent factors in the big integrand, we
can simplify this to
(φt| e−H∆t |φt−∆t) ≈ e−H(φ∗t ,φt)∆t exp (−φ∗t∂tφt∆t) . (7.113)
Piling up many time slices and taking the limit ∆t→ 0, we get that e−Ht becomes∫
Dφ∗Dφ exp
(
−
∫ t
0
dt′ [φ∗∂t′φ+H(φ∗, φ)]
)
. (7.114)
In this integral, the product of the integration volumes d2φj/pi has become Dφ∗Dφ.
The action which determines the weighting of each trajectory in the path integral
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is
S[φ∗, φ] =
∫ t
0
dt′ [φ∗∂t′φ+H(φ∗, φ)]. (7.115)
We can include the initial condition |φ(0)〉 and the projection state (1| by adding a
couple terms to the action. For example, if we start with a Poisson distribution with
mean n0, then
S[φ∗, φ] =
∫ t
0
dt′ [φ∗∂t′φ+H(φ∗, φ)]− φ(t)− n0φ∗(0). (7.116)
Now, the expectation value 〈O(t)〉 is
〈O(t)〉 = 1N
∫
Dφ∗jDφjO (φ(t)) e−S[φ
∗,φ]. (7.117)
The prefactor is a normalization constant that won’t concern us.
We can eliminate the term that was brought in by the projection state (1|, by
defining a new variable:
φ∗ → 1 + φ˜. (7.118)
The time-derivative term inside the action integral becomes∫ t
0
dt′ (1 + φ˜)∂t′φ = φ(t)− φ(0) +
∫ t
0
dt′ φ˜∂t′φ. (7.119)
This shift also transforms H, taking it to H(1 + φ˜, φ).
If we have multiple lattice sites, then the action is a function of all the φk and the
φ˜k:
S[{φ˜k}, {φk}] =
∑
k
[∫ t
0
dt′
[
φ˜k∂t′φk +H({φ˜k}, {φk})
]
− n0φ˜k(0)
]
. (7.120)
Our notation in this section largely follows the lectures by Vollmayr-Lee [261], which
provide some additional details.
7.6 Spatial Dependence
Incorporating spatial extent into a model means promoting our creation and annihi-
lation operators to sets thereof, indexed by spatial position, and adding appropriate
movement terms to the stochastic Hamiltonian. This procedure creates an expression
that can be studied by means of RG theory.
Most of the work done on this topic assumes that particles move about by diffusion
and react in some way if they happen to bump into one another. Therefore, we start
with a mathematical model of a diffusion process. The diffusion action, assuming
Poisson initial conditions, is just the diffusion Hamiltonian (7.104) in our new coherent-
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state language:
SD =
∫
dt
∑
i
φ˜i∂t′φi +
D
∆x2
∑
〈ij〉
(φ˜i − φ˜j)(φi − φj)
−∑
i
n0φ˜i(0). (7.121)
If we take the continuum limit, φ and φ˜ become fields, and the action becomes
SD =
∫
dt ddx
[
φ˜∂t′φ+D∇φ˜ · ∇φ− n0φ˜δ(t)
]
. (7.122)
Integrating by parts, we find
SD =
∫
dt ddx
[
φ˜(∂t′ −D∇2)φ− n0φ˜δ(t)
]
. (7.123)
This action is linear in the response field φ˜. Therefore, finding its extremum is easy:
δSD
δφ˜
= ∂tφ−D∇2φ− n0δ(t) = 0. (7.124)
This is satisfied when
∂tφ = D∇2φ+ n0δ(t), (7.125)
which is the familiar diffusion equation, with initial conditions specified at time t = 0.
Mobilia et al. look in particular at the sustainability transition, where the carnivores
are consuming just enough to keep up their numbers and not go extinct [99, 262].
After a lot of redefinitions and rescalings, they get an action which is an integral of a
Lagrangian density of the form
L[ψ˜, ψ] = ψ˜(∂t +Dc(rc −∇2))ψ − uψ˜(ψ˜ − ψ)ψ + τψ˜2ψ2. (7.126)
The field ψ is a shifted and rescaled carnivore density, and ψ˜ is its conjugate “response
field”. The various constants are mixed-together combinations of the parameters we
started with.1 There are a fair many assumptions in the derivation of this Lagrangian
which ought to be unpacked (such as the decision to expand perturbatively around
diffusive motion), and of course, once we’ve squeezed the dynamics we want to study
into this formalism, we’d like to get answers out of it, and that appears to involve a
whole lot of elaborate RG machinery.
1This is, incidentally, the same form of Lagrangian which defines the “Reggeon field theory” used
back in the ’70s for high-energy scattering physics, with the last term providing what I think
they’d call a quadruple-Pomeron vertex [263,264,265].
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In this field-theoretic formalism, rate equations arise as tree-level results, i.e., the re-
sults obtained by using Feynman diagrams containing no closed loops. This is easiest
to appreciate in a simple model of diffusion-limited annihilation. In this model, parti-
cles move about by Brownian motion, and if they come into contact, they annihilate
with some probability. Feynman diagrams for this model have a natural interpretation
in terms of ways a particle can survive over an interval of time.
Suppose we release a particle at time 0 and find it again at some later time t. What
could have happened to the particle in between, given that it survived until t? The
simplest possibility is that it encountered no other particles and so had no opportunity
to annihilate. The diagram for this process is just a straight line. Alternatively, the
particle could have bumped into one or more other particles but failed to annihilate
each time. Diagrams for these processes have vertices where two lines come in and one
or two lines come out. The total probability of surviving until time t is the sum over
all the ways the particle could survive, which means a sum over all possible diagrams.
Neglecting correlations means neglecting the possibility that two particles coming
together at a certain time have done so already in the past. This means that neglecting
correlations allows us to omit all diagrams containing closed loops from our sum. This
calculation is significantly easier than the complete version. Figure 7.3 shows the
reason in diagrammatic form: the heavy line, representing all possible tree-shaped
diagrams, obeys a self-consistency condition.
Figure 7.3: Self-consistency calculation for the diffusion-limited annihilation model’s
tree-level propagator.
The propagator tells us how particles get from one point to another if nothing hap-
pens in between. We’re saying that these particles move by diffusion, so the propagator
in this case is the Green’s function for the diffusion equation.
GD(k, ω) =
1
−iω +Dk2 . (7.127)
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Transforming from frequency back into the time domain,
GD(k, t) =
∫
dω
2pi
e−iωt
−iω +Dk2 . (7.128)
For t > 0, this is
GD(k, t) = exp(−Dk2t). (7.129)
In position space,
GD(x, t > 0) =
e−x
2/(4Dt)
(4piDt)d/2
. (7.130)
We can think of this as saying that the response to a delta-function spike at t = 0 is
a Gaussian curve which spreads out as time passes, its standard deviation growing as
the square root of the elapsed time.
To each trivalent vertex, we associate a factor −2λ0, and each initial vertex gets
a n0. Wave-vector (or “momentum”) conservation applies at each vertex. We can
read off the self-consistency condition for the tree-level contributions directly from the
diagrams:
atree(t) = n0 +
∫ t
0
dt1GD(0, t− t1)(−2λ0)atree(t1)2. (7.131)
The propagator with k = 0 is just 1. Differentiating both sides of the self-consistency
equation yields that the time derivative of atree is the integrand evaluated at t.
datree
dt
= −2λ0a2tree (7.132)
This is just a rate equation for atree. With the initial condition atree(0) = n0, this has
the solution
atree(t) =
n0
1 + 2λ0n0t
. (7.133)
Going beyond tree-level calculations requires RG theory. The computations are, at
least for diffusion-limited annihilation, not all that difficult on a technical level, once
the basic concepts are grasped. One fact which enables considerable simplifications
is that the reactions in this model cannot increase the number of particles present.
Applying RG to models in which this condition does not hold is more complicated.
Question: Since we require the concepts of RG at such an early stage
of our analysis, would a more sophisticated mathematical treatment of that
theory be useful? It appears that the Hopf-algebraic study of RG [266] would
be just as applicable in this stochastic setting as it is in QFT. Perhaps
diffusion-limited annihilation might even provide a simpler setting for it.
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Back in Chapter 3, we introduced directed percolation as an idealized model of fluid
flow through a porous medium. We began with the mental image of a regular lattice of
channels, some of whose junction points were blocked. If the fraction of blocked points
was too large, fluid flowing through the lattice from top to bottom would always be
stymied, but if the blockages were sparse, the fluid could percolate downwards through
the channels. We can treat this model in any number of dimensions; the crucial point is
that there is a preferred direction. And because the fluid only spreads downhill, there
is another picture available. We can also think of the tip of each stream as a corpuscle
executing a random walk. These walkers can merge, if two fluid streams come together
at a common point, and they can reproduce, which happens when a fluid stream splits
and its offshoots progress along two different channels. The walkers can also perish:
this corresponds to a stream which encounters a point where no further propagation
is possible.
In short, directed percolation in a (d + 1)-dimensional lattice, with one dimension
singled out as the axis of gravity, can equally well be thought of as merging, reproducing
and perishing random walks in a d-dimensional space. This latter conception of the
problem is amenable to the techniques we have developed in this chapter.
Consider the spatial stochastic process defined by the combination of particle decay
(A→ 0), reproduction (A→ A+A) and merging (A+A→ A) with diffusive motion.
Call the decay or mortality rate µ, the reproduction rate σ and the merging rate λ.
The stochastic action is
S =
∫
ddx
[
−φ(t) +
∫ t
0
dt′
(
φ∗(∂t′ −D∇2)φ− µ(1− φ∗)φ+ σ(1− φ∗)φ∗φ
−λ(1− φ∗)φ∗φ2)− n0φ∗(0)] . (7.134)
Performing the field shift φ∗ = 1 + φ˜, and writing r = (µ− σ)/D, we obtain
S =
∫
ddx dt′
[
φ˜
(
∂t′ +D(r −∇2)
)
φ− σφ˜2φ+ λφ˜φ2 + λφ˜2φ2
]
. (7.135)
We have deliberately dropped the initial-conditions term, because particle decay and
generation will scramble the original configuration. Note that δS/δφ = 0 is satisfied
by φ˜ = 0, and combining this with the other variation δS/δφ˜ = 0 yields the equation
of motion
∂tφ = −D(r −∇2)φ− λφ2. (7.136)
If particles can annihilate as well as merge (A+A→ 0), then the action is modified:
S =
∫
ddx dt′
[
φ˜
(
∂t′ +D(r −∇2)
)
φ− σφ˜2φ+ (λ+ 2λ′)φ˜φ2 + (λ+ λ′)φ˜2φ2
]
.
(7.137)
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And the rate equation becomes
∂tφ = −D(r −∇2)φ− (λ+ 2λ′)φ2. (7.138)
It is interesting to follow the history of the directed-percolation concept. It was first
proposed in 1957 [267]. The mathematics necessary to treat it cleverly was invented (or,
rather, adapted from a different area of physics) in the 1970s, and then forgotten, and
then rediscovered by somebody else [257]. Connections with other subjects were made.
Experiments were carried out on systems which almost behaved like the idealization,
but always turned out to differ in some way. . . until 2007, when the behavior was
finally caught in the wild [268]. And this experiment, which at last observed a DP-
class phase transition with quantitative exactness, used a liquid crystal substance
(N -(4-Methoxybenzylidene)-4-butylaniline) which wasn’t synthesized until 1969 [269].
This rather puts the lie to the notion that a scientific hypothesis must be amenable
to immediate falsification by experiment. The model here is not an esoteric proposal
for quantum gravity, but an idealization of water flowing through coffee grounds. And
not only did it take half a century to go from a mathematician’s mind to a laboratory
bench, but that journey depended on tools which did not exist when the model was
first conceived.
7.9 Prior Relevant Results and Difficulties
One can find in the literature various applications of the Doi field-theoretic formalism
to systems which resemble our host–consumer model. Field-theory tools allow one
to calculate, for example, the critical exponents which describe the dynamics of a
predator population near its extinction threshold [99, 260]. They also appear to be
fairly successful at locating where the critical point will occur in an epidemic model,
in at least some regions of parameter space [270].
One significant problem blocks the path to applying these techniques to the spatial
host–consumer model studied in this report. All the prior work assumed diffusive
motion, as we did in our brief encounter with annihilating particles above. The host–
consumer model has no such feature: all motion is due to reproduction into adjacent
lattice sites (empty sites for hosts, host-occupied sites for consumers). The validity
of expanding around a diffusion propagator is, therefore, questionable. It may be a
viable approximation in some cases, however, thanks to universality. In a later section,
we will make an argument to this effect in more depth.
Simulations such as those depicted in Figure 3.1 suggest that treating the advances
of host and consumer populations as surface growth may be a useful approach. The
field-theoretic study of the Kardar–Parisi–Zhang model may, therefore, be an area to
draw from [199, 252]. (Visually, a consumer wave eating its way through a field of
hosts does resemble burning paper, which has been studied as a possible instance of
KPZ-class dynamics.)
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Realistic ecosystem models typically have some notion of a carrying capacity : a given
environment can only sustain a living population of limited size. In our spatial host–
consumer model, population density is limited by the fact that each lattice site can only
hold one H-type or one C-type individual. (As we discussed in Chapter 3, each H-type
or C-type agent in the model can be thought of as an idealization of a homogeneous
subpopulation.) To make progress, we need to incorporate carrying capacity into the
field-theoretic formalism developed above. One way to do this is to introduce rate-
limiting terms into the Lagrangian, which ensure that the probability of the population
density growing too large at any point in space is negligible. Another way is to curtail
the state space of the theory itself. This latter approach relates to some interesting
topics in mathematical physics, so we’ll explore it at greater length.
In the Schwinger oscillator model, we have two sets of harmonic oscillator creation
and annihilation operators,
[a−, a
†
−] = 1, [a+, a
†
+] = 1, (7.139)
such that operators pertaining to one oscillator commute with those for the other:
[a+, a
†
−] = [a−, a
†
+] = 0. (7.140)
Excited states—that is, states with nonzero particle number—are built by acting re-
peatedly with the creation operators:
|n+n−〉 =
(a†+)
n+(a†−)
n−√
n+!
√
n−!
|0, 0〉 . (7.141)
The number operators N+ = a
†
+a+ and N− = a
†
−a− are eigenvalues of |n+n−〉 with
eigenvalues n+ and n−, respectively. Under the substitution
n+ → j +m, n− → j −m, (7.142)
we can write
|j,m〉 = (a
†
+)
j+m(a†−)
j−m√
(j +m)!
√
(j −m)! |0, 0〉 . (7.143)
Defining
J+ = ~a†+a−, J− = ~a
†
−a+, Jz =
~
2
(N+ −N−), (7.144)
the operators J± and Jz satisfy the angular momentum algebra su(2):
[Jz, J±] = ±J±, (7.145)
[J+, J−] = 2Jz. (7.146)
To relate Schwinger’s work and stochastic mechanics, take a system composed of
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two particle species, which we can call type a and type b. The different normalization
does not affect the operator algebra. We can still define J+ = a
†b, J− = b†a and
Jz = (a
†a− b†b)/2. Acting on a ket labeled by particle number, we still have
Jz |na, nb〉 = 1
2
(na − nb) |na, nb〉 , (7.147)
and the commutators among our operators are again
[Jz, J±] = ±J±, (7.148)
[J+, J−] = 2Jz. (7.149)
Defining
J2 = J2z +
1
2
(J+J− + J−J+), (7.150)
we find that
J2 |na, nb〉 = N
2
(
N
2
+ 1
)
|na, nb〉 , where N = na + nb. (7.151)
This means that we can label basis kets just as well by j and m as we could by na and
nb.
If the total number of individuals present is N , then we are working with the N -
dimensional representation of su(2).
In the host–consumer model, each lattice site can be in one of three states. If we
write Hi, Ci and Ei for the number of hosts, consumers and empty slots at position i,
then
Hi + Ci + Ei = 1. (7.152)
Introducing the number operator
Ni = h
†
ihi + c
†
i ci + e
†
iei, (7.153)
we have that Ni takes the value 1 on all admissible states. Ni commutes with all nine
operators which annihilate an individual and then create one: h†ihi, h
†
i ci, c
†
ihi and
so on. So, Ni commutes with all linear combinations of operators of this form. We
have, then, an eight-dimensional space of operators, which is the Lie algebra su(3), in
Schwinger form.2
7.11 A Common Denominator
One stochastic model recurs in many of the settings we have explored in different
chapters of this thesis. This model is a stochastic process which includes reproduction
by budding into empty space and death leaving empty space behind, implemented on
2Actually, it’s sl(3), the complexification of su(3). See [271].
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a lattice or other network. By understanding this stochastic process, we can obtain
quantitative predictions for the systems we studied in Chapters 3 and 4.
We can identify the basic reactions in this model as follows. Let Ai denote the
presence of a particle at site i, and let Ei denote the fact of site i being empty.
Writing i and j for site indices, and ∂(i) for the neighborhood of site i, we have
Ai + Ej → Ai +Aj , j ∈ ∂(i); (7.154)
Ai → Ei. (7.155)
The first reaction is reproduction; and the second, death. Each of these processes
happens with some probability whenever the conditions are right to allow it, i.e.,
whenever the appropriate reactants are present in the proper juxtaposition. Together,
these reactions define a kind of contact process.
The eco-evolutionary systems that have motivated us to write this simplified model
typically include higher-order complications. The rates at which organisms can die and
empty sites can be filled will, in general, be affected by the surroundings. Therefore,
we include one generalization beyond the standard contact process: The probability
of the reaction taking place, when it is allowed, can depend on the local environment.
Specifically, we are concerned with cases where the probability of a particle at site i
reproducing to make a new particle at site j depends on all the sites which are adjacent
to i. This means that the probability of site j becoming occupied can depend on the
next-to-nearest neighbors of j, which is unlike the basic contact process.
This model includes the single-species cases of the Volunteer’s Dilemma, which we
studied in §4.2. When the lattice contains only Volunteers or only Slackers, the only
difference between the two species’ basic dynamical rules are how the presence of
neighboring individuals affect the rate of the budding process. Furthermore, this model
can serve to approximate the spatial host–consumer model of Chapter 3, in a scenario
where the ecosystem is filled with hosts, and only a small number of consumers are
present in a localized area. When the consumer transmissibility is just barely large
enough to keep the consumer population from fizzling, and the lattice contains no
empty space, we can gain some understanding from a simplified model which has only
two possible states for each lattice site. In essence, we can to a first approximation
neglect the possibility of empty sites, as long as the host growth rate is nonzero,
because any sites that are emptied will be refilled quickly enough not to be of concern.
The empty lattice is an absorbing state for this model: fluctuations can take us into
it, but never out. Experience in nonequilibrium statistical mechanics, codified in a
conjecture of Grassberger and Janssen [272, 273], suggests that the phase transition
between the active and absorbing regimes will belong to the directed percolation uni-
versality class. Indeed, if our system had diffusive particle motion and no occupation
restrictions, we could make that identification immediately. Likewise, the transition
in the standard contact process is known to be a DP-class phenomenon [121].
The question now arises: does the modification we made to the contact process affect
the universality class to which the model belongs? If we can argue that it does not,
then we can use off-the-shelf results about DP-class transitions for the spatial host–
consumer model and for the Volunteer’s Dilemma. This would represent a substantial
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advance: even if the computation of DP critical exponents is a laborious calculation,
it only has to be done for one system.
We now develop two ways of writing equations for stochastic contact processes. This
will help tie the model we have defined here into the prior literature. First, we will
apply as directly as possible the tools of raising and lowering operators we developed
in earlier sections.
If we were not concerned about the need for empty space, we could write the fol-
lowing stochastic Hamiltonians to encapsulate the reactions we described above:
Hd =
∑
i
λi(a
†
iai − ai), (7.156)
Hr =
∑
〈i,j〉
σi(a
†
iai − a†ia†jai). (7.157)
Here, we have introduced the potentially site-dependent transition probabilities σi
and λi. In the simplest case, these can be taken as constant across all sites, but more
generally, they will depend on the configuration of other sites in the vicinity of i. That
is, whatever higher-order interactions among organisms might arise, we can roll them
into the σi and λi.
However, because each site can hold at most one particle at a time, events which vio-
late that constraint must be disallowed. We can represent this formally by introducing
delta functions which make a contribution to the Hamiltonian vanish if conditions are
not right. For example, the event of a particle at site i budding to produce an offspring
at site j can only take place if exactly one particle exists at i and exactly zero exist
at j. So, we write the modified stochastic Hamiltonians,
Hr =
∑
〈i,j〉
σi(a
†
iai − a†ia†jai)δni,1δnj ,0, (7.158)
Hd =
∑
i
λi(a
†
iai − ai)δni,1. (7.159)
As before, both σi and λi can be functions of the local environment around site i.
When we pass to the coherent-state representation and field theory, the delta func-
tions in our stochastic Hamiltonians will become exponential factors [274, 275]. This
is a consequence of the Fourier representation of the Kronecker delta:
δn,m =
1
2pi
∫
dx eix(n−k). (7.160)
Now for the second approach, in which we incorporate the site-occupation restric-
tions directly into our definitions of the creation and annihilation operators. Grass-
berger and de la Torre [276] define the following simplified Gribov process, which is
known to have a DP-class phase transition. Construct a regular lattice, whose points
will be labeled by the index i. Each lattice point can be occupied by at most one
particle, i.e., we restrict the occupation number νi to be 0 or 1. Each particle can
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spontaneously decay with rate κ, and each particle can produce another in an adjacent
empty lattice site with rate κ′.
The creation operator for site n acts on a basis state by the rule
c†i |· · · νi · · · 〉 = (1− νi) |· · · νi + 1 · · · 〉 , (7.161)
and the annihilation operator on site n acts as
ci |· · · νi · · · 〉 = νi |· · · νi − 1 · · · 〉 . (7.162)
Note that acting twice with either operator destroys the vector. If we apply the
combination c†i ci to a state,
c†i ci |· · · νi · · · 〉 = νi(2− νi) |· · · νi · · · 〉 , (7.163)
we see that the result vanishes if νi = 0, which is consistent. This justifies using c
†
i ci
as the number operator for site i. Likewise,
cic
†
i |· · · νi · · · 〉 = νi(1− νi)(1 + νi) |· · · νi · · · 〉 , (7.164)
which vanishes if νi = 1.
Define |0〉 to be the state annihilated by all ci, and let
V =
∏
i
(1 + ci). (7.165)
Then the probability to find particles at locations n1, . . . , nk irrespective of what is
happening elsewhere on the lattice is
ρk(n1, . . . , nk|Φ) = 〈0| cn1 · · · cnk |Φ〉 . (7.166)
We can check this for a system composed of a single site. Let the state |Φ〉 be
|Φ〉 = (1− p) |0〉+ p |1〉 . (7.167)
Then we have that
〈0| c1(1− c1) |Φ〉 = 〈0| c1(1− c1) |Φ〉
= 〈0| c1(1− p) |0〉+ 〈0| c1p |1〉 − 〈0| c21(1− p) |0〉 = 〈0| c21p |1〉
= p 〈0|0〉
= p. (7.168)
And we see indeed that the probability of finding a particle in the single site of our
system is p, as it should be.
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For a properly normalized state |Φ〉, we have
〈0|V |Φ〉 = 1. (7.169)
The time evolution of |Φ〉 is given by
d
dt
|Φ〉 = −L |Φ〉 , (7.170)
with the operator L defined as
L = κ
∑
i
(
c†i − 1
)
ci +
κ′
z
∑
〈i,j〉
(ci − 1)c†i c†jcj . (7.171)
The first sum is over all lattice sites i, and the second is over all pairs of nearest
neighbors i and j. In the prefactor of the second sum, we have used z to denote the
coordination number of the lattice.
Returning to the first way we set up the problem, let us suppose now that the
transition probabilities σi and λi are independent of position. In the absence of site-
occupation restrictions, the stochastic Hamiltonian is
H = λ
∑
i
(a†iai − ai) + σ
∑
〈i,j〉
(a†iai − a†ia†jai) (7.172)
Incorporating the restriction that a lattice site can contain at most one particle, the
stochastic Hamiltonian becomes
H = λ
∑
i
(a†iai − ai)δni,1 + σ
∑
〈i,j〉
(a†iai − a†ia†jai)δni,1δnj ,0. (7.173)
Note that we have defined the basic interactions of our model in terms of pairs; higher-
order complications would emerge should we try developing the model in perturbation
theory to make numerical computations.
Is there a relationship between L and H? The annihilation operators ai are analo-
gous to the ci, and likewise for a
†
i and c
†
i . We saw above that the operator c
†
i ci acts
like a Kronecker delta function, comparing the occupancy of site i to 1. Consequently,
(1− c†i ci) can be thought of as a delta function that compares the population size at
site i to 0.
If we replace δni,1 with c
†
i ci, δni,0 with (1 − c†i ci), ai with ci and a†i with c†i , then
we turn our operator H into the operator we constructed earlier, L. That is, we have
established that Eq. (7.171) and Eq. (7.173) are equivalent ways of representing the
dynamics of the contact process.
What happens if σ and λ are no longer constant across the system? Does this
bump the model out of the DP universality class? We can argue that in fact it does
not, for the following reason. Although for brevity we wrote the transition rates as
depending on the site index i, we defined them as depending upon the configuration
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of particles near i. The value of σi can change as the population in the vicinity of
site i fluctuates. We could instead have defined a model in which σi is chosen at
random for each i following some probability distribution, and then all the σi remain
constant over time. This latter approach is known in the language of statistical physics
as quenched disorder. And it is quenched disorder that pushes models out of the DP
universality class [277, 278, 279]. In contrast, because the fluctuations due to higher-
order interactions among organisms are not frozen, they are irrelevant, in the RG sense
of the term.
Therefore, we expect that the DP critical exponents will be applicable to the phase
transitions in our spatial host–consumer model and the lattice implementation of the
Volunteer’s Dilemma. Referring to Figures 3.6, 4.4 and 4.5, it is satisfying to report
that the simulations agree.
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8 Invasion Fitness by Moment Closure
Approximations
8.1 Introduction and Overview
Moment closures are a way of forgetting information about a system in a controlled
fashion, in the hope that an incomplete, fairly heavily “coarse-grained” picture of the
system will still be useful in figuring out what will happen to it. Sometimes, this is a
justifiable hope, but in other cases, we are right to wonder whether all the algebra it
generates actually leads us to any insights. Here, we’ll be concerned with a particular
application of this technology: studying the vulnerability of an ecosystem to invasion.
We shall find expressions for invasion fitness, the expected relative growth rate of
an initially-rare species or variety.
Consider a lattice, each site of which can occupied by an individual of “resident”
type (R), occupied by a mutant (M), or empty (0). The difference between the
mutant-type and resident-type individuals is encoded in the choice of transition rules
representing death, birth and migration. We can get an aggregate measure of the
situation by finding the probability that a randomly chosen site will be in state a,
where a can take values in the set {R,M, 0}. A finer degree of distinction is provided
by the conditional probabilities qa|b, where, for example, qR|M denotes the probability
that a randomly chosen neighbor site to a randomly chosen mutant is of resident type.
Note that if a mutant is injected into a native resident population and its offspring
form a geographical cluster, qM |M can be much larger than pM : few individuals are
mutants overall, but the probability of a mutant life-form interacting with another
mutant is high.
The pair dynamics of the system involves the time evolution of the probabilities
pab, that is, the probability that a randomly selected lattice edge will have a on one
end and b on the other. The differential equation for dpRM/dt, for example, will have
terms reflecting the processes which can form and destroy RM pairs: RM → RR
is one possibility, and RM → MM is another. Death, which comes for organisms
and leaves empty spaces behind, introduces processes like RM → R0, RM → 0M
and RM → 00. Reproduction can lead to formerly empty spaces becoming occupied:
R0 → RR and M0 → MM . We’ve moved beyond just creating and annihilating
residents and mutants, and now we’re dynamically changing the number of “resident–
resident” and “resident–mutant” pairs.
Each term in our differential equations will have a transition rate dependent upon a
conditional probability of the form qa|bc, denoting the probability that a b of a bc pair
will have a neighbor of type a. The differential equations for the pair probabilities pab
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thus depend on triplet probabilities pabc, which depend upon quadruplet probabilities
and so forth. To make progress, we truncate this hierarchy, brutally cutting off higher-
order correlations by declaring that
qa|bc ≈ qa|b. (8.1)
This imposition, a pair approximation, destroys information about spatial structure
and thereby introduces bias which in an ideal world ought to be accounted for. In
theoretical ecology, this maneuver dates back at least to Matsuda et al. in 1992 [109],
though it has antecedents in statistical physics, going back to the kinetic theory work
of Bogoliubov, Born, Green, Kirkwood and Yvon, for whom the “BBGKY hierarchy”
is named.
Invasion fitness is judged in the following manner. We start with a lattice devoid of
mutants (pMa = 0) and find the equilibrium densities p
∗
RR and p
∗
R0 by setting
dpR0
dt
=
dpRR
dt
= 0. (8.2)
The exact form of p∗RR and p
∗
R0 will depend upon interaction details which we won’t
worry about just yet. We then inject a mutant strain into this situation; as the mutants
are initially rare, we can say they do not affect the large-scale dynamics of the resident
population. Summarizing the pair probabilities pMa with the shorthand p, we write
the differential equation in matrix form
dp
dt
= T (qa|bc)p, (8.3)
where the matrix T (qa|bc) encapsulates the details of our chosen dynamics. The pair
approximation, in which we discard correlations of third and higher order, lets us
simplify this to
dp
dt
= T (qa|b)p. (8.4)
When people started doing simulations of lattice models like these, they found that
the conditional probabilities qa|M equilibrate. That is to say, even if the global density
of mutants pM changes, the local statistical structure of a mutant cluster remains
constant. This is the key statement which allows us to linearize the dynamics and
write the behavior of p in terms of eigenvectors and eigenvalues:
p(t) = CeA exp(λt). (8.5)
The dominant eigenvalue λ of T is the “invasion exponent” which characterizes whether
an invasion will fail (λ < 0) or succeed (λ > 0). The eigenvector eA associated with
λ describes the vehicle of selection for the mutants’ particular genetic variation, by
summarizing the structure of their geographical cluster.
All of this, of course, is only as good as our linearization! If something interesting
happens further away from the fixed point, just looking at the eigenvalues we got from
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our matrix T won’t tell us about it. In addition, if the actual dynamics of the system
tend to form patterns which can’t be represented very well by pairwise correlations,
then pair approximation will run into a wall. As long ago as 1994, Tainaka [280]
pointed out that, in a rock-paper-scissors system,
The failure of the mean-field theory and PA model implies that the long-
range correlation is essentially important for the pattern formation.
Minus van Baalen puts the issue in the following way:
The extent to which pair-dynamics models are satisfactory depends on the
goal of the modeler. As we have seen, these models do not capture all of
the phenomena that can be observed in simulations of fully spatial prob-
abilistic cellular automata. Basically, the approximation fails whenever
spatial structures arise that are difficult to “describe” using pairs alone.
More technically, the method fails whenever significant higher-order cor-
relations arise – that is, whenever the frequency of parituclar triplets (or
triangles, squares, or all sorts of star-like configurations) starts to diverge
from what one would expect on the basis of pair densities. Thus, pair-
dynamics models satisfactorily describe probabilistic cellular automata in
which only “small-scale” patterns arise. Larger, “meso-scale” patterns such
as spirals are difficult to capture using this method.
—in Dieckmann et al. (2000), chapter 19 [104].
It’s also pretty easy for the algebra involved in a pair-approximation calculation to
blow up far beyond the point of being useful. For example, Dobrinevski et al. [281]
study a four-species system, where the pair approximation turns out to require 256
coupled differential equations. The only way to tackle that problem is to give it back
to the computer and solve those equations numerically—and when they do that, it
doesn’t even work all that well!
8.2 Example 1: Birth, Death, Movement
In Chapter 3, and again in the previous section, we introduced the idea of pair ap-
proximation, by which we try to understand a system by tracking the joint probability
distributions for pairs of its pieces. Now, we’ll look at this machinery in more detail
by focusing on a specific example. The ecosystem which we shall study will contain
one species living on a regular lattice, and the individual organisms of that species
can move about, give birth and die. That is, our pair dynamics will include three
processes, each occurring stochastically with its own characteristic rate: movement or
migration, birth and death. We follow the notation of van Baalen [104].
We write z for the “coordination number” of the lattice. That is, each lattice site
will have z neighbors. We can represent the birth process as follows:
R+ 0→ R+R, (8.6)
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and we say this takes place with rate b/z.
Similarly, the death process can be represented as
R+ a→ 0 + a, (8.7)
for any site type a. This takes place with rate d/z.
Movement or migration from one site to a neighboring location is the reaction
R+ 0→ 0 +R. (8.8)
This reaction occurs with rate m/z.
Given these reactions, we can write differential equations for the time derivatives of
the pairwise densities. The density of R0 pairs changes as
dpR0
dt = −pR0[b/z + d+ (z − 1)q0|R0m/z + (z − 1)qR|0R(b+m)/z]
+p00(z − 1)qR|00(b+m)/z
+pRR[d+ (z − 1)q0|RRm/z].
(8.9)
Likewise,
dp00
dt
= −p002(z − 1)qR|00(b+m)/z + pR02[d+ (z − 1)q0|R0m/z]. (8.10)
Finally,
dpRR
dt
= pR02[b/z + (z − 1)qR|0R(b+m)/z]− pRR2[d+ (z − 1)q0|RRm/z]. (8.11)
Summing over pairwise densities recovers overall densities:
pi =
∑
j
pij . (8.12)
From this, we deduce that
dpR
dt
= (bq0|R − d)pR. (8.13)
If we ignore spatial structure altogether, we can say that
q0|R = p0, (8.14)
which by normalization of probability means
q0|R = 1− pR. (8.15)
So,
dpR
dt
= (b(1− pR)− d)pR. (8.16)
This should look familiar: it’s a logistic equation for population growth, with growth
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rate b− d and equilibrium population 1− d/b.
It’s worth pausing a moment here and using this result to touch on a more general
concern. Often, a logistic-growth model is presented with the growth rate and the
equilibrium population size as its parameters. When we see the model in that form, we
naturally start thinking of those parameters as independently variable quantities. We
imagine that a mutation or a change in the environmental conditions could change one
without affecting the other. However, if the growth rate and the equilibrium population
size are both functions of other parameters taken together, then the changes which
are biologically reasonable to consider will likely affect both of them. To understand
which quantities we should treat as independent, we need to spend time looking at how
the numbers which apply to population-scale phenomena arise from the smaller-scale
physiological and ecological goings-on [282].
8.3 Example 2: Epidemic in an Adaptive Network
We can juice things up a little by considering another example, one which is topical for
these jittery times. Let’s look at the spread of an epidemic. There’s a classic genre of
models for this, which we can call after a prototypical representative, the Susceptible–
Infected–Recovered or SIR model. In the SIR model, we imagine a population of
individuals through which a disease can spread. Each individual is either Susceptible
to the disease, Infected with it or Recovered from it.
Contact with an Infected individual can turn a Susceptible one into an Infected, so an
S plus an I becomes an I plus an I. If the disease runs its course in an individual, they
gain the status of R and are thereafter immune to further infection. (Perfect immunity
is, mathematically, the same as death, but we’ll be optimistic with our labels today.)
We can complicate the model in many ways, for example by making the immune
response imperfect, so that individuals who have recovered can be re-infected later.
This could happen by the immunity fading over time, so that R individuals transition
back to S, or the immunity might only be partial, so that we have transitions from R
directly back to I. We can also add population structure: interesting things happen
when the individuals are not all in direct contact with one another. This complication
is obviously something we’ll have to address if we want to do epidemiology with real-
world diseases! Speaking from a more mathematical perspective, we find neat phase-
transition effects when we put these epidemic models on a lattice; see Chapter 3 and
references therein.
The complicating factor we’ll consider in this section is the following: the spread
of a disease through a social network can itself change the way people contact each
other. This makes epidemiology a candidate subject for the study of adaptive net-
works: graph-structured systems in which the states associated with the vertices and
the topology of the edges can change on the same timescales, feeding back on one
another [67,68,70,71,110,167,168,169,171,283].
To the SIR problem we described earlier, we add two extra wrinkles: first, the
individuals are arranged in a network, and infection spreads only along the links within
that network. Second, if a susceptible individual is in contact with an infected one,
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that link can be broken, and a new link established to another susceptible individual,
which we pick at random from the pool of eligible susceptibles (that is, those who aren’t
already neighbours—we are disallowing multiple links). This rewiring rule makes this
scenario an adaptive-network problem.
For the moment, let’s say that once they’re infected, these organisms don’t recover.
We have only S and I in the population at any time. Therefore, the probability that
an organism chosen at random has status S and the probability that an organism
chosen at random has status I sum to 1:
pS + pI = 1. (8.17)
This simplifies the SIR model to an SIS model. A node can start in the S state,
become infected and enter the I state, and then potentially recover and return to the
S state again. We neglect the possibility of immunity: nodes which have been infected
and recovered are just as susceptible to the disease as those which have never been in
the I state.
Following the literature [110, 167], we choose to normalize our pairwise densities in
the following way:
pSS + pSI + pII = 〈k〉, (8.18)
where 〈k〉 is the average degree of the nodes in the network.
The number of infected individuals decreases as organisms recover from the disease,
while it increases as the contagion spreads over links from those already infected. We
say how quickly recovery happens using the parameter r, and we encode the ease
with which the disease travels along network links with the transmissibility τ . With
these definitions, we can write the following rate equation for the density of infected
individuals, pI :
d
dt
pI = τpSI − rpI . (8.19)
In the original SIR example, where everyone was in contact with everyone else, we
could say pSI ≈ 〈k〉pSpI . But we ought to be wary of using this approximation here,
for two reasons. First, any time we have a system which has a chance of developing
heterogeneity, of forming lumps in one region which don’t directly affect lumps in
another, then averaging over the whole system becomes a risky business. Second,
more specifically, this approximation can’t capture rewiring. Links are breaking and
re-forming all the time in our model, but the product pSpI stays the same when we
move links around. So, to write an equation for how pI changes, we need to write
down how the density of SI pairs will change, but in order to do that, we have to
include the rewiring effect.
Let’s introduce a third parameter, w, to indicate how much rewiring is going on. The
w parameter will be a rate, having units of inverse time, just like r and τ . The density
of SS pairs will go down as the disease spreads to them from infected nodes, but it
will go up as nodes recover and as susceptible nodes rewire their links. Consequently,
the time derivative of pSS must include a positive term which depends on r and w,
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and a negative term which depends upon τ .
d
dt
pSS = (r + w)pSI − τpSSI . (8.20)
Similarly, pII is increased by the disease being transmitted, and decreased by the
rewiring effect:
d
dt
pII = τ(pSI + pISI)− 2rpII . (8.21)
Now comes the moment-closure step. We enforce a pair approximation, by writing
three-way probabilities in terms of lower-order ones:
pISI =
〈q〉
〈k〉 ·
p2SI
pS
. (8.22)
The “mean excess degree” 〈q〉 is the number of additional links we expect to find
after we follow a random link. It turns out [110] that 〈q〉 = 〈k〉 is a reasonable
approximation.
Our dynamical system is defined by three equations. First, we have the rule we
wrote before,
d
dt
pI = τpSI − rpI , (8.23)
and then the rules we deduced using pair approximation:
d
dt
pSS = (r + w)pSI − 2τpSI pSS
pS
, (8.24)
and
d
dt
pII = τpSI
(
1 +
pSI
pS
)
− 2rpII . (8.25)
Having written these equations, we can compare the behaviour of the dynamical system
they define to that of a simulation of the original model. They actually agree pretty
well [110,167].
Note that we have made an important simplifying assumption, not in the analytical
treatment of our model but in the original definition of it: we chose a rewiring rule
which lets nodes form new links to S -type nodes anywhere else in the system. That
is, the rewiring rule lacks any notion of proximity. Depending on the phenomenon
we’re trying to model, it might be reasonable to allow rewiring only to neighbours of
a node’s current neighbours, for example. This could be the case if information about
available opportunities for building new connections had to spread through existing
links. Or, if the nodes’ spatial positions are significant, perhaps links which span longer
geographical distances should be disfavoured. These are the sorts of complications
which can make pair approximations inapplicable.
The study of dynamical processes on and of graph structures brings together the
subjects of “network theory”, as the term has been used in stochastic process research,
and “complex networks”, to invoke a term which has been trending elsewhere.
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8.4 Example 3: Evolution of Altruism
One application of this machinery has been to understand how evolution can produce
altruistic behaviour [103]. A behaviouristic definition of “altruism” would go something
like, “Acting to increase the reproductive success of another individual at the expense
of one’s own”. This can be written out using game theory; one defines a parameter b
to stand for benefit, c to stand for cost and a payoff function which depends on b, c
and the strategy employed by an organism.
We shall consider a lattice of sites, each one of which can be in one of three states:
empty, denoted by 0; occupied by a selfish organism, denoted by S; and occupied by
an altruist, denoted by A.
In the reproduction process, an organism spawns an offspring into an adjacent empty
lattice site. This turns a pair of type S0 into a pair of type SS. At what rate should
the transition S0 → SS occur? If we presume some baseline reproductive rate, call
it b0, then the presence of altruistic neighbours should augment that rate. We’ll say
that if the number of nearby altruists is nA, then selfish individuals will reproduce at
a rate b0 + BnA/n, where the parameter B specifies how helpful altruists are. The
reproduction process for altruists, which we can write A0 → AA, occurs at a rate
b0 + BnA/n − C. Here, the parameter C is the cost of altruism: it’s how much an
altruist gives up to help others.
In the differential equation for dpS0/dt, the S0→ SS transition contributes a term
proportional to the density of S0 pairs:
− [(1− φ)bS + (bS +m)φqS|0S ]pS0, (8.26)
where we have written φ for 1 − 1/z, to save a little ink. All things told, the rate of
change of pS0 is given by
dpS0
dt = (bs +m)φqS|00p00−[dS +mφq0|S0]pS0
−[(1− φ)bs + (bS +m)φqS|0S ]pS0
+[dS +mφq0|SS ]pSS
−(bA +m)φqA|0SpS0
+[dA +mφq0|AS ]pSA.
(8.27)
Yuck! After writing a few equations like that, it’s easy to wonder if maybe we should
look for new mathematical ideas which could help us better organise our thinking.
But, for the nonce, we will simply press on with the algebra.
The next steps follow the general plan we laid out above. We write differential
equations for the pairwise probabilities pab, which depend on triplet quantities qa|bc.
Then, we impose a pair approximation, declaring that qa|bc = qa|b, which gives us a
closed system of equations. Next, we find the fixed point with pA = 0, and we perturb
around that fixed point to see what happens when a strain of altruists is introduced
into a selfish population. The dominant eigenvalue λ of the time-evolution matrix T
tells us, in this approximation, whether the altruistic strain will invade the lattice or
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wither away. The condition λ > 0 can be written in the form
Bφq˜A|A − C > 0. (8.28)
Here, we’ve written q˜A|A for the conditional probability of altruists contacting altruists
which obtains as the local densities equilibrate. That is to say, an attempted invasion
by altruists will succeed if a measure of benefit, B, multiplied by an indicator of
“assortment” among genetically similar individuals, is greater than the cost of altruistic
behaviour, C.
After all our mucking with eigenvalues, we have found a condition which is strongly
reminiscent of a classic and influential idea from mid-twentieth-century evolutionary
theory. In biology, the inequality
(benefit)× (relatedness) > (cost) (8.29)
is known as Hamilton’s rule [55]. This is a rule-of-thumb for when natural selection
can favour altruistic behaviour: altruists can prosper when the inequality is satisfied.
Hamilton’s rule was originally derived for unstructured populations, with no network
topology or spatial arrangement to them. We can understand Hamiltion’s rule in this
context in the following way:
How well an organism fares in the great contest of life depends on the environment
it experiences. During the course of its life, an individual member of a species will
interact with a set of others, which we could call its “social circle”. The composition of
that social circle affects how well an individual will propagate its genetic information
to the next generation—its fitness. In an unstructured population, we can think of
such circles being formed by taking random samples of the population. An altruist, by
our definition, sacrifices some of its own potential so that offspring of other individuals
can prosper. A social circle of altruists can fare better than a social circle of selfish
individuals, increasing the chances that social circles which form in the next generation
will contain altruists [55].
It’s common to treat “benefit” and “cost” as parameters of the system. We could
potentially derive them from more fundamental dynamics, if we looked more closely at
the interactions within a particular ecosystem, but right now, they’re just knobs we can
turn. What about the remaining quantity in Hamilton’s rule: what does “relatedness”
mean? Excellent question! We can get a feel for where the term came from by taking a
gene’s-eye view: copies of many of my particular genetic variants will be sitting inside
the cells of my close relatives. Consequently, as far as my genes are concerned, if my
relatives survive, that’s almost as good as my surviving. When reckoning the benefit
of altruism against its cost, then, the aid one organism brings to another ought to be
weighted by how “related” they are.
So, we can say that we have “recovered Hamilton’s rule as an emergent property
of the spatial dynamics”—if we are willing to draw a circle around the middle of our
formula and declare those terms to be the “relatedness”.
Knowing where our invasion condition came from, we can appreciate some of the
caveats which scientists have raised in connection with Hamilton’s rule.
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Simon et al. address this specifically [153]:
In particular, r is often taken to be the average relatedness of interacting
individuals, as compared to the average relatedness in the population, in
which case inequality (1) [rB > C] is referred to as Hamilton’s rule. It is
important to note that inequality (1) is only a description of whether the
current level of assortment as subsumed in the parameter r is sufficient to
favour cooperation, but not a description of the mechanisms that would
lead to such assortment. It has been suggested repeatedly that the problem
of cooperation can be understood entirely based on Hamilton’s rules of the
form (1). Even though often taken as gospel, this claim is wrong in general,
for two reasons.
First, and foremost, even if a rule of the form (1) predicts the direction of
selection for cooperation at a given point in time, the long-term evolution
of cooperation cannot be understood without having a dynamic equation
for the quantity r, i.e., without understanding the temporal dynamics of
assortment. The dynamics of r in turn cannot be understood based solely
on the current level of cooperation, and hence expressions of type (1) are in
general insufficient to describe the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.
Second, the quantity r, which measures the average relatedness among in-
teracting individuals, is insufficient to construct Hamilton’s rule in models
that account for variable individual-level death rates and/or group-level
events.
Damore and Gore [47] have more to say on this point:
Contrary to the popular use of the word, “relatedness” describes a pop-
ulation of interacting individuals, where r refers to how assorted similar
individuals are in the population.
And in further detail:
[E]very definition of relatedness must take into account the population.
Therefore, relatedness is not the percent of genome shared, genetic dis-
tance, or any extent of similarity between two isolated individuals in a
larger population. Also, because horizontal gene transfer is commonplace
between microbes and selection is strong, phylogenetic distance or any
other indirect genetic measure is likely to be inaccurate. Many of these
false definitions live on partly because ambiguous heuristics like “ 12 for
brothers, 18 for cousins,” which require very specific assumptions, are re-
peated in the primary literature. Also, most non-theoretical papers simply
define relatedness as “a measure of genetic similarity” and do not elaborate
or instead leave the precise definition to the supplemental information [. . .]
Unfortunately, scientists can easily misinterpret this “measure of genetic
similarity” to be anything that is empirically convenient such as genetic
distance or percent of genome shared. Largely because of this confusion,
we support the more widespread use of the term “assortment,” which is
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harder to misinterpret [. . .] For similar reasons of reader understanding,
we also encourage authors to make calculations more explicit, either in the
main or supplemental text, and to avoid repeating previous results without
giving the assumptions that went into deriving them.
It is for this reason that we called φq˜A|A a measure of “assortment” earlier. Of
course, even with this careful choice of terminology, the limitations of our Hamilton-
esque rule still apply: we know that because we derived it from the condition that the
dominant eigenvalue be positive, it will miss any effects which a fixed-point eigenvalue
analysis is not sensitive to.
Stepping back for a moment, notice that although the terms and coefficients started
to proliferate on us, we haven’t introduced any remarkably “advanced” or “esoteric”
mathematics. Derivatives, matrices, eigenvalues—this is undergraduate stuff! The
amount of algebra we’ve been able to stir up without really even trying is, however,
a little worrying. We can invent a mathematical model for some particular biological
scenario, and we might even be able to solve it, or at least tell how it’ll behave in
certain interesting circumstances. But what if we want general results which extend
across models, or ideas which will help us identify the common features and the key
disparities among a host of examples? We will return to this question in Chapter 10.
We conclude this section with a more detailed derivation of the invasion condition
(8.28). First, for convenience’s sake, we define the abbreviations
αj = (bj +m)φ = (bj +m)(1− 1/z), (8.30)
βj = (1− φ)bj = bj
z
, (8.31)
γjk = dj +mφq0|jk. (8.32)
These denote, respectively, the effective rates of arrivals from neighboring sites, birth
events within pairs of sites, and the vacation of sites by migration or death. If there
are no altruists in the ecosystem, then the S0 and SS pair densities evolve according
to the coupled equations
dpS0
dt
= αSqS|00p00 − (βS + αSqS|0S + γS0)pS0 + γSSpSS , (8.33)
dpSS
dt
= 2(βS + αSqS|0S)pS0 − 2γSSpSS . (8.34)
Setting these rates to zero determines the equilibrium point for the altruist-less
ecosystem. At this equilibrium,
αS q¯S|0S p¯00 − γS0p¯S0 = 0. (8.35)
Invoking the pair approximation, we drop some indices:
αS q¯S|0p¯00 − γS p¯S0 = 0, where γs = dS +mφq0|S . (8.36)
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Recalling that
q¯S|0 =
p¯S0
p¯0
, q¯0|0 = 1− q¯S|0 = p¯00
p¯0
, (8.37)
we conclude that
αS q¯0|0 − γS = 0. (8.38)
This tells us the density of adjacent empty sites in an equilibrated S-type population.
Next, we consider a resident population of selfish individuals that has come to an
equilibrium and is invaded by a strain of altruists. Will the invasion be successful or
not? We make the approximation that initially, the altruists are sufficiently rare that
they do not affect the resident population, so the demographic statistics we derived
above are still applicable.
The pairwise densities involving altruists then evolve according to the following three
coupled differential equations:
dpA0
dt
= αAqA|00p¯00 − (βA + αAqA|0A)pA0 − αSqS|0ApA0 + γSApAS − γA0pA0, (8.39)
dpA0
dt
= αAqA|0S p¯0S + αSqS|0ApA0 − (γAS + γSA)pAS , (8.40)
dpA0
dt
= 2(βA + αAqA|0A)pA0 − 2γAApAA. (8.41)
We are treating the barred quantities as constant, so the dynamical variables are pA0,
pAS and pAA. Collecting these into a three-element vector (pA0, pAS , pAA)
T, we can
express this dynamical system as
d~p
dt
= M(qj|kl)~p, (8.42)
where the matrix M is a function of the triplet densities:
M(qj|kl) =
 αAqA|00 − (βA + αAqA|0A)− γA0 − αSqS|0A γAS γAA(αS + αA)qS|0A −γAS − γSA 0
2(βA + αAqA|0A) 0 −2γAA
 .
(8.43)
Here, we have used the fact that
qA|0S p¯0S = qS|0Ap0A = pA0S (8.44)
to simplify the middle element in the left column.
Again calling upon the pair approximation, we simplify the matrix M to
M(qj|k) =
 αA − βA − (αA + αS)q¯S|0 γS γA(αS + αA)q¯S|0 −γA − γS 0
2βA 0 −2γA
 . (8.45)
We are now in the familiar terrain of linear stability analysis. The altruist invasion
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will be successful, according to all the approximations we have made so far, if the all-S
fixed point is unstable. The transition between stability and instability occurs when
the dominant eigenvalue of M changes from negative to positive. The product of the
eigenvalues of M is the determinant of M , so we seek the location in parameter space
where the determinant of M vanishes. This yields the condition
(αA − γA)(γA + γS)− (αA + αS)γAq¯S|0 = 0. (8.46)
Having derived q¯0|0 in Eq. (8.38), we have a value we can use for q¯S|0. Making this
substitution,
(αS + γA)(αAγS − αSγA) = 0, (8.47)
meaning that the transition lies at
αA
γA
=
αS
γS
. (8.48)
The all-S fixed point is unstable when the ratio αA/γA exceeds αS/γS . This provides
our condition for invasion success:
(bA +m)φ
dA +mφq˜0|A
>
(bS +m)φ
dS +mφq˜0|S
, (8.49)
where q˜0|j are given by the eigenvector of M corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue.
To simplify still further, let’s see what happens when the migration rate goes to
zero, and the death rates dA and dS are equal. Then the invasion condition reduces
to bA > bS , or
Bφq˜A|A − C > 0. (8.50)
This has the form we promised: the altruists invade if the benefit parameter, multiplied
by an assortment factor that depends on population structure, is greater than the cost
parameter. Note that the assortment factor will generally depend upon the population
dynamics, through quantities like migration rates!
8.5 Host–Consumer Dynamics
Let us consider a spatial host–consumer system containing a single type of consumer.
In such an ecosystem, each lattice site can be in one of three possible states: 0, H and
C. Consequently, there are six different site-site correlations. Because∑
j
P (ij) = P (i), (8.51)
only three of the six variables are independent. Following de Aguiar et al., we choose
the independent correlations to be
u = P (H0), r = P (HC) and w = P (0C). (8.52)
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That is, our independent variables will be x, y, u, r and w. This choice implies that
if we write z = 1− x− y for the fraction of empty space, the other three correlations
are given by
q = P (00) = z− u−w, p = P (HH) = x− r− u and s = P (CC) = y− r−w. (8.53)
A given host can only be consumed once. Therefore, the simplest way to find the
probability of its consumption is to calculate one minus the probability that it is not
consumed. If a host has m consumer neighbors, then this probability is 1− (1− τ)m.
Analogous considerations apply to empty sites being colonized by hosts.
Let ζ be the number of nearest-neighbor sites (so, on the default square lattice,
ζ = 4). We define
hζ(α) = 1− (1− α)ζ . (8.54)
The host population fraction x increases if hosts can reproduce into empty space,
which depends upon the contact rate between host sites and empty sites. Therefore,
dx/dt will have a positive contribution that depends on u. It will also have a negative
contribution that depends upon the probability that consumers will be adjacent to
hosts and thus able to consume them. Together, these two processes combine to yield
dx
dt
= z hζ(gu/z)− xhζ(τr/x). (8.55)
The rate of change in y can be written similarly. However, consumers do not require
the presence of any particular entities in their neighborhood to die off, so the negative
term will only depend on y itself:
dy
dt
= xhζ(τr/x)− vy. (8.56)
If we make the approximation r = xy, this becomes
dy
dt
= xhζ(τy)− vy, (8.57)
which is the mean-field equation we would write for consumer dynamics.
On much the same principles, we can write time-evolution equations for the pairwise
correlation variables. The appropriate equations turn out to be
du
dt
= (q − u)hζ−1(gu/z) + vr − uhζ−1(τr/x)
− gu[1− hζ−1(gu/z)], (8.58)
and
dr
dt
= (p− r)hζ−1(τr/x)− vr + w hζ−1(gu/z)
− τr[1− hζ−1(τr/x)] (8.59)
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and
dw
dt
= uhζ−1(τr/x) + v(s− w)− w hζ−1(gu/z) . (8.60)
This is the system of differential equations we solved numerically in order to find
the pair-approximation results in Chapter 3. They can be extended to include two
types of consumer with differing τ values. However, investigating that augmented
system of equations reveals a problem [95, 100, 101]: higher τ almost always wins out
over lower τ . This means that, as we saw in Chapter 3, whatever we learn from pair
approximation must be augmented by knowledge from another source if we wish to
understand evolutionary processes.
8.6 Modified Mean-Field
We should at this point mention a proposal by Pascual et al. [284] to incorporate
spatial effects into mean-field models by altering the functional dependence on mean-
field quantities in differential equations, rather than by moment closures. Pascual et
al. begin with a simple Lotka–Volterra model for a plant species, whose population
density they denote p, and an herbivore species, whose density is denoted h:
p˙ = αpe− βph, (8.61)
h˙ = βph− δh. (8.62)
Here, e stands for the density of empty space, 1 − (p + h). By rescaling the units of
time, we can eliminate one parameter, which we pick to be the consumption rate β:
p˙ = αpe− ph, (8.63)
h˙ = ph− δh. (8.64)
This system of equations has a stable equilibrium point at
p∗ = δ, h∗ =
α(1− δ)
1 + α
. (8.65)
Pascual et al. suggest modifying the dependence of p˙ and h˙ on the variables p, e and
h, so that each variable no longer enters linearly:
p˙ = αc1p
a1eb1 − c2pa2hb2 , (8.66)
h˙ = c2p
a2hb2 − δh. (8.67)
This is the “modified mean-field” (MMF) model. The new parameters ai and bi are
intended to represent the deviations in the effective population density from mean-field
expectations which an individual organism experiences due to spatial fluctuations. The
other new parameters, c1 and c2, incorporate linear effects of spatial pattern formation
which “can decrease or increase (when 0 < ci < 1 or ci > 1 respectively) the overall
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rate but cannot not modify its functional form” [284]. The MMF may appear to be a
rather ad-hoc alteration of the original Lotka–Volterra system, but the equations are
simpler than those produced by pair approximation, and by fitting the new parameters,
the trajectories of p and h seen in a lattice system can be reproduced.
For our purposes, however, we need more. Can the MMF say anything about the
competition between two types of herbivore with different consumption rates? This
is the minimum we require when we advance from ecological to eco-evolutionary dy-
namics. To investigate this, we consider an augmented MMF system with population
densities p, h and k. Now, the amount of empty space is given by
e = 1− (p+ h+ k). (8.68)
The dynamical equations are
p˙ = αc1p
a1eb1 − c2pa2hb2 − c3pa2kb2 , (8.69)
h˙ = c2p
a2hb2 − δh, (8.70)
k˙ = c3p
a2kb2 − δk. (8.71)
The new parameter c3 indicates the consumption rate of the additional herbivore
species, which we can think of as a mutant variety. Without loss of generality, we
take c3 > c2. If k = 0, we recover the two-species MMF system. Moreover, the
only difference between the two types of herbivore is the rate at which they consume
plants, so we have no reason to think that the exponents should be different (and in
fact Pascual et al. find no significant dependence of the fitted exponents a2 and b2 on
the rate parameters).
From the difference
d
dt
(h− k) = h˙− k˙ = pa2(c2hb2 − c3kb2)− δ(h− k), (8.72)
we see that if h = k, then the right-hand side is negative, and so h˙ < k˙. Consequently,
if the resident and mutant herbivore population densities are ever equal, then the
mutant population is growing faster, or is diminishing less rapidly. This implies that
the resident population density cannot cross from below the mutant density to above.
Invasion by a strain with lower voraciousness is, in the MMF, impossible. However,
we see it happening easily in the spatial host–consumer model.
Numerical analysis (Figure 8.1) shows that a small amount of a mutant herbivore
strain with higher voracity can take over a two-species system which has settled into
its equilibrium. In other words, the MMF approach isn’t any better at handling
coexistence or “the resident strikes back” effects than moment closure is [100, 101].
This is only to be expected, since neither approach captures the descendent-shading
we examined in Chapter 3. One can hack the exponents until the MMF model matches
the two-species ecological dynamics, but it is inadequate for evolutionary studies.
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Figure 8.1: Time required for a mutant herbivore population to take over an ecosys-
tem, as a function of the difference in consumption rates, ∆c = c3 − c2.
The mutant population density is initialized to 1/100 of the resident, and
the dynamics are simulated until the resident population density has di-
minished to 1/100 of its initial value. To facilitate comparison with the
original paper [284], parameter values for these computations were set at
a1 = 0.2, b1 = 0.59, c1 = 0.19, a2 = 0.59, b2 = 1.0, c2 = 0.4, α = 0.6,
δ = 0.25.
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9.1 Introduction
Ever since Darwin, biologists have tried to explain how social behaviors—cooperation,
even self-sacrifice—could emerge from natural selection, which seems to embody a dog-
eat-dog, dog-eat-cat world. One explanation for how evolution could yield altruism,
popular up through the 1950s, went something like this: imagine a species divided
into several smaller sub-populations, like flocks, tribes or wandering herds. Some of
the herds might be full of selfish individuals who act without regard to others in their
vicinity, but other sub-populations might be full of altruists, whose cooperative behav-
ior allows those sub-populations to produce more sub-populations, also full of altruists.
If something in the environment kills off sub-populations, then the clusters of altruists
will produce more offspring clusters than those comprised of selfish individuals, and
this biased survival of stochastically varying replicators—in this case, the replicating
units being taken as clusters—will lead to a species dominated by altruists.
In fact, this idea goes back to Darwin [285], who wrote,
Natural selection will modify the structure of the young in relation to the
parent, and of the parent in relation to the young. In social animals it
will adapt the structure of each individual for the benefit of the whole
community; if the community profits by the selected change.
And, in more detail [286]:
When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into
competition, if the one tribe included (other circumstances being equal)
a greater number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who
were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each
other, this tribe would without doubt succeed best and conquer the other.
[. . .] Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence
nothing can be effected. A tribe possessing the above qualities in a high
degree would spread and be victorious over other tribes; but in the course
of time it would, judging from all past history, be in its turn overcome
by some other and still more highly endowed tribe. Thus the social and
moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout
the world.
However, as Darwin recognized, this process might be vulnerable to subversion from
within:
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It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic
and benevolent parents, or of those which were the most faithful to their
comrades, would be reared in greater number than the children of selfish
and treacherous parents of the same tribe.
Understanding this problem more deeply requires a better knowledge of the mecha-
nisms of heredity than was available in Darwin’s time. Indeed, genetics did not become
a serious part of evolutionary theorizing until the early twentieth century [287]. Now
we know that each human being has far more cells in their brain than genes in their
genome, so we must expect that genes code for patterns of development. In turn, the
structures formed by those developmental patterns then display ranges of behavior,
in ways which depend on the environment. And, as for our species, so for the others.
A justifiably popular aphorism observes, “Evolution is the control of development by
ecology” [288]. When we perform mathematical modeling, we often elide these in-
termediate steps and pretend that genetic information can specify behaviors directly.
How much we lose by doing this is difficult to say in advance—but even the bower
birds we modeled back in Chapter 2 turn out to have culture [289].
We can refer to the idea that natural selection acts upon groups of organisms as group
selection. The general notion of natural selection effecting change at different scales
within a population is multilevel selection. This has been a remarkably controversial
idea [290, 291, 292], with a significant fraction of the controversy arising from people
arguing words instead of mathematics. And, when mathematics was employed, it
turned out to be too much statistics and too little dynamics [150,151].
In order to sort this out, we have to be careful and delineate the various different
ideas which have been paraded under the “multilevel selection” banner. All too often,
the terminology of the subject has brought the appearance of precision, more than the
actuality.
A useful parallel can be drawn between the different types of multilevel selection
and the hierarchy of approximations used in spatial ecology. This relationship clarifies
which modeling methods are equivalent, and it points the way to future extensions of
multilevel selection theory. The key question is one of description: how much and what
kind of information does a modeling method use to represent the state of being of an
ecosystem? The different types of multilevel selection (MLS) answer this in different
ways and thus relate to different kinds of ecological model. We shall see that “MLS-A”
stands on a level with mean field theory, and “MLS-B” is akin to pair approximation.
Emphasizing the idea that context matters takes us beyond the mean field approx-
imation. This extension becomes necessary if our model includes explicit group-level
processes like budding and fusion, or if the geographical extent of our ecosystem fos-
ters spatial heterogeneity. The much-discussed equivalence of multilevel selection and
inclusive fitness (IF) is easy to establish for MLS-A and can be proven mathematically
in the mean field, but real differences arise when we move from MLS-A to MLS-B and
beyond.
The mathematical study of biological evolution, as it stands today, includes a wide
variety of particular models but lacks an overall theory to organize those models and
clarify their interrelationships [33]. This provides an opportunity for interdisciplinary
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collaboration. Mathematicians and physicists can bring not just new techniques but
also new attitudes, potentially creating a novel way of thinking about generalizations,
specializations, equivalences and other ways mathematical models are interrelated.
The challenge for the physicist is to know enough biology that one does not waste
time on an obsolete or irrelevant problem, while also avoiding absorption in the internal
politics and factionalism of long-running biologist debates. Interdisciplinary research
must steer a course between the Scylla of dilettantism and the Charybdis of tedium.
Simon et al. [153] characterize two types of MLS models, which we shall designate
MLS-A and MLS-B. Their description of MLS-A states,
Key features typically include that all groups form at the same time from a
randomly mixed (or mated) global population and contain two types (e.g.
cooperators and defectors), the number of groups is constant or infinite,
groups start out all the same size, groups vary only in the reproduction rate
of the individuals, and all groups cease to exist at the same time. Groups
then contribute their individuals to the random global mixing (or mating)
phase from which new groups are again formed.
In MLS-A, the “groups” are social circles of organisms which form at random, typically
once each generation. This random formation and reformation implies that the only
information used to predict the environment experienced by any organism are aggregate
measures taken over the entire population. Any single organism interacts with its local
environment, i.e., the randomly-formed group of which it is a part, but that local
environment is modeled using a global average. This coarse-graining of the ecological
picture is a mean-field approximation [48]. (We recall from Chapter 3 that this term,
used in spatial ecology [95,108] and evolutionary dynamics [68], derives originally from
statistical physics [49].) Additional complications, such as nonlinear fitness functions,
can make the mathematical analysis more cumbersome, but as long as the model uses
only global averages to stand in for the ecosystem’s configuration, it remains within
the mean field.
By contrast, MLS-B models “contain more explicit group-level events” such as group
fissioning, group merging, mass dispersal and so forth [153]. An MLS-B model does not
treat all configurations with the same total numbers of cooperators and defectors as
equivalent. The allocation of individuals into groups matters, and most importantly,
the composition of each group is not set by global averages [153, 154]. An organism’s
local environment is no longer assumed to be representative of the aggregate properties
of the whole population, and vice versa.
This advance is, in concept if not in algebraic detail, essentially the same as the
move in spatial ecology from mean-field theory to higher-order moment closures such
as pair approximation. We can illustrate this parallel by example: let us consider
how one would treat a population of cooperators and defectors, arranged in a spatial
or a network structure, by a pair approximation method. Because the population
is structured, rather than being well-mixed, having a clump of cooperators in one
small region is a significantly different circumstance than having the same number
of cooperators spread uniformly throughout the whole ecosystem. To attempt to
capture this distinction, we augment the bare-bones, coarse-grained description of
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the ecosystem, moving beyond overall averages and including some measure of how
local environments can differ. Consider the probability that an organism chosen at
random from the population is a cooperator. This is an overall, global average; we can
denote it pC . Its complement, the probability that a randomly-picked organism is a
defector, is pD = 1−pC . (For simplicity, we assume that the region we are studying is
entirely filled up, with no empty spaces.) If all the cooperators are clustered together
in a patch, then the conditional probability that the neighbor of a cooperator is also a
cooperator will be significantly different from the overall density of cooperators in the
population at large. If we pick an organism at random and find that it is a cooperator,
we should be willing to bet more heavily on the chance that picking one of its neighbors
at random will find another cooperator. In short, the conditional probability qC|C can
differ from pC . A pair approximation for this model assumes that these pairwise
conditional probabilities capture enough of the ecosystem’s heterogeneity to make all
the predictions in which we are interested.
The move from mean-field theory to a pair approximation, like the move from MLS-
A to MLS-B, brings in the idea that variation among local environments matters.
Furthermore, both MLS-B and pair approximation share an important simplifying
assumption of their own: variation among locales is important, but the set of all locales
has no structure. Consider, for example, the MLS-B model of Simon et al. [153]. This
model represents the state of the entire population at time t by a list of numbers,
namely, the number of groups of type ~x at that time t, for all possible group-types ~x.
There is no sense in which some groups are geographically closer to each other than
others. A group of type ~x in one spot is just as good as a group of type ~x in any other
spot. Likewise, when we develop a pair approximation, a pair of a certain type (for
example, cooperator–defector) occurring in one location counts the same as a pair of
that type occurring anywhere else.
As we mentioned earlier, the parallel between MLS-B and pair approximation is at
a conceptual level, not necessarily an exact mathematical one. (We shall see plenty of
exact mathematics soon enough.) The essential fact is that both extend our thinking
beyond the mean field, while both are themselves limited in the same way: context
matters, but the relationships among contexts are neglected.
One can extend the basic notion of pair approximation to higher orders. Instead
of reducing everything to pairs, we can describe an ecosystem using triples, for ex-
ample. Mathematically, if we write a probability distribution over all possible states
an ecosystem can be in, then imposing a mean-field approximation means replacing
that with a product of many independent single-variable probability distributions. In
other words, mean-field theory depends on the assumption that the joint probability
distribution can be factored in a drastic way without losing important information.
A pair approximation is the imposition of a slightly less drastic factorization, namely
one into probabilities for pairs of variables, instead of single variables. Factorizations
into higher-order probability distributions yield higher-order moment closures. (The
exact analogue of the Simon et al. MLS-B model falls within this picture, but is not
necessarily the pair approximation which we used to illustrate the basic concept.)
We note that the terms “type 1” and “type 2 multilevel selection” are also employed
in the literature. However, their usage is not quite consistent [293], and since the
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distinction which Smith et al. make is the most convenient for our purposes, we will
employ the MLS-A and MLS-B designations for the categories they describe. (We will,
in this way, bypass talk of “the level at which fitness is assigned” [292].) In this case,
we are confronted with a tradeoff, and we choose attempting to reduce ambiguity over
maintaining continuity with older writings.
9.2 Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem
We have in this subject an interesting situation. The mathematics that has been
employed to date has not been very elaborate. It involves a lot of algebra, some
of it linear, much of it high-school. The challenge lies in the stories told about the
mathematics, stories which have historically been muddled, overzealous in their claims,
communicated at cross-purposes and, dare I say it, politicized. Later, we will try to
sort some of that out. But before we reach that point, we will get the important
equations in place.
Consider two populations, each composed of individuals of different types in various
amounts. Let the proportion of type i in the first population be pi, and denote the
proportion of type i in the second population by p′i. We can let the index i range from 1
to however large it needs to be to enumerate all types present in both populations.
The basic statements of normalization are∑
i
pi = 1,
∑
i
p′i = 1. (9.1)
Now, introduce a third set of quantities to express the relationship between the two
populations, thusly:
piw˜i = p
′
i. (9.2)
This defines w˜i in terms of the given information about the population demographics.
We suppose that this is always possible, i.e., that there is no i for which pi = 0 but
p′i 6= 0.
If we take the mean of w˜i across all types present in the first population, weighted
by their abundances, we find that
w˜ =
∑
i
piw˜i
=
∑
i
p′i
= 1. (9.3)
If we instead take the mean weighted by the proportions in the second population, we
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obtain
w˜
′
=
∑
i
p′iw˜i
=
∑
i
piw˜
2
i . (9.4)
The difference between the two averages can be written
w˜
′ − w˜ =
∑
i
piw˜
2
i − 1 =
∑
i
piw˜
2
i −
∑
j
pjw˜j
2 . (9.5)
The right-hand side has the form of a variance, as we defined in Chapter 5: the second
moment minus the square of the first. It is often called as such. And, if we designate
w˜i the relative fitness of type i, then we can read Eq. (9.5) as saying that the change in
fitness from one population to the other is the variance of fitness in the first population.
When we say it in words, this statement sounds like the definition of a dynamical
system, or perhaps the beginnings of such a definition. However, it really isn’t: we
took both populations as given, and we declared that the {wi} have the right values
to relate them. Eq. (9.5) holds by fiat. It is neither a predictive statement—given
some {pi} and {p′i} obtained experimentally, it tells us nothing we did not already
know—nor an update rule for a dynamical system that we can iterate and thereby
explore mathematically.
The word “fitness” makes Eq. (9.5) sound like biology, and in that context, it is
known as Fisher’s fundamental theorem [294]. But as an arithmetic identity, Eq. (9.5)
has nothing necessarily to do with genetics or evolution. To illustrate, let the first
population be a set of books, and let the second be a set of movie and TV adapta-
tions. Many books never make the journey to the small or large screens. Some books
are adapted once, and some are adapted multiple times. For example, Dashiell Ham-
mett’s novel The Maltese Falcon (1929) was made into a movie by that name in 1931,
another film titled Satan Met a Lady in 1936 and, most famously, the version starring
Humphrey Bogart opposite Mary Astor in 1941. We could say that the novel’s fitness
in Hollywood is w1 = 3, if its index on our list is i = 1. Assigning “fitnesses” wi in
this way for all values of i, we can then define
w˜i =
wi∑
j pjwj
, (9.6)
and the sum of the w˜i, weighted by pi, will be unity. Fisher’s fundamental theorem
tells us that the change in fitness due to moving from the written word to the moving
picture is the fitness variance among the original novels.
This should make clear the difference between an arithmetic identity and a predictive
model. The former can be “always true” or “universally applicable”; nevertheless,
without additional assumptions, it doesn’t go anywhere. In turn, those additional
assumptions can make the application of the identity invalid. For example, suppose
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one wishes to compare two configurations of an ecosystem separated by a long interval
of time. The ecosystem dynamics are defined in terms of short-term ecological or
game-based interactions (as we did in Chapters 3 and 4). The fitnesses which arise as
functions of game payoffs generally will not be the ones necessary to fill the role of the
{wi} relating the two population configurations.
9.3 The Price Equation: Motivation and Shortcomings
Biological evolution is the change over generations of the genetic composition of pop-
ulations due to natural factors, typically including significant randomness. Describing
this mathematically, and developing quantitative tools to predict what might evolve
under which conditions, is a great challenge. One place to begin is by describing,
in a nice way, a population’s change in genetic character from one generation to the
next. By “a nice way”, we mean that we’d like to be able to attribute changes to
the appropriate influences. What changes are due to random mutations creating new
variations, for example, and what changes are due to natural selection winnowing out
varieties which cannot survive in their environment?
We can make a crude measure of a population’s genetic composition by counting
up how many organisms in the population have a certain gene of interest. We can
express this amount as a percentage of the total population, saying, for example,
“The frequency of gene A in this population is 0.22.” This, of course, is a mean-
field statement. We know that such statements can be insufficient for making viable
predictions about dynamics, but in this section, we will assume a more modest aim,
and try only to manipulate the description, as we did in deriving Fisher’s theorem.
In this section, we use the notation of van Veelen [295].
We consider two populations, S1 and S2. All the offspring of organisms in S1 belong
to S2, and all the parents of organisms in S2 are in S1. We write N for the size of
population S1. For an individual i ∈ S1, the frequency of gene A is
qi =
gi
lz
, (9.7)
where lz is the zygotic ploidy, i.e., the number of copies of each chromosome carried
by a fertilized egg. The frequency of gene A in population S1 is
Q1 =
∑
i∈S1 gi
lzN
=
∑
i qi
N
. (9.8)
We want to relate Q2 and Q1. One simple way to do so is to take their difference:
∆Q = Q2 −Q1. (9.9)
We can write Q2 as
Q2 =
∑
i g
′
i
lg
∑
i zi
, (9.10)
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where lg is the gametic ploidy, zi is the number of successful gametes from individual i,
and g′i is the number of A-type genes in the set of all successful gametes from individual
i. The proportion of A-type genes in that set is
q′i =
g′i
zilg
. (9.11)
From this,
Q2 =
∑
i zilgq
′
i
lg
∑
i zi
=
∑
i ziq
′
i∑
i zi
. (9.12)
Therefore,
∆Q =
∑
i ziq
′
i∑
i zi
− 1
N
∑
i
qi. (9.13)
We’d like our expression for the change in Q to be written in terms of the changes in
the individual qi, so we subtract and add a sum over qi:
∆Q =
∑
i zi(q
′
i − qi)∑
i zi
+
∑
i ziqi∑
i zi
− 1
N
∑
i
qi. (9.14)
Next, we gather the last two terms over a common denominator:
∆Q =
∑
i zi(q
′
i − qi)∑
i zi
+
∑
i ziqi − 1N
∑
i qi
∑
j zj∑
i zi
. (9.15)
Now, we factor an N out of the latter term.
∆Q =
∑
i zi(q
′
i − qi)∑
i zi
+
N∑
i zi
 1
N
∑
i
ziqi − 1
N2
∑
i
qi
∑
j
zj
 . (9.16)
We rearrange this just a bit to yield the Price equation:
∆Q =
N∑
i zi
 1
N
∑
i
ziqi −
(
1
N
∑
i
qi
) 1
N
∑
j
zj
+ ∑i zi(q′i − qi)∑
i zi
. (9.17)
This is just an algebraic identity: we took the compositions of the two populations
as given, and we wrote a fancy expression for the change of gene frequency between
them. We have not said anything about dynamics from which this change could be
derived, nor have we made any claims about what changes are more probable than
others. Eq. (9.17) is a rearrangement of the given information, not an update rule
for a dynamical system. It is not even a statement about probabilities, although the
expression in brackets formally resembles the covariance between two random variables.
Nothing in the derivation of Eq. (9.17) was a random variable; despite this, the Price
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equation is typically written in “covariance” notation. This poor tradition of notation
has contributed more than a little confusion to the subject.
Van Veelen et al. [296] make the point in the following way:
[W]hat is most important is that we realize that the numerical input of
the Price equation is a list of numbers. It is a list that concerns two
generations, and which tracks who is whose offspring. But whatever it
reflects, it is crucial to realize that the point of departure is nothing but
a list of numbers. This list of numbers is used twice. First we use it to
compute the frequencies of the gene under consideration in generations 1
and 2, respectively, and subtract the latter from the former. This amounts
to the change in gene frequency. Then we use the same list to compute a few
other, slightly more complex quantities. The essence of the Price equation
is that these quantities also add up to the change in gene frequency. One
way of computing the change in frequency therefore can be rewritten as
the other and vice versa. What they are, therefore, is nothing but two
equivalent ways to compute the change in gene frequency, given a list of
numbers concerning genes in two subsequent generations . . . Whether this
particular second generation is likely to follow the first or not, the two ways
of computing the change in frequency return the same number.
To make a physics analogy, what we have done is like starting with Newton’s second
law, ~F = m~a, and writing it as
m~a = m~a. (9.18)
We could then rewrite the ~a vectors in some elaborate way. For example, we could
write one side of the equation in Cartesian coordinates and the other in spherical
coordinates, giving some complicated formulas involving trigonometric functions all
over the place. These formulas would be true, in the sense that Euclidean geometry is
true, but they would contain no physics. In some circumstances, they might be useful,
but we could not wring value out of them without some extra assumptions about the
dynamics at work.
We now make a series of assumptions geared towards turning the Price equation
(9.17) into something more like an update rule for a dynamical system.
First, we specialize our considerations to a scenario in which individuals interact by
donating effort or assistance to one another. Donors of effort increase the number of
successful gametes produced by the recipient, at the expense of their own. We param-
eterize this in the following way: denote by c a donor’s decrease in successful gametes
of its own, and denote by b the increase in successful gametes of the recipient. We
idealize interactions as pairwise events, and so we keep track of them using matrices.
The first index, i, denotes an individual in population S1. The second index, α, ranges
over the occasions on which interactions can take place.
∆Q =
N∑
i zi
 1
N
∑
i
ziqi −
(
1
N
∑
i
qi
) 1
N
∑
j
zj
+ ∑i zi(q′i − qi)∑
i zi
. (9.19)
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We can be slightly more general and allow each individual to have their own ploidy,
li. So, instead of using the population size N , we use
∑
i li. Following the literature,
we calculate the number of successful gametes per haploid set, wi = zi/li.
∆Q =
∑
i li∑
i liwi
[∑
i liwiqi∑
i li
−
(∑
i liwi∑
i li
)(∑
i liqi∑
li
)]
+
∑
i liwi(q
′
i − qi)∑
i liwi
. (9.20)
We now make two additional assumptions:
1. The second term in this form of the Price identity is negligible.
2. The fitnesses zi can be written
zi = liwi = fi + b
∑
α
Siα − c
∑
α
Qiα. (9.21)
Here,
∑
α Siα is the total number of times individual i received a benefit, and∑
αQiα is the number of times individual i incurred a cost.
We introduce the abbreviation
q =
∑
i liqi∑
i li
. (9.22)
Dropping the last term of ∆Q and substituting in our chosen form for liwi, we arrive
after some algebra at the following:
∆Q =
(∑
i,αQiα(qi − q)∑
i liwi
)[(∑
i,α Siα(qi − q)∑
i,αQiα(qi − q)
)
b− c
]
. (9.23)
The quantity in square brackets has the form of Hamilton’s condition, if we identify
the quotient multiplying b as a measure of assortment:
r =
∑
i,α Siα(qi − q)∑
i,αQiα(qi − q)
. (9.24)
9.4 Interconverting MLS-A and Inclusive Fitness
Hamilton [297] defines inclusive fitness in the following manner.
Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an indi-
vidual actually expresses in its production of adult offspring as it becomes
after it has been first stripped and then augmented in a certain way. It is
stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the individ-
ual’s social environment, leaving the fitness which he would express if not
exposed to any of the harms or benefits of that environment. This quantity
is then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm and benefit
which the individual himself causes to the fitnesses of his neighbours. The
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fractions in question are simply the coefficients of relationship appropriate
to the neighbours whom he affects: unity for clonal individuals, one-half for
sibs, one-quarter for half-sibs, one-eighth for cousins, [. . .] and finally zero
for all neighbours whose relationship can be considered negligibly small.
Allen [151] comments,
At this point you may be asking, “Wait, does it really make sense to
divide offspring into those produced on one’s own versus those produced
by help from others?” This is exactly the problem! Aside from the obvious
point that no one reproduces without help in sexual species, nature is full
of synergistic and nonlinear interactions, so that making clean divisions
like this is impossible in most situations. Thus the idea of inclusive fitness
theory only works in simplified toy models of reality.
Inclusive fitness has variously been claimed to supersede multilevel selection, to be
mathematically equivalent to MLS or to be a subset of it. In order to clarify the
relationship between MLS and inclusive fitness (IF) models, it helps to have a specific
example in hand. Fortunately, Bijma and Wade [46] have provided an explication
which, made slightly more general, is quite helpful.
The remainder of this section will be specific to MLS-A. That is, while we will some-
times speak of “groups” within the population, these groups will be formed at random
from the pool of available individuals, rather than being entities which have their own
explicit dynamics included in the update rules. Furthermore, we will consider only
short-term changes, comparing one generation to the next, instead of entire evolution-
ary trajectories. This is just the kind of comparison where we can apply the Price
equation which we derived in the previous section.
We shall consider a quantitative genetic model in which the trait value of an indi-
vidual organism affects its fitness as well as the fitness of those with which it interacts.
The trait value of individual i, which we denote Pi, depends on a genetic component
and a nonheritable, environmental component:
Pi = Gi + Ei. (9.25)
The personal fitness of individual i depends on that individual’s trait value, Pi, as
well as the trait values of those in its social group. For simplicity, we imagine that all
groups have size 2; that is, each individual i interacts with a partner j. In addition,
we assume that the effect of trait value on fitness is linear, and that the combination
of the self-value and partner-value effects is also linearly additive. Including residual
effects (due, say, to exogenous environmental variation), we can write
Wi = const. + βi,iPi + βi,jPj + ei. (9.26)
It could be that, for the evolutionary ecosystem one is trying to model, the relationship
between trait value and fitness is not linear. One could still run a linear regression
on experimental data obtained from that system, but the output from the statistical
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software package would not be meaningful [47]. We shall neglect this complication for
the moment and return to it in a later section.
The next step in model-building would be to define a rule which gives the following
generation in terms of the current one and the set of fitness values {Wi}. Typically, one
uses the Price equation to do so, saying that “the change in gene frequency is given
by the covariance of genes and fitness.” This amounts to pretending that a purely
descriptive equation has predictive value. In other words, taking this step requires
importing additional assumptions. (The language of the invocation, with its talk of
“covariance,” also propagates the confusion about the Price equation and its status,
which we touched upon in the previous section.)
Furthermore, the update rule one invents by this scheme does not even really define
a dynamical system: it requires more information about the current generation than
it can yield about the next generation, so it cannot be iterated. We can say that this
update rule is not “dynamically sufficient.”
This “inclusive” or “neighbor-modulated” fitness calculation, Eq. (9.26), represents
the state of the population by the trait values {Pi}. We can equally well use a group
selection calculation—that is, an MLS-A model—wherein we say that the personal
fitness of individual i depends on the mean trait value of its social circle,
P g =
1
2
(Pi + Pj), (9.27)
and on how far Pi deviates from that average,
∆Pi = Pi − P g = 1
2
(Pi − Pj). (9.28)
If we once again assume linear relationships, we can write the personal fitness Wi in
terms of a between-group component and a within-group component:
Wi = const. + ei + β
′
i,gP g + β
′
i,∆∆Pi. (9.29)
If we substitute our definitions of P g and ∆Pi into this equation, we find
Wi = const. + ei + β
′
i,g
Pi + Pj
2
+ β′i,∆
Pi − Pj
2
= const. + ei +
1
2
(β′i,g + β
′
i,∆)Pi +
1
2
(β′i,g − β′i,∆)Pj . (9.30)
Comparing this expression with the “inclusive” or “neighbor-modulated” fitness ex-
pression in Eq. (9.26), we see that
βi,i =
1
2
(β′i,g + β
′
i,∆), (9.31)
and
βi,j =
1
2
(β′i,g − β′i,∆). (9.32)
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On the one hand, we have the formula based on inclusive fitness, Eq. (9.26), and
on the other, we have the levels-of-selection formula, Eq. (9.29). The relation between
the two is a linear transformation of coordinates: we change from one way of tallying
trait values to another. When we transform our coordinate system, the parameters of
our model get mixed up with one another, as seen in Eqs. (9.31) and (9.32).
A mechanical analogy is illustrative: if we wish to study the collision of two billiard
balls on a table, we can look at the collision in countless different ways. We could
describe what happens from the perspective of an observer standing at rest with respect
to the pool table. Or, alternatively, we could view the situation from the perspective
of an observer who is at rest with respect to the center of mass of the two billiard
balls. We can even switch perspectives in the middle of a calculation: starting with
information given in terms of the table rest frame, we transform into the center-of-
mass rest frame to see what Newton’s laws imply, and then we transform back into
the table rest frame to predict what the observer standing beside the table will see.
The biological situation is analogous: we have transformed the trait values from a
laboratory reference frame into a “center of group” frame.
We can express this transformation more generally using matrix notation. If we
write the trait values as a vector, then the group-based trait values are given by the
vector of individual trait values multiplied by a matrix:(
P g
∆Pi
)
=
1
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)(
Pi
Pj
)
. (9.33)
Writing Λ for the transformation matrix,
Λ =
1
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (9.34)
we are saying that the MLS-A model’s trait values, P′, are related to the inclusive-
fitness trait values, P, by the equation
P′ = ΛP. (9.35)
We know that the results of the two calculations must agree. In matrix form, this
requirement means
β′P′ = βP, (9.36)
where the matrix β is
β =
(
βi,i βi,j
βj,i βj,j
)
. (9.37)
By substituting in the transformation rule for P, we see that
β′(ΛP) = βP, (9.38)
which in turn means that
β = β′Λ. (9.39)
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This is the matrix version of Eqs. (9.31) and (9.32).
The matrix-algebra statement of the relationship between IF and MLS-A, although
somewhat more abstract than the original equations, brings forth the essential point:
when we change the way we describe trait values, we must make a corresponding
change in the parameters which control the evolutionary dynamics. If we go from P
to P′ by the transformation Λ, then we change our coefficients β by the inverse of Λ:
β′ = βΛ−1. (9.40)
Because our IF model and our MLS-A model are different perspectives on the same
mathematics, problems with one will be problems with the other, only seen from a
different angle. For example, to predict what strategy will be evolutionarily favored,
the IF model relies on Hamilton’s concept of “relatedness,” and in practical scenarios,
“relatedness” is problematic. But if “relatedness” is ill-defined or inapplicable, mixing
it with another parameter by means of a coordinate transformation will do no good,
either.
9.5 An Example of MLS-B
In order to understand how MLS-B goes beyond MLS-A, we now turn to an example of
an MLS-B dynamical system, constructed by van Veelen et al. [290]. Per the definition
of MLS-B, the population is organized into groups, and the dynamical update rules
make explicit reference to the group level of structure. In this particular model, all
groups are taken to have the same size, and this size is constant over time. This is
accomplished by balancing reproduction events with death events. If an individual
within a group reproduces, an organism is picked at random from that group and
killed. Organisms come in two types, which we designate cooperators and defectors.
The difference between the types manifests in a difference in reproductive fecundities.
For simplicity, we say that cooperators reproduce at rate 1, while defectors reproduce
at an augmented rate, 1 + s.
In order to make this an MLS-B model, we need an explicit group-level dynamic.
So, we say that in addition to the within-group reproduction of individuals, entire
groups also reproduce. The offspring group has the same proportion of cooperators
and defectors as its parent group. The rate of group reproduction depends on that
proportion: if the size of the group is k and it contains nc cooperators, then that group
reproduces at a rate 1 + u
(
nc
k
)α
. The parameter α controls the degree of nonlinearity
in the dynamics.
As van Veelen et al. observe,
Being a cooperator therefore comes at a cost—it reduces the reproduction
rate of the individual by s—but it has a benefit for all group members,
including itself, through an increase in the rate at which the group as a
whole reproduces.
Taking the limit of large population size and large k, the dynamics of this system
can be cast into a deterministic partial differential equation. Let x be the fraction of
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cooperators in a group, and denote by µ(x; t) the relative frequency of groups having
cooperator fraction x at time t. Then,
dµ(x; t)
dt
= s
d
dx
[x(1− x)µ(x; t)] + uµ(x; t)
[
xα −
∫ 1
0
dy yαµ(y; t)
]
. (9.41)
The right-hand side of this PDE has two terms, reflecting two effects at work. The
first term, with its logistic form, describes the decrease of x within a group, due to
the defectors’ local advantage. The second term, proportional to the parameter u,
indicates how groups with low x decrease in frequency, and those with high x increase
in frequency, due to natural selection. The two contributions of opposite sign within
the brackets ensure that the overall population size remains constant.
Treating µ(x; t) as a time-dependent probability density function, we can summarize
the population by the moments of x:
〈xn(t)〉 =
∫ 1
0
dxxnµ(x; t). (9.42)
The overall frequency of cooperators changes at a rate that can be computed, after
some algebra:
d 〈x〉
dt
= s(
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉) + u(〈xα+1〉− 〈x〉 〈xα〉). (9.43)
The simplest case is where α = 1, and the cooperators’ effect on group reproduction
rate is linear. Then,
d 〈x〉
dt
= s(
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉) + u(〈x2〉− 〈x〉2). (9.44)
The s term, which reflects within-group selection, will be negative or zero. The u term
is zero or positive, and it indicates the effect of between-group selection. Whether
the frequency of cooperation increases or decreases depends on which of these two
countervailing influences wins out.
Rewriting the previous equation, we find that
d 〈x〉
dt
= u(
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2) + s(〈x2〉− 〈x〉) (9.45)
= (
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2)(s+ u)− (〈x〉 − 〈x〉2)s (9.46)
= 〈x〉 (1− 〈x〉)
[(〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2
〈x〉 − 〈x〉2
)
(s+ u)− s
]
. (9.47)
This is reminiscent of when we turned the Price equation into a condition resembling
Hamilton’s rule, in Eqs. (9.23) and (9.24).
Note that the parameter s is the “cost of cooperation,” in that it indicates the
demotion of the reproductive rate due to being a cooperator rather than a defector.
Likewise, the aggregate benefits that other group members accrue thanks to the pres-
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ence of a cooperator are b = s+u. The s is from the reduction in the death rate, due to
the balancing of birth and death events in each group. So, if we write the assortment
coefficient r as
r =
〈
x2
〉− 〈x〉2
〈x〉 − 〈x〉2 , (9.48)
then we can write the rate of change of 〈x〉 as
d 〈x〉
dt
= 〈x〉 (1− 〈x〉)(rb− c). (9.49)
The sign of d 〈x〉 /dt depends on a factor that has the form of Hamilton’s rule. Re-
member, though, that in order to achieve this form, we had to define r in terms of
the current population demographics, by way of the moments 〈x〉 and 〈x2〉. This
means that, as the population composition changes, r will vary. We could try to apply
Hamilton’s rule to solve the problem, but in order to apply Hamilton’s rule, we have
to solve the problem anyway!
When α = 1, we see that we can express the change in cooperator frequency by
an equation with a natural MLS interpretation, or by a formula with an IF flavor.
The two are freely interconvertible. However, if we introduce nonlinearity by choosing
α > 1, we still have the basic MLS expression (9.43), but we can no longer reshape it
into an IF condition. Should we try to define an assortment coefficient r as we did for
the α = 1 case, we would find that it necessarily depends on all the parameters of the
dynamics. That is, our r would include s, u and α, in addition to the moments of x.
There’s no reason why MLS-B should be the end of the story. Earlier, we noted
that MLS-B is conceptually analogous to a pair approximation. We have already seen
multiple reasons why pair approximations, and similar but more elaborate extensions
beyond mean-field theory, fail to capture important effects. This was a recurring
motif in Chapter 3, where competition was defined in terms of predation on a limited
resource. We also saw it in Chapter 4, when the effects of network topology manifested
themselves.
9.6 A Literature of Confusion
In §8.4, we quoted Damore and Gore’s point that errors propagate through the works
in this area, thanks to assumptions going unspoken and definitions being swept into
the Supplemental Information. The evolutionary theory of social behaviors is a field
where there is no substitute for reading the primary sources.
For example, Dawkins recently claimed that Ho¨lldobler has “no truck with group
selection” [298]. A 2005 piece by Wilson and Ho¨lldobler proposes, in the first sen-
tence of its abstract, that “group selection is the strong binding force in eusocial
evolution” [299]. Later, Ho¨lldobler (with Reeve) voiced support for the “trait-group
selection and individual selection/inclusive fitness models are interconvertible” atti-
tude [149]. Ho¨lldobler’s book with Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance,
and Strangeness of Insect Societies [300], maintains this tone. Quoting from page 35:
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It is important to keep in mind that mathematical gene-selectionist (in-
clusive fitness) models can be translated into multilevel selection mod-
els and vice versa. As Lee Dugatkin, Kern Reeve, and several others
have demonstrated, the underlying mathematics is exactly the same; it
merely takes the same cake and cuts it at different angles. Personal and
kin components are distinguished in inclusive fitness theory; within-group
and between-group components are distinguished in group selection the-
ory. One can travel back and forth between these theories with the point
of entry chosen according to the problem being addressed.
This is itself a curtailed perspective, whose validity is restricted to a narrow class
of implementations of the “multilevel selection” idea. Regardless, this is not at all
equivalent with having “no truck with group selection”. The statement “method A is
no better or worse than method B” is a far cry from “method A is worthless and only
method B is genuinely scientific”.
We have also a 2010 solo-author piece by Ho¨lldobler, in a perspective printed in
Social Behaviour: Genes, Ecology and Evolution [301]. Quoting from page 127:
I was, and continue to be, intrigued by the universal observation that
wherever social life in groups evolved on this planet, we encounter (with
only a few exceptions) a striking correlation: the more tightly organized
within-group cooperation and cohesion, the stronger the between-group
discrimination and hostility. Ants, again, are excellent model systems
for studying the transition from primitive eusocial systems, characterized
by considerable within-group reproductive competition and conflict, and
poorly developed reciprocal communication and cooperation, and little or
no between-group competition, one one side, to the ultimate superorgan-
isms (such as the gigantic colonies of the Atta leafcutter ants) with little
or no within-group conflict, pronounced caste systems, elaborate division
of labour, complex reciprocal communication, and intense between-group
competition, on the other side (Ho¨lldobler & Wilson 2008 [the book quoted
above]).
And, a little while later, on p. 130:
In such advanced eusocial organisations the colony effectively becomes a
main target of selection [. . .] Selection therefore optimises caste demog-
raphy, patterns of division of labour and communication systems at the
colony level. For example, colonies that employ the most effective recruit-
ment system to retrieve food, or that exhibit the most powerful colony
defence against enemies and predators, will be able to raise the largest
number of reproductive females and males each year and thus will have the
greatest fitness within the population of colonies.
Ho¨lldobler also says that these phenomena can be thought of as “extended pheno-
types,” which is a Dawkinsian turn of phrase; this is consistent with the “MLS and IF
are interchangeable” theme.
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One author who has been less often read and more often misread third-hand is
the zoologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards [302, 303]. In the early 1960s, Wynne-Edwards
compiled a thick volume documenting how different species use signaling mechanisms
to determine their population density and, effectively, figure out how crowded the living
situation is. Introducing the compendium, he said that group selection would have
to be the explanation for these observations, since, in essence, that’s how cooperative
behaviors are explained. To quote an essay [304] that he wrote shortly after,
In a recent book [302] I advanced a general proposition which may be
summarized in the following way. (1) Animals, especially in the higher
phyla, are variously adapted to control their own population densities. (2)
The mechanisms involved work homeostatically, adjusting the population
density in relation to fluctuating levels of resources; where the limiting re-
source is food, as it most frequently is, the homeostatic system prevents the
population from increasing to densities that would cause over-exploitation
and the depletion of future yields. (3) The mechanisms depend in part on
the substitution of conventional prizes, namely, the possession of territo-
ries, homes, living space and similar real property, or of social status as the
proximate objects of competition among the members of the group con-
cerned, in place of the actual food itself. (4) Any group of individuals en-
gaged together in such conventional competition automatically constitutes
a society, all social behaviour having sprung originally from this source.
Wynne-Edwards’ point (2) is reminiscent of the descendant-shading effect we saw
in Chapter 3. Indeed, one can add social signalling among consumers to the host–
consumer model, and it turns out that curtailing consumption in overcrowded situa-
tions is a robustly evolvable trait [72]. However, in the spatial host–consumer model,
Wynne-Edwards’ point (3) is not necessary: the consumers do not substitute any “so-
cial status” or “conventional prize” in the place of the actual resource, but reproductive
restraint evolves anyway.
Wynne-Edwards continues,
In developing the theme it soon became apparent that the greatest ben-
efits of sociality arise from its capacity to override the advantage of the
individual members of in the interests of the survival fo the group as a
whole. The kind of adaptations which make this possible, as explained
more fully here, belong to and characterize social groups as entities, rather
than their members individually. This in turn seems to entail that natural
selection has occurred between social groups as evolutionary units in their
own right, favouring the more efficient variants among social systems wher-
ever they have appeared, and furthering their progressive development and
adaptation.
The general concept of intergroup selection is not new. It has been
widely accepted in the field of evolutionary genetics, largely as a result of
the classical analysis of Sewall Wright [43, 305, 306]. He has expressed the
view that “selection between the genetic systems of local populations of a
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species . . . has been perhaps the greatest creative factor of all in making
possible selection of genetic systems as wholes in place of mere selection
according to the net effect of alleles” [43]. Intergroup selection has been
invoked also to explain the special case of colonial evolution in the social
insects [307,308,309].
Others criticized Wynne-Edwards using “group selection” models which we can clas-
sify as MLS-A. These critiques, however, impose upon Wynne-Edwards a conception
of population structure that was not his own [303]. Indeed, the image of population
structure that Wynne-Edwards appears to have in mind is closer to that realized in
a cellular automaton lattice model, than to that seen in the critiques by Maynard
Smith [310,311] and others.
We conclude this section by revisiting Fisher’s fundamental theorem, which we de-
veloped as an arithmetic identity in §9.2. Fisher himself [176] stated what he called
“the fundamental theorem of Natural Selection” in the following way:
The rate of increase in fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its
genetic variance in fitness at that time.
Fisher arrives at this statement after a lengthy discussion which invokes many more
particular assumptions than we did in §9.2. Moreover, he takes his fundamental the-
orem to be an approximation:
Since the theorem is exact only for idealized populations, in which for-
tuitous fluctuations in genetic composition have been excluded, it is im-
portant to obtain an estimate of the magnitude of the effect of these fluc-
tuations, or in other words to obtain a standard error appropriate to the
calculated, or expected, rate of increase in fitness.
Fisher then considers a model of a panmictic population and argues using that model
that fluctuations should decrease with the square root of the population size.
In other words, although Fisher was quite favorably impressed with the importance
of his result, he himself did not take it as universally true. This is in sharp contrast to
more recent authors who take the Price equation as the way to think about evolutionary
change, thereby imparting a glow of perceived universality to Fisher’s theorem.
9.7 Discussion
Consider the following statement from a recent popular-science summary of the peren-
nial MLS/IF dispute [312]:
In the final analysis, multilevel selection is little more than a rebranding of
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness (albeit the “enhanced” 1975 version).
That such a claim can be the punchline of a popularization is definitely an advance
from the curmudgeonly attitude that only IF is viable and anything which sounds like
MLS is old-fashioned at best or antiscientific at worst. However, it is only the first step
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in a rhetorical journey. We have seen that this interchangeability is straightforwardly
true in mean-field theory, the domain of MLS-A. Nevertheless, there are more things
in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that approximation, and it is well past time
to move on to new adventures.
If one defines MLS so narrowly that it is indeed just IF in a new coordinate system,
than MLS will inherit all the problems which limit IF’s usefulness in modern biology.
On the other hand, if one defines MLS broadly, then one invites misunderstanding
from those who, knowingly or not, define it narrowly. Likewise, if we try to reserve
the term “group selection” for those cases which include explicit group-level processes
(MLS-B but not MLS-A), then we engender the same confusion.
The esteemed science communicator Larry Gonick [313] identified the key problem:
We always overestimate the degree to which we are understood! That is,
when I talk, I assume you understand me—unless you tell me otherwise!
And there are a lot of reasons you may not give me this essential feedback:
you’re too polite; you thought you got it, even though you didn’t; you’re
afraid of looking stupid. The result is a worldwide overvaluation of the
level of understanding!
In this chapter, we have used the designations MLS-A and MLS-B. A future devel-
opment might conceivably push the terminology into the alphanumeric, perhaps in-
troducing “MLS-114” and the like. Jargon of this kind is intimidating and appears
quite nontransparent. It is the sort of insider-speak which fills a room with fog. But
this fog comes with a silver lining: we may not know what “MLS-B” means when we
hear it, but we know that we do not know. This is unlike what happens when we hear
a nontechnical-sounding term like “group selection”—the language may seem more
friendly, but that sense of welcome is dangerous. Its seeming hospitality leads to mis-
communication and ceaseless confusion. Technical argot befuddles the outsider and,
all too often, the student, but thoughtfully chosen terminology can do wonders to make
one’s meaning clear, at least to fellow professionals. (The words which doctors throw
around are intimidating, particularly when we are patients ourselves, but they do have
good reasons to use the language they learned in med school: drawing careful distinc-
tions which everyday speech cannot saves lives.) Perhaps we must accept the cost of
jargon and mathematics, until such time as we have cleared enough of that confusion
that we can make the essential points in plainer speech without error. If our choice
is between an algebra prerequisite and another generation wasted on Team Inclusive
Fitness versus Team Multilevel Selection, we unhesitatingly affirm our preference for
the former.
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According to John Baez [314],
The raw beginner in mathematics wants to see the solutions of an equation.
The more advanced student is content to prove that the solution exists. But
the master is content to prove that the equation exists.
This chapter is devoted to demonstrating that equations could, potentially, be written.
10.1 More on Multiscale Information
Our first major topic, the information-theoretic formalism for multiscale structure,
presents us with several possibilities for future extensions. We saw that the complexity
profile C(k) depends on the amounts of information associated with all the possible
subsets of a system. If Q(j) denotes the sum of the joint information of all collections
having size j,
Q(j) =
∑
i1,...,ij
H(ai1 , . . . , aij ), (10.1)
then the complexity at scale k is
C(k) =
N−1∑
j=N−k
(−1)j+k−N
(
j
j + k −N
)
Q(j + 1). (10.2)
We saw that we can simplify this expression in the special case where all sets of the same
size carry the same amount of information. This is a strong symmetry requirement,
and one naturally wonders whether other, less stringent symmetries can also lead to
useful and mathematically interesting expressions for C(k).
Moreover, the Marginal Utility of Information has a conceptual connection with a
method for detecting community structure within networks [315], and this relationship
could potentially be developed further. An intuitive definition of a module within a
network could be phrased in the following way: a set of nodes more strongly connected
among themselves than they are to anything else [316]. The extent to which a network
is “modular” would be, then, the extent to which it consists of multiple more-or-
less independent pieces. We could try to formalize this intuition with some quality
index for a division of a network into putative modules. If a partition of the vertices
breaks only a few edges, then the quality of that partition is high. We could become
more sophisticated and compare the number of severed connections with some null
hypothesis, and then accord higher quality rankings to those partitions which cut
225
10 Speculations for New Mathematics
fewer edges than we’d expect by random chance. For example, if we have an undirected
graph with E edges and we know the degrees ki and kj of two nodes, then our best
guess for the number of edges linking the vertices i and j is
kikj
2E . The quality index
Q would then be a comparison of this quantity to Aij , the actual number of edges;
we could then embark on a scheme to optimize Q. Such optimization problems turn
out to be NP-hard [316], and while various heuristics appear to work well enough
in networks one sees in practice, we should take care before calling their results the
“best” partition, as they may be only first among equals in partition space [317].
An alternative, complementary perspective on modularity takes a more dynamical
view. Suppose that each vertex in a graph comes with an oscillator attached (perhaps
a pendulum or a firefly), and that oscillators for linked vertices are coupled. If the
dynamics tend to synchrony, we’d expect that oscillators within a module would syn-
chronize with each other first; the timescale for different modules to begin oscillating
in phase would be longer. Or, we could unleash drunkards upon the network: a ran-
dom walk starting within a module would be more likely to stay within that module
than to escape and begin perambulating elsewhere. Turning this intuition around, we
could define a module as a subset of nodes which a random walker is more apt to stay
within than to leave. We could then take this approach and devise a procedure for
partitioning a graph based on the conditional probability distribution
Gtij ≡ p(j|i, t), (10.3)
denoting the probability that a random walker starting at i will be standing at j after
a time period t. (The time period is typically taken to be the inverse of the smallest
non-zero Laplacian eigenvalue, but there are other ways to find a good timescale that
might be more computationally efficient.)
Because of the NP-hardness issue mentioned earlier, we should not expect to be able
to write down a dynamical rule which, when implemented on an arbitrary graph, will
yield a steady-state configuration revealing the optimal partition. Instead, we ought
to expect metastable configurations, long decay timescales and fuzzy assignments of
nodes to clusters.
Ziv, Middendorf and Wiggins (ZMW) use the diffusion of random walkers to cal-
culate a conditional probability distribution p(y|x). Both Y and X range over the
vertices of the network we’re studying; y gives the position which a random walk
started at x reaches after a specified time. The description variable Z is an index over
modules. The cardinality |Z| indicates the number of modules we are considering in
our network partitioning, and p(z|x) is the probability that vertex x is mapped into
module z. With these definitions, ZMW use the information bottleneck procedure
to find optimal network partitions, i.e., divisions into modules which best preserve
p(x, y).
One result of the ZMW procedure is a curve of information gained versus informa-
tion provided, that is, of how well a description with a certain information content
reproduces the random-walk probability distribution of the network. This curve is,
essentially, the utility of a description as a function of description size. Each partition
solution p(z|x) has a Shannon information content I(Z;X), which for comparison pur-
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Figure 10.1: Fidelity curves for networks built by preferential attachment. The deriva-
tives of these curves are analogous to the MUI.
poses we can normalize by H(X). The fidelity of this module assignment scheme is
the ratio of how well it predicts diffusion, I(Z;Y ), to how the original network did so,
I(X;Y ). The information curve is a plot of I(Z;Y )/I(X;Y ) against I(Z;X)/H(X).
The ZMW paper presents such curves for some synthetic and empirical graphs, but
knowing how the fidelity curves behave for typical classes of synthetic networks would
provide much helpful context.
The first unexpected thing happened when I looked at networks built by the fash-
ionable method of preferential attachment [318, 319, 320, 321]. The parameters of this
process are N , the total number of nodes in the network, and m, the number of edges
brought by each node as it is added to the network.
In ZMW, it is claimed that the fidelity curves are always concave; however, as we
can see in Fig. 10.1, this is not so. Slonim and Tishby [322] state that for agglom-
erative information bottleneck (the algorithm employed by ZMW), concavity is an
empirical result. (In a different, though closely related implementation of the infor-
mation bottleneck concept, the fidelity curve is concave by construction.) From the
numerical indications I’ve had so far, I think this is what’s happening: the marginal
fidelity curve is nicely monotonic if you plot it as a function of the number of modules
in the description. If you change the horizontal axis to the Shannon entropy of the
description variable, the marginal fidelity curve gets a bump.
All the stochastic processes we’ve considered in this thesis have been classical :
nowhere have we incorporated quantum effects. Still, it is worth asking whether our
multiscale structure formalism can be applied in quantum theory. How should one
go about constructing a quantum analogue for our classical calculations? The first
instinct might be to replace the Shannon index with the von Neumann entropy, the
standard information measure of quantum physics. This choice is problematic, because
while the von Neumann entropy is strongly subadditive, it is not monotonic [323], and
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so it does not satisfy our basic axioms. Before we consider modifying those axioms,
however, there is another possibility, one which might yield some conceptual insight.
In quantum mechanics, we are always calculating probabilities. We get results like,
“There is a 50% chance this radioactive nucleus will decay in the next hour.” Or, “We
can be 30% confident that the detector at position X will register a photon.” But the
nature and origin of quantum probabilities remains obscure. Could it be that there are
some kind of “gears in the nucleus,” and if we knew their alignment, we could predict
what would happen with certainty? Fifty years of theorem-proving [324] have made
this a hard position to maintain: quantum probabilities are more exotic than that.
But what we can do is reconstruct a part of quantum theory in terms of “internal
gears” [325, 326, 327, 328]. We start with a mundane theory of particles in motion or
switches having different positions, and we impose a restriction on what we can know
about the mundane goings-on. The theory which results, the theory of the knowledge
we can have about the thing we’re studying, exhibits many of the same phenomena
as quantum physics. It is clearly not the whole deal: For example, quantum physics
offers the hope of making faster and more powerful computers, and the “toy theory”
we’ve cooked up does not. But the toy theory can include many of those features
of quantum mechanics that are commonly deemed “mysterious.” In this way, we
can draw a line between “surprising” and “truly enigmatic,” or to say it in a more
dignified manner, between weakly nonclassical and strongly nonclassical. Results which
are weakly nonclassical by this standard include quantum teleportation, quantum key
distribution, the no-cloning theorem, coherent superpositions turning to incoherent
mixtures by becoming entangled with the environment, quantum discord and many
more.
The ancient Greek for “knowledge” is episte¯me¯ (piιστηµη) and so a restriction
on our knowledge is an epistemic restriction, or epistriction for short [328]. Finding
epistricted models for subtheories of quantum mechanics illuminates the question of
what resources are required for quantum computation [329]. In addition, it suggests
a way to apply our multiscale structure formalism directly, if not to the full variety
of quantum phenomena, at least to an interesting and important subset. We can
simply treat the states of the epistricted theory as probability distributions and use
the Shannon index.
10.2 Category Theory for Moment Closures
A Petri net specifies a symmetric monoidal category [330]. Each truncation of the
moment-dynamics hierarchy for a system yields a Petri net, and so successive trun-
cations of the moment-dynamics hierarchy yield mappings between categories. Going
from a pair approximation to a mean-field approximation, for example, transforms
a Petri net whose circles are labelled with pair states to one labelled by site states.
Category theory might be able to say something interesting here. Anything which
can tame the horrible spew of equations which arises in these problems would be
great to have. Ought we be considering, say, the strict 2-category whose objects are
moment-closure approximations to an ecosystem, and whose morphisms are symmetric
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monoidal functors between them?
10.3 Games with Variable Numbers of Players
When we discussed evolutionary game theory, we treated the size of social groups as
constant. For example, in the Volunteer’s Dilemma of §4.1, groups of k ≥ 2 individuals
coalesced out of the population, played the game, gathered their payoffs and fell back
into the mix. In the network-structured version of the Volunteer’s Dilemma, the size
of each group of interacting players was fixed by the graph degree. But what if the
number of players in a group changes from one interaction to the next? What if some
contributions to an individual’s fitness come from playing with one partner, some from
playing with two and so on?
We can begin to answer this by importing technology from statistical physics. In
chapter 5, we deduced the linked-cluster theorem, which states that for a certain way
of assigning numerical values to graphs, the generating function over all graphs is the
exponential of the generating function for connected graphs. We developed this in the
context of probability distributions for random variables, where connected diagrams
stand for cumulants, and the generating function over all moments is the exponential
of that over cumulants:
Q(z) =
∞∑
n=0
zn
n!
〈xn〉 = exp
( ∞∑
l=1
〈
xl
〉
c
l!
zl
)
. (10.4)
Now, it is time to deploy this machinery in evolutionary game theory. Let the
weight of a k-vertex connected graph be the effect upon an individual’s fitness due to
interacting with k other agents at once. That is, the weight of a k-vertex connected
graph is determined by the payoff of a (k + 1)-player game. If a focal agent plays a
game with k1 partners, then a game with k2 partners and so on, we represent this by
a graph comprising a k1-cluster, a k2-cluster and so on. If game payoffs are mapped
exponentially to fitnesses, then the total fitness effect due to a sequence of accumulated
payoffs is the product of the fitness effects due to each payoff in the sequence. That
is, the weight which we should assign to a graph comprising multiple disjoint clusters
is the product of the weights of those clusters.
What is the meaning of a sum over graphs in this context? One reason to add up
a set of fitnesses is to find their average. If each possible sequence of cluster sizes
satisfying k1 +k2 + · · ·+kn = m is given equal weight, then the expected fitness effect
due to a life history involving a total of m other organisms is proportional to the sum
over all the appropriate graphs.
We have graph weights which compose in the proper manner. Therefore, we can use
the linked-cluster theorem, Eq. (5.138), to deduce that the generating function over
expected fitnesses for complicated life histories is the exponential of the generating
function for the fitness effects of individual games.
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10.4 Composition and a Multiscale Doi Formalism
In Chapter 7, we saw that classical stochastic dynamics can be treated with notations
and tools adapted from quantum theory, specifically, raising and lowering operators
(and associated entities like coherent states). The essential point was that these oper-
ators satisfied the commutator relation[
a, a†
]
= 1, (10.5)
and, we noted, one implementation of this abstract algebra is differentiation and mul-
tiplication by a formal variable. This provides an instance of an unusual turnabout:
mathematicians solve probability problems using generating functions, the specific rep-
resentation, while the physicist approach uses the abstract algebra!
One thing which the specific representation suggests that the abstract algebra does
not is the composition of functions: with two functions f(z) and g(z), it is easy to
imagine evaluating g at a particular value and then plugging the result into f . We
studied this construction in §5.6, where we saw that the linked-cluster theorem is
a specific example of the iterated chain rule for differentiation. The composition of
generating functions is used to great effect in combinatorics, as we shall now illustrate.
Let’s say we have a set with k elements, and we wish to make some arrangement
of those pieces. Perhaps we want to impose a linear order on the elements, or fashion
them into a rooted tree, or make of them a point-set topology. In very general terms,
we’d like to know how many ways we can do this: given some type of mathematical
pattern F , how many ways can we implement F on a k-element set? Denote the set of
all F -type arrangements on k elements by Fk; then the number of ways to implement
F on that many elements is the cardinality |Fk|. We can often deduce much about F
from the generating function
|F |(z) =
∞∑
n=0
|Fn|
n!
zn. (10.6)
For example, the vacuous structure is just the arrangement of “being a finite set”;
its generating function is ez. Closely related is the uniform structure, which is like
the vacuous structure except that it cannot be put on the empty set. Its generating
function is therefore ez − 1.
Consider the set Fk of F -type structures built out of a k-element set. If each such
possible structure is weighted equally, then the “information content” in the statement
“there’s a structure of type F on this set of k elements” is the logarithm of |Fk|.
This ties the combinatorial notion of “structure” to the informational one we used in
Chapter 2.
The bars on |F |(z) in Eq. (10.6) suggest that we will regard the whole generating
function as the cardinality of some object. What kind of entity is the combinato-
rial species F? For each k-element set, we have floating nearby the set Fk of F -type
combinatorial arrangements we can perform on it; note that we care only about the
cardinality of the set we are arranging, not about the character of its entries. Any two
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sets of the same size—that is, any two finite sets between which exists a bijection—
are equivalent for these purposes. We thus find ourselves manipulating FinSet0, the
category whose elements are finite sets and whose morphisms are bijections. The com-
binatorial species F involves relating elements of FinSet0 with finite sets of possible
arrangements, i.e., with objects in the category FinSet. Therefore, we understand F
as a functor between these categories. Specifically, F send sets of structures to their
substrate sets, being a “forgetful functor” which forgets the arrangement made out of
the set’s elements. That is, a combinatorial species F can be represented
F : FinSet→ FinSet0. (10.7)
Investing in category theory pays off when we seek relationships among combinatorial
species. Most importantly for our current purposes, we can compose two functors F
and G to make a new species which encodes the “superstructure” of making an F -type
arrangement from G-type structures. For example, we could construct a linear order
out of trees. (Or we could bake a chocolate-chip cookie in which the chips are pieces of
Oreo—or of Hydrox, which is equivalent up to isomorphism.) The generating function
for the functorial composition of two species is the composition of the original species’
generating functions.
The Bell numbers {Bn} are the number of ways to partition a set of n elements into
nonempty subsets [228]. That is, Bn counts the number of ways to make a finite set
out of nonempty finite sets, such that the total number of elements in the component
sets adds up to n. We recognize this as making a uniform structure out of uniform
structures, so we can say immediately that the exponential generating function for the
Bell numbers is
B(z) =
∞∑
n=0
Bn
n!
zn = ee
z−1 − 1. (10.8)
Note that in Eq. (10.8), we have a generating function which is (almost) equal to the
exponential of a quantity which is itself (almost) an exponential of the formal variable
z. This is more than slightly reminiscent of the linked-cluster theorem, Eq. (5.138).
If bl were to equal 1 for all l, the resemblance would be even stronger, which suggests
we ought to look into possible generalizations of the composition which gave us the
Bell numbers. We also have those −1 terms in Eq. (10.8), which came from choosing
the uniform combinatorial species instead of the vacuous. The difference between the
uniform and the vacuous species is in this case more than an off-by-one error: if we
had tried to use the vacuous species instead, the number of possibilities would have
blown up, as we could have interleaved an arbitrary number of empty sets into our
arrangement. Composing with the vacuous species requires something more general
and robust than ordinary combinatorial species [259,331] which we shall explore below.
One problem with bringing partition functions like Eq. (5.138) into combinatorics
and category theory is that we will sooner or later want graph weights which are not
integers. Our graphs could be weighted by amounts of information content, interaction
energies, probabilities or even probability amplitudes; even setting aside the quantum
mechanics, we will have to weight graphs with real or at the very least rational numbers.
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We require, then, a mathematical object whose cardinality is nonintegral.
One candidate solution is provided by the surreal numbers [213, 332, 333]. Joyal
observed that the surreals, defined by Conway in terms of combinatorial games, can
be formed into a category we could call Game, whose objects are game positions
and whose morphisms are strategies [334]. By imposing a few extra conditions on the
allowed game positions to eliminate infinite, infinitesimal and “pseudo-number” quan-
tities, we can construct a category RealGame whose decategorification is precisely
the real numbers R.
Another approach, whose basic ingredients have been more fully developed in the
literature, is to replace finite sets with groupoids, categories in which all morphisms
are invertible. (In a groupoid with one object, the morphisms form a group.) Baez
and Dolan [259] give the following formula for the cardinality of a groupoid: for each
isomorphism class of objects within the groupoid, we pick a representative item and
take the reciprocal of its number of automorphisms. The cardinality is then the sum
over isomorphism classes.
|G| =
∑
[x]
1
aut(x)
. (10.9)
When all the morphisms in the groupoid are identity morphisms, groupoid cardinality
reduces to set cardinality.
When we wrote the generating function for a combinatorial species, Eq. (10.6) we
considered the preimage Fn of an n-element object in FinSet0, which was a set of
F -type structures living in FinSet. If the preimage of an object in FinSet0 lived
instead within a groupoid G, its cardinality would not be constrained to the natural
numbers, and could be a nonnegative rational quantity.
Take a groupoid G and make the groupoid X of G-colored finite sets. Then the
functor
Φ : X→ FinSet0 (10.10)
is a generalized species known as a stuff type. Morton [331] shows that the cardinality
of |Φ| is
|Φ| =
∑
n∈N
|Xn|zn
=
∑
n∈N
|G//Sn|zn
=
∑
n∈N
|G|n
n!
zn
= exp (|G|z) . (10.11)
Here, Sn is the permutation group on n elements, and // denotes the “weak quotient”
defined as follows:
Take a category C and a group G. The strict action of G on C is a map from group
elements to functors. For every g ∈ G, the action A gives a functor A(g) : C → C
232
10.4 Composition and a Multiscale Doi Formalism
satisfying A(1) = IdC and A(gh) = A(g)A(h). The weak quotient of C by G is a
groupoid, denoted C//G, whose objects are objects of the category C and whose
morphisms are defined using the action A.
The categorical interpretation of Eq. (5.138) is that we are taking the cardinality of
the functorial composition of two stuff types, one for “being a finite set” and the other
encoding the graph-weighting procedure.
What does all this have to do with the Doi technology for stochastic processes?
To make the connection, we recall that the Doi formalism is an abstract approach to
probability generating functions. So, the question becomes, what is the meaning of the
composition of two generating functions whose coefficients are probabilities instead of
set cardinalities?
One application of generating functions in probability theory is to problems in-
volving randomly-sized sets of random variables. Let N be a random variable taking
nonnegative integer values, and define
Y =
N∑
i=1
Xi, (10.12)
where each Xi is a random variable defined by a probability distribution pX . That is,
we pick some number n in accord with the distribution pN , and then we draw n times
from pX and add the results up. For example, we could roll a 20-sided die, obtain the
result 14, and then roll a 6-sided die 14 times. What is the probability distribution
for the total?
The generating function for the random variable Y is the composition of those for N
and for X. Specifically,
GY (z) = GN (GX(z)). (10.13)
Suppose that, instead of being the outcome of a die roll, X is the number of objects
present in a box. Then, naturally, N is the number of boxes, and Y is the total number
of objects in all the boxes. Using the Doi method, we could write two vectors
|φX〉 =
∞∑
i=0
pX(i) |i〉 , (10.14)
|φN 〉 =
∞∑
i=0
pN (i) |i〉 . (10.15)
Their composition is a third vector
|φY 〉 =
∞∑
i=0
pY (i) |i〉 (10.16)
=
∞∑
i=0
1
i!
(
d
dz
)i
GN (GX(z))
∣∣∣∣∣
z=0
|i〉 . (10.17)
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If either pN or pX changes over time, then |φY 〉 will change as well. This is a way of
defining a two-level stochastic process. It is not, in its current form, the most useful
approach, because the way we have set things up means that the dynamics of the two
levels happen independently. But perhaps there is a way to make the levels interact:
for example, for a box containing a large number of objects to split into a pair of boxes.
Composing a probability generating function with itself is useful in the study of
iterated processes. If each of the objects inside a box is itself a smaller box, then Y
is the total number of small boxes. Or, if the random variable X is the number of
children produced by one individual, then Y is the number of grandchildren born to
the N siblings. Setting pN = pX amounts to declaring that the reproductive outcomes
of one generation are the same, statistically, as those of the next.
This is a very different way of thinking about reproduction probabilities than we
used in Chapter 7. Perhaps the intersection of the two can yield something interesting.
10.5 Multiplayer Games and Biodiversity Indices
In Chapter 5, we developed the Shannon index as a measure of information for a
probability distribution. We started with the idea that, if pi is our probability for
seeing the ith possible outcome of an experiment, then if we repeat the experiment
N times, the least surprising number of times that outcome can occur is Ni = Npi.
A typical illustration of this is the experiment of plucking a letter at random from
English-language text. Finding the letter E would be a less surprising event than
coming up with a Q.
This is fine as far as it goes, but it does leave something out. The letters E and
Q are, for many purposes, more dissimilar than, for example, S and Z, or F and V.
In the first case, we have a consonant and a vowel, while the latter two pairs are all
consonants. Furthermore, the latter two pairs are analogous: S and Z both stand
for sibilants, one of which is voiced (that is, the vocal cords vibrate when the sound
is articulated). Likewise, F stands for a voiceless consonant, and V for its voiced
counterpart. From a phonetic standpoint, the event of encountering an F is more like
the event of encountering a V than the event of finding an E is like that of meeting
a Q. A quantitative measure of similarity would, justifiably, assign comparable values
to the F–V and S–Z pairs, and a lower number to E–Q. Moreover, this is a separate
question from how common or how typical the individual letters are.
For some purposes, the similarity between characters, and thus between the events
of observing those characters, is a result of their evolutionary history. Our letters T
and N have been distinct for as long as they have existed, and in a sense, longer than
that: their ancestors in the Proto-Canaanite alphabet were distinct as well [335]. In
contrast, the letter I did not diverge from J, or V from U, until after the Renaissance;
and indeed dictionaries listed words beginning with U and with V together as recently
as 1837 [336].
As with linguistic evolution, so with biological.1There is a meaningful sense in which
1The analogy between these two processes was already clear to Darwin, who addressed it in Chap-
ter 13 of the Origin. Later, he commented, “The formation of different languages and of distinct
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the events of encountering two species from the same genus are more similar events
than those of finding specimens from separate genera.
So, it is useful to consider information functions for cases in which we have not only
a probability distribution over events, but a notion of similarity or contrast between
those events as well [338].
Even if we do not have a full evolutionary history behind each type of entity we
may encounter, we can still tabulate the characteristics of those entities. Suppose, for
concreteness, that there exists a pool of n possible attributes, and an entity is defined
by choosing exactly k of them. The attribute sets of any two entities may be disjoint,
or they may have elements in common. If the attribute sets of two entities share
common elements, then the events of encountering those entities are similar. But note
that if we say “point” and “line” instead of “attribute” and “entity,” we have again
the type of finite geometries we studied in Chapter 2. This suggests a new wrinkle:
there are, very naturally, higher-order kinds of similarity, which cannot be deduced
from lower-order relationships. Even if any two lines meet in a common point, a set
of three lines might converge at a single intersection, or they might not.
Back in Chapter 5, we derived the Shannon index, which, we saw, reflects the extent
to which a probability distribution is “spread out”: the Shannon index is maximized for
a uniform distribution, and it attains its minimum value of zero when the distribution
is a delta function. Another way to quantify the spread of a probability distribution is
an effective number. This is a type of quantity, useful in mathematical ecology, which
we can motivate with the following scenario.
Imagine that we have an urn full of marbles, and we presume that when we draw
a marble from the urn, no choice is preferred over any other. If the urn contains N
marbles, our probability of obtaining any individual one of them is 1/N . But what if
our probability distribution is not uniform, as it would be if we thought the drawing
was rigged in some way? In that case, we can label the marbles with the integers
from 1 to N , and we say that our probability for obtaining the one labeled i is p(i).
We draw one marble, replace it and repeat the drawing. What is the probability
that we will draw the same marble both times? Let the result of the first drawing be
j. Then our probability for obtaining that marble again is p(j), and to find the overall
probability for drawing doubles, we average over all the choices of j:
p(doubles) =
∑
j
p2(j). (10.18)
For a uniform distribution, this is
∑
j
p2(j) =
∑
j
(
1
N
)2
= N
(
1
N
)2
=
1
N
. (10.19)
That is, if all draws are equally probable, then the probability of a coincidence is the
reciprocal of the population size. Turning this around, we can say that whatever our
species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously
the same” [286]. It is an area of ongoing conceptual exchange [337].
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probabilities for the different draws, the effective size of the population is
Neff =
∑
j
p2(j)
−1 . (10.20)
So far, we have presumed that any pair of outcomes is as good as any other. For
some problems, this can be good enough. However, if we are trying to find the effective
number of organisms present in an ecosystem, we must face the fact that some pairs
of species are more closely related than others.
Leinster and Cobbold have proposed a framework for biodiversity indices which
systematizes and extends many prior developments in that field [339]. The basic
input data they consider is a set of probabilities p(i), which characterize the relative
preponderances of species in an ecosystem, and a similarity metric which indicates how
closely species i resembles species j. Their diversity indices depend on a sensitivity
parameter, call it q, which indicates the relative emphasis placed on rare species versus
common ones. The larger one makes q, the less sensitive the diversity index is to
improbable species.
The Leinster–Cobbold diversity index is
qDZ[p] =
∑
i
p(i)
∑
j
Zij p(j)
q−1

1
1−q
. (10.21)
Here, we follow Leinster and Cobbold in writing Z for the matrix of similarity values
Zij . If Zij = δij , we recover the case in which distinct species are considered wholly
unrelated to one another, which is often (and unrealistically [338, 340]) assumed in
much of the older work on biodiversity. We can motivate Eq. (10.21) in the following
way: if Zij is the similarity between species i and species j, then summing Zij p(j)
over all possible values of j will give the “ordinariness” of species i. The “average
ordinariness” of the whole ecosystem is then just the mean of this taken over the
probability distribution p(i). Because “diversity” ought to be inversely related to
average ordinariness, we take the reciprocal. Eq. (10.21) generalizes this to power
means of order q − 1. Most of our attention will be focused on the special case q = 2;
that is, we will mostly consider the index defined with the ordinary arithmetic average.
Biodiversity indices allow us to compare ecosystems. For example, given two test
tubes full of microorganisms, one which we characterize by a probability distribution
p and the other which we characterize by r, we can compare the “diversity profiles”
of the two microbial ecosystems by computing qD[p] and qD[r] as functions of q [339].
We can delve more deeply if the two ecosystems are composed of the same species, that
is, if p and r are not just of the same length, but defined over the same events. Suppose
that we pipette a microbe at random from the first test tube, and that we identify
this microbe as being of type i on our list of all possible microbe varieties. What is
the probability that the act of pipetting out a random microbe from the second test
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tube will yield an organism of the same type? By definition, it is r(i). What, then, is
the average probability over all possible microbe varieties that the results of the two
experiments will “collide” in this way? The answer is the expectation value of r(i)
with respect to the probability distribution p, or in other words, the dot product of
the two probability vectors p and r. As before, we would like a measure of diversity
to be inversely related to a tendency toward coincidence. We can therefore define a
cross diversity as
2D[p; r] =
1∑
i p(i)r(i)
. (10.22)
We can also include a distance metric Z in the cross diversity, as we had with the
Leinster–Cobbold index:
2DZ[p; r] =
1∑
ij Zijp(i)r(j)
. (10.23)
As before, this reduces to the ordinary cross diversity of Eq. (10.22) in the limiting
case that Zij is a Kronecker delta, that is, when a species resembles only itself and is
distinct from all others.
For reasons stemming from biology, Leinster and Cobbold prefer to set up their
indices as “effective numbers” of species present, rather than as entropies. This has
become a standard practice in mathematical ecology. In just about any circumstance,
it’s reasonable to say that an island with four equally abundant, unrelated species is
only half as biodiverse as an island with eight equally abundant, unrelated species.
Effective numbers preserve this desirable scaling property, while entropies of the forms
familiar from information theory do not [341]. Relating these effective numbers to
various entropies people have defined is not conceptually difficult. Generally, we expect
an entropy to be logarithmically related to an effective-number diversity measure,
because an entropy should count the number of questions needed to specify an item in
a set. (For example, in the study of complex networks or graphs, the “effective degree”
of a vertex is the exponential of the entropy of its edge-weight distribution [342].)
We can think of these diversity indices in another way, which suggests a natural
generalization. The key comes from game theory. Imagine a game in which each
player’s goal is to match the move made by the other. The score earned by a player
who makes move i is 1 if the other player also makes the move i, and 0 otherwise. If
the players make their moves randomly, in a way characterized by the probabilities
p(i), then the expected payoff obtained by either player is just p · p. Now, suppose
the matching is not such an all-or-nothing affair: perhaps there are wild cards in the
deck, so that the ace (i = 1) can match any other. Or, perhaps matching one card
with another of the same suit is almost as good as matching it with a copy of the
same card. Then the expected payoff will include cross terms, since the score of an
i matched against a j is no longer just δij . Diversity indices, then, are measures of
expected welfare in games whose goal is agreement.
This new perspective hints at a generalization: what about games played by more
than two players?
Leinster and Cobbold think in terms of distance between species, and distance is
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naturally a pairwise thing. However, as they point out, some of the earlier work
in the area considered inter-species conflict instead [343]. Conflicts, or interactions
more generally, do not have to break down into pairwise relationships. In human
affairs, what Alice does in the company of Bob and Carol does not have to be a linear
combination of what she does when alone with Bob and when alone with Carol. In
game theory, the payoff in a multiplayer game is not restricted to being a linear sum
of pairwise games (recall Chapter 4). Or, consider a parasite species with multiple
hosts in its life cycle: the total effect on humanity due to Anopheles mosquitos and
Plasmodium microbes depends on both species taken together.
We imagine, therefore, an “interaction tensor” of the form Zijk, which tells us how
the presence of species i and j taken in combination affects a focal species, k. The
natural modification of Eq. (10.21) is
qDZ[p] =
∑
k
p(k)
∑
ij
Zijk p(i)p(j)
q−1

1
1−q
. (10.24)
Biodiversity measures, generalized to multiplayer games as we have done here, have
an application in quantum information theory, of all places. This is one of the oddest
bits of interdisciplinary boundary-jumping which I have seen, so I think it’s worth
talking about for a while.
In quantum physics, we take what we think we know about a system, roll it into
a density operator ρ, and use that density operator to make statistical predictions
about what the system might do in particular experiments. But presenting that in-
formation as a matrix operator is not always the most illuminating choice. We can
actually rewrite any finite-dimensional density matrix as a probability distribution,
using the idea of informationally complete measurements [344, 345]. These are gener-
alized measurement procedures (positive operator valued measures, or POVMs) which
have an appealing ability: given a probability distribution over the possible outcomes
of an informationally complete POVM, we can compute all the statistics which we
could have gotten using the density matrix. Such POVMs can be constructed in any
finite-dimensional Hilbert space [224, 346]. The nicest variety are the symmetric in-
formationally complete POVMs, known familiarly as SICs [347, 348]. A SIC for a
d-dimensional Hilbert space is a set of d2 operators {Ei = 1dΠi} where the rank-one
projection operators {Πi} satisfy
Tr(ΠkΠl) =
dδkl + 1
d+ 1
. (10.25)
An arbitrary density matrix ρ can be decomposed in terms of SICs. If p(i) is the
probability that performing a SIC measurement on the system yields the outcome
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labeled by i, then
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
)
Πi = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)Πi − I. (10.26)
Exact expressions for SICs have been found for dimensions 2–16, 19, 24, 28, 31, 35,
37, 43 and 48 [349]. High-precision numerical approximations have been discovered for
dimensions 2–67 [350], and more recently, E. Schnetter has claimed numerical solutions
for dimensions 68–76, 78–81, 83–85, 87, 89, 93 and 100 [349]. It is not known whether
SICs exist for all values of d, but it has become commonplace to assume that they do.2
The extremal states in the space of density matrices are the “pure” states, which
satisfy the condition ρ2 = ρ. Thanks to a theorem of Flammia, Jones and Linden [352,
353,354], we can also characterize pure states as those Hermitian matrices satisfying
Trρ2 = Trρ3 = 1. (10.27)
This result is well worth calling a remarkable theorem: it is simple, powerful and easy
to prove once asserted, but it was apparently missed completely until 2004 [211]. In
turn, this definition of purity yields the following two conditions on the probability
distribution p(i) [349,355,356]. First,
d2∑
i=1
p(i)2 =
2
d(d+ 1)
, (10.28)
and second, ∑
ijk
cijk p(i)p(j)p(k) =
d+ 7
(d+ 1)3
, (10.29)
where we have defined the real-valued, symmetric three-index tensor
cijk = Re Tr(ΠiΠjΠk). (10.30)
The second condition, Eq. (10.29), has been nicknamed the QBic equation [211]. The
full state space is the convex hull of probability distributions which meet Eqs. (10.28)
and (10.29). It would be interesting to be able to motivate these equations from some-
thing other than the pre-existing quantum formalism: is there a reason, independent
of quantum physics, to care about functionals of probability distributions like we see
on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (10.28) and (10.29)?
Formally, the conditions defining quantum-state purity, Eqs. (10.28) and (10.29),
become
2Dδ[p] =
d(d+ 1)
2
(10.31)
2Following a conjecture about a way to reduce the number of equations which must be solved to
obtain a SIC [211,351], I’ve found low-precision evidence that such a structure exists in d = 77 as
well.
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and
2Dc[p] =
(d+ 1)3
d+ 7
. (10.32)
This form of the QBic equation is, of course, still a cubic constraint, in that it employs
three instances of the probability vector p. However, as far as the sensitivity parameter
q is concerned, it is a “second order” equation, as we have kept to the special case
q = 2.
What can we learn from these restatements of the pure-state conditions? Amusingly,
assigning a pure state to a quantum system means that the effective number of possible
outcomes for a SIC experiment which one is willing to contemplate is just
(
d+1
2
)
. The
fact that an effective number works out to be a combinatorial quantity hints strongly,
at least to me, that this is a promising avenue to explore: combinatorics is, after all,
the art of counting cleverly. (Thinking in terms of effective numbers has at least a
few pence of “cash value” [211], in that it means I can remember what goes on the
right-hand side of the quadratic purity condition.) Another way to think of this is
that when all SIC outcomes are judged as equiprobable, that is to say p(i) = 1d2 , the
effective number of experimental outcomes is the total number which comprise the
SIC: 2Dδ = d2. So, if we focus on the quadratic constraint, ascribing a pure state
means neglecting
(
d
2
)
possible outcomes of a SIC experiment. Entertainingly, this is
also the best known upper bound on the number of entries which can be zero in a
quantum-state assignment p [356]. This is not a coincidence: we can deduce that
bound by starting with the normalization of p and squaring to find(∑
i
p(i)
)2
= 1. (10.33)
We then apply the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality to find, writing n0 for the number of
zero-valued entries in p,
(d2 − n0)
∑
nonzero
p(i)2 ≥
( ∑
nonzero
p(i)
)2
= 1. (10.34)
We see the inverse of the quadratic diversity appearing on the left-hand side. Conse-
quently,
n0 ≤ d2 − 2D[p], (10.35)
and from Eq. (10.28) we know the right-hand side equals d(d− 1)/2, as advertised.
This bound is perhaps not the tightest possible. In fact, it is suspected [349] that
the actual upper bound on the number of zeros permitted in a quantum state is just
the dimension, d.
In addition, quantum mechanics implies a constraint on pairs of probability vectors
[349, 356, 357]. If we begin with state assignments written as density matrices ρ and
σ, then using Eq. (10.26) we can deduce that the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product of
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those state assignments is
Tr ρσ = d(d+ 1)
∑
i
r(i)s(i)− 1. (10.36)
Because the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product is always nonnegative, two quantum state
assignments defined on Hilbert spaces of the same dimension d “can never be too
nonoverlapping” [349]: ∑
i
r(i)s(i) ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
. (10.37)
Comparing this to Eq. (10.22) above, we have a bound on the cross diversity of r and
s:
2D[r; s] ≤ 2
(
d+ 1
2
)
. (10.38)
From the first purity condition, Eq. (10.28), we know that all valid probability vectors
lie within a ball. The dot product of any two state assignments will therefore obey the
bound ∑
i
r(i)s(i) ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
, (10.39)
meaning that their cross diversity is also bounded from below:(
d+ 1
2
)
≤ 2D[r; s] ≤ 2
(
d+ 1
2
)
. (10.40)
The lower bound is saturated if r = s and r is a pure state.
Tabia [358, 359] has discovered a fascinating simplification of the QBic equation,
Eq. (10.29), in the case of a qutrit, a system whose Hilbert space has dimension d = 3.
In this special case, Eq. (10.29) can be reduced through a clever choice of SIC to∑
i
p(i)3 − 3
∑
(ijk)∈S(9)
p(i)p(j)p(k) = 0. (10.41)
Here, S(9) denotes the Steiner triple system of order 9, a set of 12 elements which
can be found by cyclically tracing all the horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines in the
array
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
; that is to say, S(9) =
(123) (456) (789)
(147) (258) (369)
(159) (267) (348)
(168) (249) (357)
. (10.42)
The order-9 Steiner triple system also rejoices in the name of the Hesse configuration
[358,359,360,361]. This construction is also an example of a dual affine plane, a type of
incidence geometry which is known to be relevant to SICs more generally [25,27,362],
and which we saw all the way back in Chapter 2.
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We consider “striations” of the 3×3 array: we can carve it up into horizontals, verti-
cals, left-leaning diagonals or right-leaning diagonals, and each of these four striations
divides the array into three parallel sets of numbers. That is, each striation produces
one row of the table in Eq. (10.42).
We can easily check the simplified QBic equation, Eq. (10.41), in one case where
we know it should hold true: for the SIC states themselves. In a SIC representation,
the kth vector making up the SIC has a 1/d in the kth slot and 1d(d+1) everywhere
else. Specializing to d = 3, any of the nine SIC states appears in exactly four of the
index triples listed in Eq. (10.42). This makes checking that all nine SIC states satisfy
Eq. (10.41) a straightforward arithmetic problem.
Note that we can recast the d = 3 QBic equation, Eq. (10.41), as
∑
i
p(i)3 + 3
∑
(ijk)∈S(9)
p(i)p(j)p(k) = 2
3 ∑
(ijk)∈S(9)
p(i)p(j)p(k)
 = 2(∑
i
p(i)3
)
.
(10.43)
On the right-hand side of Eq. (10.43), we have the inverse of the ternary diversity we
defined back in Eq. (10.24), with experimental outcomes treated as wholly dissimilar.
On the left-hand side, we have something which is starting to look like a ternary
diversity with some sets of outcomes distinguished as more similar than others.
Let Yijk be the completely symmetric tensor which is 1 if (ijk) ∈ S(9) and 0 if no
permutation of (ijk) is in S(9). Then∑
ijk
Yijk p(i)p(j)p(k) = 6
∑
(ijk)∈S(9)
p(i)p(j)p(k). (10.44)
Now, let Zijk be 1 if all subscripts are equal and
1
2Yijk otherwise. Then the d = 3
QBic equation reads
2DZ[p] =
∑
i
p(i)3 + 3
∑
(ijk)∈S(9)
p(i)p(j)p(k)
−1 = 1
2
2Dδ[p]. (10.45)
For qutrits, pure states are those for which treating as similar the proper sets of SIC
outcomes reduces the diversity of possible outcomes by 2.
The Hesse configuration has other interesting properties in relation to qutrit SICs,
including a result I found about “mutually unbiased bases” and compatibility criteria
for quantum-state ascriptions [363]. This is a result of quantum information theory—
actually, a correction to others’ earlier work in that field—which I proved thanks to
an interest in mathematical biology and complex systems. These calculations are, if
taken just as mathematics, neutral on philosophical questions about quantum physics.
From that perspective, they are matters of complex projective geometry. However,
the research tradition they derive from, and which they might feed back into, is a
philosophy which treats quantum physics itself in evolutionary terms, as a tool which
agents immersed in the creative profusion of the world can use to make the best of
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life’s Darwinian contest [211,349].
10.6 Gauge Theory and Evolution
The study of evolution has a certain conceptual intersection with the subject of eco-
nomics. Both are concerned with the effects of limited resources. And, both make
use of game theory. On the evolutionary side, however, we are not concerned with
whether agents are “rational”; nor do we start with an assumption that a system is
“efficient” or that the participants in it are by any standard well-informed. This is
a significant difference in outlook between evolutionary theory and economics, and
arguably, economics needs to catch up [31,364,365,366,367,368].
I can think of one idea, though, which is rather in the borderlands of economics,
which might fruitfully be transposed over into mathematical biology. That is the
application of gauge theory and differential geometry to economic indices. This subject
was inaugurated by Malaney [369], in collaboration with Weinstein. More recently, it
has been promoted by Smolin [370] and discussed by Baez [371].
A big concern in the Malaney thesis is how to define a cost-of-living index when the
goods which are relevant to daily life change over time. If Richard III regarded a horse
as a fair trade for his kingdom, how much of England should we be able to swap for a
Prius? We can answer this kind of question quantitatively, as long as old goods remain
in circulation at least temporarily as new ones are introduced. During the period of
overlap, we can evaluate the price at which agents participating in the economy will
trade an old good for a new one and vice versa. By chaining overlap intervals, we
can gradually eliminate all the goods in the initial “basket,” while maintaining an
unbroken sense of what counts as a decent standard of living.
An evolutionary analogue would be the origin of new traits. A common mechanism
for this is gene duplication: a whole stretch of DNA accidentally gets copied twice,
so the offspring carries two copies of the same gene. This doesn’t make much im-
mediate difference, but it does provide redundancy: over the generations, mutations
accumulate, and because mutations which knock out one gene leave the other intact,
the species is more resilient. Over time, one of the gene copies can gain a new function,
while the other keeps doing the old. This is studied in the context of gene interaction
networks, where it’s known as the “duplication-divergence model” [372].
Adapting the Malaney–Weinstein economics stuff might provide a way to talk about
what “fitness remaining constant” means in this context, and to write equations for
population dynamics.
To lay the groundwork for this project, we can establish a dictionary from economics
to evolution. Instead of goods and services, we can speak of traits. In economics, one
considers the amount of a good held by an agent; the counterpart in evolutionary
dynamics is the expression level or quantitative value of a trait. Rather than a pricing
system that assigns prices to baskets, we have fitness functions, given in the simplest
case as a linear combination of trait values with coefficients (e.g., the β values of
Chapter 9).
The Malaney thesis [369] defines a “barter” as a set of debts and possessions whose
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net monetary value is zero. For example, if six cupcakes are worth ten cookies, then
a debt of ten cookies can also be paid by six cupcakes. The evolutionary analogue is
a mutation which does not affect the reproductive fitness of the individual. On the
molecular level, this happens all the time: replication errors swap out nucleotides so
that the offspring end up carrying different DNA sequences, but those sequences still
code for the same protein. In the mathematical setup we discussed in the previous
chapter, a neutral mutation could be one trait diminishing in value while another one
increases, so the wi we get by taking the dot product doesn’t change.
On the economic side, we have phenomena like inflation, in which the function from
baskets to prices changes over time. This has a natural counterpart in evolution; for
example, shifts in external environmental conditions can be represented as variations
in the parameters of the fitness function.
By carrying over the basic notions of Malaney [369] to the new terminology, we have
our first result: If the covariant derivative of an evolutionary history vanishes, then
that history consists of neutral mutations.
So far, in fashioning this map from one jargon to another, we have neglected popu-
lation structure. It would be interesting to push further, into models where the fitness
function is not constant across the population. Moreover, the work on the economics
side presumes that price scales linearly with quantity, and we know that doing math-
ematical biology means facing up to nonlinearity sooner rather than later.
Gauge theory provides a platform for understanding the phenomenon of moving
through a circuit and not ending up exactly how you began. In Chapter 3, we saw an
evolutionary dynamic which is reminiscent of this: a consumer strain can go from rare
and successful to rare and dwindling, while local information indicates no difference
between the environmental conditions. Can we express this phenomenon in terms of
fiber bundles?
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11.1 Review
Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any rate be a universe
that lends itself to lengthy discourse.
—William James [2]
We began, many chapters ago, with the idea of a complex system being one which
exhibits organization at multiple scales. Formalizing this concept mathematically, we
saw that indices of multiscale structure can describe the patterns which result from
evolutionary processes. Then, we saw how the emergence of multiscale structure can
control the evolution of trait values in an ecosystem, and we explored how we can
expand game theory to multiplayer scenarios, providing another angle on the question
of scale. With tools from probability theory in hand, we brought adaptive dynamics
into the stochastic regime, and we found a way to quantify the interplay between
mutation and selection, revealing how the outcome depends upon population structure.
Academic writing traditionally patterns itself rather like the Twelve Labors of Hera-
kles [373]. First, there is the statement of the problem, and then, a litany of failed
attempts to solve it, which we call a “literature review.” Next, a new and better
solution is proposed, and its triumph is proclaimed. I elected to deviate from this
template, as far as the overall layout of this thesis is concerned. This choice hinged
upon a tradeoff that I think is important enough to warrant discussing explicitly. A
literature review is a specialized history in miniature, and so it is at this juncture
worth thinking about historical expositions of science more generally.
This thesis has addressed several variations on the theme of multiscale structure in
evolutionary dynamics. I have tried to make the material flow as smoothly as possible,
and to build up the ideas in a sequence which helps them come across transparently. It
may be, however, that in doing so, I have clouded the distinction between new research
and old. The first glimpse of a discovery is not always the most clear, after all, and
later treatments of a topic can have the advantage of experience over the early ones.
Initial reports are commonly soaked in the confusions of the time, which require hard
work (and, sometimes, as the proverb says, funerals) to overcome. Consequently, an
exposition which aims to express the current synthesis is apt to be ahistorical.
Any field of science which has reached a sophisticated level of development is sus-
ceptible to this problem. Suppose I want to teach a classful of college sophomores
the fundamentals of quantum mechanics. There is a standard “physicist’s history of
physics” [374] which goes along with this, one that progresses through a familiar litany
of famous names: Planck, Einstein, Bohr, de Broglie, Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger, Born.
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We like to go back to the early days and follow the development forward, because the
science was simpler in its initial stage—or so we tend to believe.
The problem is that all of these men were highly trained, professional physicists who
were thoroughly conversant with the knowledge of their time. But this means that
any one of them knew more classical physics than a modern college sophomore. They
would have known Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics, for example, in addition
to techniques of statistical physics. Unless you know what they knew, you can’t really
follow their thought processes, and we don’t teach big chunks of what they knew
until after we’ve tried to teach what they figured out! For example, if you aren’t fairly
conversant with thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, you won’t be able to follow
why Planck proposed the blackbody radiation law he did [375], and a crucial step of
the development will be lost, without your even knowing it.
Consequently, any “historical” treatment at the introductory level will probably end
up conventionalized. One has to step extremely carefully! Strip the history down to
the point that students just starting to learn the science can follow it, and you might
not be portraying the way the people actually did their work. That’s not so bad, as
far as learning the facts and formulæ is concerned, but you open yourself up to all
sorts of troubles when you get to talking about the process of science. Are we doing
physics differently than folks did N or 2N years ago? If we aren’t, is that a problem?
Well, we sure aren’t doing it like they did in the textbooks we learned out of.
Carelessly repeating a “scientist’s history” instead of teaching a history of science
leads to a kind of inadvertent myth-making that Stephen Jay Gould designated “text-
book cardboard” [376]. An example from biology would be the assertion that no one
put genetics and natural selection together until the 1930s [287]. In physics, to name
one of many possibilities, we have the canard that in the last years of the 19th cen-
tury, physicists thought that the only remaining task was to calculate answers to more
decimal places.1 The “physicist’s history” of twentieth-century physics is replete with
textbook cardboard [383,384,385,386], and no doubt we’ll keep this tradition going in
the twenty-first.
Having argued that there exists a cause for concern, I am now in the unheroic
position of admitting I have no way to solve it. The only way out seems to be flexibility,
sacrificing one objective for another as the circumstances permit.
The field of complex-systems research has an additional challenge. Many of the
models it employs are defined computationally: we begin with a specification of the
model, and then we implement it as a computer program. Not infrequently, that im-
plementation is within the range of a fairly novice programmer. The primary challenge
1This sentiment is often attributed to Kelvin, but never with an actual pointer to a primary source.
In a 1900 lecture, expanded the next year to an essay, Kelvin described two “clouds over the
dynamical theory of heat and light” [377]. Dispelling the first cloud turned out later to require
special relativity, and removing the second was a task for quantum mechanics. Kelvin concludes
his discussion of the first problem by the remark, “I am afraid we must still regard Cloud No. I. as
very dense.” Figures as prominent as Tait [378], Gibbs [379] and Maxwell himself [380] all pointed
out that classical physics fails to grasp the specific heats of gases. A text as widely admired and
merchandised as the Feynman Lectures laid out the historical situation [381, 382]. Even so, the
assertion of fin-de-sie`cle physicists’ na¨ıve folly lives on, helping thinkpieces to be glib and cocktail
talk to be smug.
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lies not in the coding, but in deciding which model would be interesting to explore, and
in knowing how to investigate it systematically. The mathematical prerequisites for
working with adaptive-network models, say, are less demanding than they are for many
topics at the modern physics frontier. Furthermore, when analytical treatments are
possible for complex-systems models, they often only apply to special cases. Nonequi-
librium phase transitions provide a good example: a basic implementation of directed
percolation is easy to code [74], but the statistical field theory which describes it is
difficult to obtain (Chapter 7), and the elaborate mathematics is most useful near the
critical point.
It may be that the special case of a problem, the case amenable to analytical work,
was historically discovered first, and computational methods which made the general
case accessible only came later. However, as we have discussed, computational methods
can admit easier expositions than densely mathematical ones. Thus, an explanation
which moves from the familiar to the esoteric would invert the historical order.
As a result, presenting all of the literature review first [387] would have been a
dissatisfying scheme for this thesis. Moreover, such a sequence would have required
muddling through the remarkably confused MLS/IF literature we surveyed in Chap-
ter 9, before seeing the simulation results in Chapters 3 and 4, which are significantly
easier to appreciate. Likewise, for a reader trained in physics, the Price equation we
met in Chapter 9 is likely to be unfamiliar and, indeed, to appear arcane and even
overwrought. In contrast, the dynamical stability analysis presented in Chapter 4 is a
technique more routine to a physics student, albeit applied to a less common-or-garden
problem. Again, choosing to begin with the approachable material means that we turn
history on its head.
That said, optimizing towards one goal can impede the achievement of another.
With this in mind, I will use this section to revisit the previous chapters and more
cleanly separate research from review.
Chapter 2 discussed a general formalism for multiscale structure, based on informa-
tion theory. We saw two indices of structure, the complexity profile and the Marginal
Utility of Information (MUI). The complexity profile was introduced some years ago
by Bar-Yam [4]. More recently, Allen developed an axiomatic foundation upon which
the complexity profile and related quantities could be constructed. The three of us
coauthored a paper on the subject [3]. During the course of that project, I derived the
binomial transform equation for computing the complexity profile in the special case
of exchange-symmetric systems, Eq. (2.37). I also worked out the illustrative examples
using combinatorial geometry, which our three-author paper was already long enough
without. The complexity profiles for the imitation dynamics (noisy voter model) and
the frequency-dependent Moran process are new calculations for this thesis.
Chapter 3 is based on a paper by Gros, Bar-Yam and myself, as I indicated in
its concluding note. The organism-swapping test and the use of survival-probability
curve intersections were new contributions of that paper. In addition, the use of
percolation arguments to find the critical thresholds in certain limits had not been
done for that model before, and the discrepancy between predator-prey and epidemic
dynamics (§3.3.6) had not been commented upon. Relating the correlation lengths
to the evolved transmissibilities is new, as are the crossover in the perimeter-area
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relationship and the 99th-percentile curves. The scaling argument which shows the
inability of pair approximation to handle the correlation length is a new application
of earlier semi-numerical work. So is the combination of the pair approximation with
the coagulation and fragmentation model to predict how τ will evolve.
The next chapter, on multiplayer games, contains several novelties. I encountered
the Volunteer’s Dilemma in papers which argued that it was an understudied type of
scenario [56, 201]. While writing Chapter 4, however, I found that I had to treat the
game in ways which I hadn’t read about. The continuous-time, well-mixed dynamical
systems, with their baseline growth and death rates, logistic forms, pessimistic view
of the cost of Volunteerism and unfixed total population size, are unusual. The lattice
models are, likewise, atypical with respect to the literature. The analytical computa-
tions which conclude the chapter are an extension to multiplayer games of ideas which
had only been applied to dyadic interactions.
Chapter 5 is largely a review of material which would have otherwise required refer-
ences to selected chapters in a scattering of textbooks. The part about an evolutionary
analogue of the Jeffrey rule is, to my knowledge, not covered elsewhere. (I’ve men-
tioned the possibility over the past few years to people better-read than I, and prior
art never came up.) Anomalous cross-diffusion terms, as seen in §5.8, are known in the
literature [132, 133], but that literature arrives at them in a much more complicated
way.
I learned at school the physicist’s justification of the Fokker–Planck equation [388]
which now appears in Chapter 6, and I read about the deterministic limit of adaptive
dynamics [230]. The applications to the continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift
games are new developments for this thesis, as is the connection to random matrix
theory.
Both Chapters 8 and 9 are pedagogical reviews, for the most part. The argument
that the “modified mean-field model” is insufficient for eco-evolutionary considerations
(§8.6) is my contribution. My approach to the interconversion between MLS-A and
neighbor-modulated fitness calculations (§9.4) is more abstracted and generalized than
Bijma and Wade’s [46], which is where I began.
The work on which this thesis builds is, in many places, fairly new itself. This adds
an extra layer to the challenge of exposition: the ideas are sometimes recent enough
that their significance has yet to be fully hashed out. I hope this thesis can be a part
of that process.
In 1996, John Horgan published a book titled The End of Science. This attracted
some serious criticism at the time [389], but the passing of years has brought an
even more strongly negative review. To wit: in 1997, the first E. coli genome was
published [390], and in 1998, the expansion of the Universe was found to be accelerat-
ing [391, 392]. Accomplishments like these are not the final fits of a dying enterprise;
nor are they the concluding, semi-senescent huzzahs before a quiet retirement. They
are new beginnings, which raise up new opportunities and which all the work that
comes after must acknowledge. These are the kind of discovery which go beyond pro-
viding answers: they change the questions which we are able to ask. And to these
examples we could add many more.
I mention this because the bulk of the references on which I leaned most directly
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date to the post-End-of-Science period. The complexity profile, for example, emerged
in 2004 [4], and the axiomatic formalism of multiscale structure only last year [3].
Chapter 4’s analytical calculations depend on a scheme which was likewise published
in 2014 [37], and the Fokker–Planck treatment of stochastic adaptive dynamics is an
extension of research reported the year before that [230]. The theory of the structure
coefficient σ, which provides a convenient way to discuss many mathematical models
of evolution in a unified fashion, was put forth in 2009 [231], and it is perhaps still not
as well known as it should be.
11.2 Just One More Thing
Another way in which my organizational scheme is a little heterodox is that I decided to
move the Acknowledgments to the end. Partly, this is to soothe my conscience: having
all those pages come before now makes me a little more inclined to feel that this work
is substantial, and thanking those who helped it along is not entirely damnation by
faint praise. And, partly, this arrangement is to benefit those who, like me, skip to
the end to see what the thing is about.
I am indebted to my collaborators, first of all to those with whom the relation is
made official by coauthorship: Marcus de Aguiar, Benjamin Allen, Yaneer Bar-Yam
and Andreas Gros. Many portions of this thesis are my attempts to build on something
Ben has done. It would be a much slimmer document without his achievements as
wellsprings. Without our conversations, it might not exist at all.
Special mention must also be given to my thesis committee: Yaneer Bar-Yam,
Aparna Baskaran and Albion Lawrence. Their input throughout the stages of this
project has been consistently helpful.
John Baez had very kind things to say about the work which became Chapter 3,
and also stimulated parts of Chapters 5 and 7. Karla Z. Bertrand read many iterations
of what is now Chapter 3, and in addition helped test my presentation in Chapter 2.
Chris Fuchs got me to thinking about some of the matters which inform Chapters 5
and 10.
Credit must go to my far-flung correspondents, who kept my curiosity active and
my sense of honesty engaged by reminding me of questions in varied fields of science.
A large fraction of our interactions these past few years have taken place through a
strange one-to-many telegraph.
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@arikia
@artologica
@arutherfordium
@AstroKatie
@bengoldacre
@biochembelle
@bug gwen
@carlzimmer
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@elakdawalla
@ErinPodolak
@evelynjlamb
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@HirokiSayama
@HowardBarnum
@Laelaps
@mandaYoho
@MarkCC
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@RaquelHRibeiro
@rebeccawatson
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Eric Downes was my gateway to the people and the puzzles with whom and which
this thesis began.
My housemates put up with me. I’m not entirely sure why I deserved it.
For my family, all my love.
Lieutenant Columbo, Avatar Korra and Daria Morgendorffer were always there for
me in the small hours of the morning.
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